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τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι

AMMON
BOOKS



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(Parmenides, Fr. B. 3 DK)

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
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Articles



"Mein Feld ist die Welt": On Magnus Hirschfeld's Conception of Exilic Nomadism and the Origins of Sexual Ethnology

J. Edgar Bauer, PhD

"[W]e are all androgynous, not only because we are all born of a woman impregnated by the seed of a man but because each of us, helplessly and forever, contains the other—male in female, female in male, white in black, black in white."

James Baldwin: "Freaks and the American Ideal of Manhood"¹

1. In 1933, the year of Hitler's *Machtergreifung*, German-Jewish sexologist and critical race theorist Magnus Hirschfeld (1868-1935) published in Switzerland *Die Weltreise eines Sexualforschers* [The world voyage of a sexual researcher], a report on the journey he had undertaken between November 1930 and April 1932. Initially, Hirschfeld had planned only a lecture tour to the United States, but once there, he decided to prolong his trip into a world voyage that effectively became the beginning of his years as an exile. Hirschfeld's scholarly travelogue is significant not only because it

¹ Baldwin, 1998, p. 828.

constitutes one of the foundational texts of sexual ethnology, but also because it comprises his most detailed reflections on how the Jewish people were formed by the memory of their nomadic past and the recurrent experience of displacement. Despite being neither systematic nor exhaustive, Hirschfeld's elaborations reflect a stance that is unmistakably at variance with the self-understanding of religious pre-Shoa Judaism, as well as with the then-consolidating *weltanschauung* of secular Zionism. As Hirschfeld admitted, his dissenting views stood under the sign of Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844-1900) thought. Accordingly, he set as motto of his posthumously issued book on *Racism* a dictum included in the philosopher's "Ten Commandments of the Freethinker"²: "To be able to tell the truth, you shall choose exile."³

2. In the first book-length biography of Hirschfeld, British-German psychotherapist and writer Charlotte Wolff (1897-1986) drew attention to the import of the sexologist's considerations on Jewish history. In his recent *Magnus Hirschfeld und seine Zeit* [Magnus Hirschfeld and His Time],⁴ historian Manfred Herzer expanded the views on the sexologist's approach of the Jewish past, which he had advanced decades earlier in the two editions of his initial Hirschfeld biography.⁵ Unlike these two publications, the 2017 volume does not discuss Jewish issues in a separate chapter, but it does reaffirm Herzer's earlier contention that Hirschfeld could not really identify himself with Judaism.⁶ For Herzer, the sexologist's self-understanding as a Jew was the result of the minority status imposed on him by anti-Semitic terror and fascist propaganda.⁷ Contrasting with Herzer's socio-etiological take on Hirschfeld's Jewishness, Wolff delves into the psychological and intellectual

² "Die 10 Gebote des Freigeistes."

³ "Du sollst, um die Wahrheit sagen zu können, das Exil vorziehen" (Nietzsche, 1980, p. 348; Hirschfeld, 1938, p. 5; see Hirschfeld, 1938, p. 7).

⁴ Herzer, 2017.

⁵ Herzer, 1992; Herzer, 2001.

⁶ See Herzer, 1992, p. 25.

⁷ See Herzer, 2017, p. 367.

complexities of Hirschfeld's Jewish life, taking into account the writings he penned in Southern France following the publication of *Weltreise*. As though echoing the Nietzschean motto of *Racism*, Wolff remarked toward the end of her volume: "Exile had profiled [Hirschfeld's] own Jewishness."⁸

3. Ignoring Wolff's elaborations on the sexologist's Jewish self-understanding, Herzer maintains that Hirschfeld considered his Jewish descent as "a taboo," and that his "experiences of rejection and outsidersness remained inaccessible to reflection and were almost denied, at least as far as the written word is concerned."⁹ Herzer's allegations concerning "Hirschfeld's consistent silence about his Jewish provenance"¹⁰ hinge on the premise that the sexologist "could not accept, as an atheist, the religion of the Jews, nor be enthusiastic about the ideas of political Zionism."¹¹ In general, Herzer assumes that, when it came to vindicating their Jewishness, twentieth century Jews had to recur either to a traditional religious rationale, or to the secular ideology of Zionism. Since Hirschfeld clearly dispensed with both, Herzer postulates a psychological suppression mechanism that was supposed to conceal the groundlessness of Hirschfeld's Jewishness from himself and from others. Herzer's somewhat contorted reasoning, however, hardly stands critical scrutiny, especially in view of Hirschfeld's often recourse to profoundly Jewish patterns of thought when elaborating on sexual emancipation, historicity and his own sense of tradition. That Hirschfeld owned the Jewish heritage becomes particularly apparent upon closer examination of the argumentative strategies he deployed not only in *Weltreise*,

⁸ Wolff, 1986, p. 402.

⁹ "ein Tabu, und die damit verbundenen Erfahrungen der Zurückweisung und des Außenseitertums sind der Reflexion, jedenfalls soweit es um das geschriebene Wort geht, nicht zugänglich und werden geradezu verleugnet" (Herzer, 1992, p. 16).

¹⁰ "Hirschfelds konsequentes Schweigen über seine jüdische Herkunft" (Herzer, 1992, p. 25).

¹¹ "weder konnte er als Atheist die Religion der Juden akzeptieren noch sich für die Ideen des politischen Zionismus begeistern" (Herzer, 1992, p. 25).

but also in the installments of *Phantom Rasse*, and in his posthumously published volume on *Racism*.¹²

4. Hirschfeld's oeuvre provides ample evidence about his espousal of the tensional relation between the minority status of the Jewish people and their world-historical mission. As a consequence, Hirschfeld rejected—unlike many Jewish intellectuals of his time—baptism as a "billet d'entrée"¹³ to the Christian-dominated world of science and culture. Consistent with his core epistemic convictions, however, Hirschfeld did join the *Deutscher Monistenbund* (German Monist Association), a group of free-thinkers founded by Darwinian theorist and zoologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) and devoted in the main to bridge the gap between the avant-garde science at the turn to the twentieth century and the pantheistic world sentiment that originated with the early modern philosophies of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) and Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677).¹⁴ Resonating with the overarching critical stance of the *Monistenbund*, Hirschfeld was acutely aware of the role historical Christianity played in

¹² As the brief editorial announcement at the beginning of the nineteenth installment of *Phantom Rasse* conveys, the publication of the series had to be prematurely terminated due to Hirschfeld's unexpected death (see Hirschfeld, 1935c, p. 7). In a uncaptioned, ten-line prefatory note, the editors of *Racism* state: "This posthumous work, of which the present is the first complete publication in any language, was planned by the author, in his native language, towards the end of 1933 and the beginning of 1934, as an exile from Nazi Germany" (Paul & Paul, 1938, p. 7). The differences between *Phantom Rasse* and *Racism* in their published form appear to undermine the assumption that the manuscript of the installments was the same, which Eden Paul and Cedar Paul edited and translated. Despite the commonalities that can be expected from two texts written more or less contemporaneously by the same author, even a cursory comparison shows that there are considerable divergences between the two publications as regards their argumentative progression, content distribution, thematic accentuation and paragraph headings. Regardless of whether these divergences remit to the existence of two separate manuscripts or to editorial interventions in a no more extant manuscript, *Racism* cannot be considered to be merely an English version of the text that was partially issued in the Prague installments.

¹³ "Entréebillett" (Heine, 1976, p. 622).

¹⁴ See Bauer, 1998, pp. 23-25, 41-43.

the repression and, at times, decimation of sexual dissenters. As regards his own time, he exposed the Christian churches' systemic incapacity to acknowledge and validate the complexity and diversity of human sexuality. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Hirschfeld depicted Jews and homosexuals as the "world's scape goats, which ever since the introduction of Christianity have routinely been made responsible for all suffering and calamity in this world."¹⁵

5. Contrasting with the secular ambitions Christianity evinced from early on, Hirschfeld characterized the history of the Jews as "the destiny of [a] 'restlessly and elusively' roaming people, which can nowhere find a true homestead, but nevertheless accomplishes everywhere a great human mission."¹⁶ Tellingly, Hirschfeld's considerations on the exilic plight and civilisatory achievements of Judaism are reflected in the basic pattern of his own life story, inasmuch as his increasing alienation from the country of his birth eventually led to the growing impact of his scientific and emancipatory pursuits throughout the world. As Charlotte Wolff pointed out in this connection, Hirschfeld was a man "convinced of his *mission in life*,"¹⁷ and who won acceptance as "the prophet of the scientific roots of love and sex."¹⁸ However, notwithstanding her praise, Wolff failed to acknowledge that Hirschfeld's *sexuelle Zwischenstufenlehre* (doctrine of sexual intermediary degrees) constitutes the epistemic kernel of his sexology and that it necessitated dismantling the traditional binary scheme of sexual difference as well as the resulting conception of homo- and heterosexual combinatories. Despite depicting *Sappho und Sokrates* [Sappho and Socrates] (1896)—Hirschfeld's initial sexological treatise—as

¹⁵ "Weltsündenböcken, die seit Einführung des Christentums für alles Leid und Unglück dieser Welt verantwortlich gemacht zu werden pflegen" (Hirschfeld, 1986, p. 126).

¹⁶ "das Schicksal dieses 'unstet und flüchtig' herumwandernden Volkes, das nirgends eine eigentliche Heimstätte finden kann und doch überall eine große menschliche Mission erfüllt" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 390).

¹⁷ Wolff, 1986, p. 253; emphasis added.

¹⁸ Wolff, 1986, p. 285.

"iconoclastic,"¹⁹ Wolff lastly overlooked the deconstructive thrust of Hirschfeld's intellectual project, thereby constricting the scope of his "mission," in the main, to the socio-political championing of sexual reform and emancipation.²⁰ Interestingly enough, Wolff welcomed Hirschfeld's "enthusiastic revival"²¹ in contemporary Germany, but opined that it was "bound to fade away sooner or later."²² Since Wolff dispensed altogether with assessing Hirschfeld's paradigm shift towards an unprecedented taxonomy of potentially infinite sexualities,²³ her gloomy prognosis proved to be, in the last resort, baseless.

¹⁹ Wolff, 1986, p. 33.

²⁰ Charlotte Wolff's disregard for Hirschfeld's epistemic achievements has remained the basic characteristic of the way mainstream scholarship has assessed his oeuvre (see Bauer, 2019; Bauer, December 2019).

²¹ Wolff, 1986, p. 444.

²² Wolff, 1986, p. 444.

²³ See Bauer, 1998; Bauer, December 2002. While Charlotte Wolff followed the lead of German sexologists by ignoring Hirschfeld's profound reconceptualization of sexual difference, French Fourierian-Marxist philosopher and writer Guy Hocquenghem (1946-1988) paid tribute to Hirschfeld's core epistemic achievements in his 1979 book titled *Race d'Ép*. Within the framework of a "translude," Hocquenghem presents an old lady named Héléne, who is depicted as Hirschfeld's former secretary, but who "n'existe bien sûr que dans l'imagination de l'auteur..." (obviously only exists in the imagination of the author) (Hocquenghem, 1979, p. 145). Besides recalling her experiences at Hirschfeld's Berlin *Institute for Sexual Science* that the Nazis destroyed in 1933, fictive Héléne recapitulates with brilliant acumen Hirschfeld's understanding of sexual difference (Hocquenghem, 1979, pp. 147-148) as being a matter not of two mutually exclusive sexes, but of gradual nuances configuring the specific sexual intermediariness of the individual. According to Hocquenghem's *alter ego*, the man who eventually became "une sorte d'Einstein du sexe" (a kind of Einstein of sex) (Hocquenghem, 1979, p. 148), had advanced the idea "que nous sommes tous, d'une manière ou d'une autre, des degrés intermédiaires entre l'homme et la femme, et il avait entrepris de le prouver" (that we all are, in one way or another, intermediary degrees between man and woman, and he embarked upon proving it) (Hocquenghem, 1979, pp. 147-148; emphasis added). Avoiding linguistic technicalities, Héléne's summary of Hirschfeld's *sexuelle Zwischenstufenlehre* points to the *in-betweenness* of humanity's sexual condition as the core premise of a new sexual-distributive scheme designed to supplant the male/female template.

6. Although the influence of Jewish culture and Darwinian-inflected monism on Hirschfeld's theoretical endeavors is apparent, the issue has hardly received any scholarly attention. By comparison, there is no lack of sophisticated research on the way Sigmund Freud's Jewishness and atheistic outlook permeated his work.²⁴ The prevalent reticence to discuss in depth Hirschfeld's life and writings goes back to the views expressed by German sexologists in the 1970s and 1980s to the effect that Hirschfeld was "ambitionless from the point of view of thought,"²⁵ that he "remained as theoretician superficial and incomplete,"²⁶ and that his work as a whole was characterized by "exiguity of knowledge."²⁷ Following the lead of this kind of contentions, Charlotte Wolff peremptorily declared that Hirschfeld's sexual *Lehre* "had feet of clay"²⁸ and "has not survived."²⁹ Against the backdrop of these assessments, it is not surprising that the 1996 "corrected edition" of the monumental *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (1971-1972) shied away from making any reference to the sexologist, while covering seven figures carrying the name *Hirschfeld*, including the *New York Times* caricaturist Al Hirschfeld and a past president of the *American Academy of Periodontology*.³⁰ Only the 2007 "second edition" of the *Encyclopaedia* contains a 60-line entry on Magnus

²⁴ See Klein, 1981; Meghnagi, 1993; Gay, 1987.

²⁵ "denkerisch anspruchslos" (Sigusch, 1985, p. 244).

²⁶ "als Theoretiker flach und unfertig blieb" (Haeberle, 1984, p. xx).

²⁷ "Erkenntnisarmut" (Dannecker, 1978, p. 47).

²⁸ Wolff, 1986, p. 129.

²⁹ Wolff, 1986, p. 154. In a similar vein, Herzer asserted in the 2001 edition of his biography that Hirschfeld's work can be considered "ein abgeschlossenes Kapitel aus der Geschichte der Sexualwissenschaft" (a closed chapter in the history of sexology) (Herzer, 2001, p. 28).

³⁰ See *Encyclopedia Judaica*, 1996, vol. 8, pp. 523-527. The complete disregard for Hirschfeld's life and work even in the 1996 edition of *Encyclopaedia Judaica* is all the more striking as some earlier Jewish encyclopedias included entries on the sexologist. See *Große Jüdische National-Biographie* (Cernăuți, 1925); *Jüdisches Lexikon* (Frankfurt am Main, 1986 [Berlin, 1927]); *Encyclopaedia Judaica. Das Judentum in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Berlin 1928-1934); *Enciclopedia Judaica Castellana* (México, D.F., 1949).

Hirschfeld,³¹ which outlines his life and work, but without even hinting at his principled dissolution of the culturally prevalent man/woman binary and its ad hoc finite supplementations through "third sex" alternatives.³² Astoundingly, the entry also leaves unmentioned that Hirschfeld, in his later work, had advanced a critique of finite race taxonomies, which relied on theoretical tools comparable to those he had brought to bear on the sexological domain.³³

³¹ *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2007, vol. 9, pp. 138-139.

³² On account of this consequential neglect, the 2007 edition of *Encyclopedia Judaica* contributed to the continued distorted reception of Hirschfeld's oeuvre. The omission is all the more regrettable, as Hirschfeld anticipated some of the critical contentions forwarded by post-1968 French intellectuals. Thus, Hirschfeld's calculation regarding the existence of 43,046,721 sexual types on the basis of a very conservative estimate of the sexual variables configuring the individual's unique sexuality (see Hirschfeld, 1926, pp. 594-599; Bauer, 2002b) resonates with the total amount of "perverts" foreseen in the title of a collective work edited by Félix Guattari (1930-1992) and published under the title *Trois Milliards de Pervers. Grande Encyclopédie des Homosexualités* (1973). Clearly, the programmatic title of the encyclopedic volume was meant to suggest that the whole world population at the time escaped the normativity generally assigned to the dichotomous scheme of sexual distribution. Among the contributors to the *Grande Encyclopédie* figured the already mentioned Guy Hocquenghem as well as Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), the author, along with Félix Guattari, of the modern philosophical classic *Capitalisme et Schizophrénie. L'Anti-Œdipe* (1972). Hirschfeld's key premise to the effect that "[d]ie Zahl der denkbaren und tatsächlichen Sexualtypen ist unendlich" (the number of imaginable and factual sexualtypes is infinite) (Hirschfeld, 1926, p. 599), foreshadows the potential in-finitization of sexualities suggested not only in the *Encyclopédie's* title, but also in a pregnant passage of *L'Anti-Œdipe*, which, after positing the existence of "n...sexes" inherent in every subjectivity, concludes: "à chacun ses sexes" (to everyone his sexes) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1999, p. 352). French theorist and writer Monique Wittig (1935-2003) remits to this passage in her philosophical essay "Paradigm," where she indicates as regards sexual subjectivities beyond alienation: "For us there are, it seems, not one or two sexes, but many (cf. Guattari/Deleuze), as many sexes as there are individuals" (Wittig, 1979, p. 119).

³³ Two encyclopedia articles have underscored Hirschfeld's deconstructive take on sexual and race taxonomies: Bauer, 2015; Bauer, 2017a. For more detailed elaborations on the issue, see Bauer, 2006.

7. The pervasive neglect of Hirschfeld's oeuvre is reflected in the invariably cursory treatment of his almost 400-page travel report with its detailed sexological descriptions and observations concerning Japan, China, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, Egypt, and Palestine. Not by chance, *Weltreise* represents a milestone in the development of sexual ethnology,³⁴ which, as Hirschfeld underscored, constitutes "in view of its content, the oldest, in view of its treatment, the newest" sexological discipline.³⁵ As regards the report's methodological assumptions, Hirschfeld pointed out that, while "the *biological* and *pathological* foundations in the domain of sexuality" are everywhere the same, "the *sociological* entailments, solutions and assessments of this natural instinct" are thoroughly diverse.³⁶ Furthermore, Hirschfeld specified in this connection that the sexual impulses and predispositions are, "on the whole,"³⁷ identical for all humanity. Obviously, this assertion was not meant in support of the immemorial dichotomous paradigm of sexual difference. Quite the contrary, Hirschfeld reckoned with an increasing and potentially unlimited diversification of sexualities, whose number is, at any given point in time, co-extensive with the number of existing sexed individuals. On these premises, the thorough variability of corporeal sexualities and their interactions enable the appearance of the plethora of sexual mores observable in cultural history. However, since such mores, more often than not, ignore the actual biological and historical processes that sustain their

³⁴ In *Weltreise*, Hirschfeld remits to three authors who had made significant contributions to sexual ethnology: Bronislaw Malinowski (Malinowski, 1929), Felix Bryk (Bryk, 1928) and J. Winthuis (Winthuis, 1928) (see Hirschfeld, 1933, pp. 3-4).

³⁵ "ihrem Inhalte nach die älteste, ihrer Behandlung nach die jüngste" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 3). Besides sexual ethnology, Hirschfeld mentions the following "Schwesterdisziplinen" (sister disciplines) of sexual research: sexual psychology, sexual physiology, sexual pathology und sexual sociology.

³⁶ "die *biologischen* und *pathologischen* Grundlagen auf dem Geschlechtsgebiet" / "die *soziologischen* Auswirkungen, Lösungen und Beurteilungen dieses Naturtriebes" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. vi; emphasis in original).

³⁷ "als Ganzes genommen" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 12).

emergence, they are prone to justify their validity claims by resorting to "symbolic and idealistic explanations," which are, as Hirschfeld underlines, merely "*subsequent* constructions."³⁸

8. In the course of his analysis and critique of these constructions, Hirschfeld underscored that "each nation (and each religion) is convinced that its mores are morality in an *objective* sense," and for this reason condemns "any other mores as being more or less immoral."³⁹ Since all cultural configurations of sexuality and their *a posteriori* legitimization strategies tend to misrepresent alien sexual mores, Hirschfeld posited that the ensuing misconceptions and discrepancies can only be overcome by recurring to the "results of sexual-biological and sexual-sociological research."⁴⁰ Consequently, Hirschfeld rejected on principle sexual constructions incapable of relativizing their claims to universal validity after considering the historical and anthropological evidence for the profusion of concurring sexual configurations. Since neither ethnic nor religious doxas reckon with nature's relentless drive toward diversification as the biological basis for sexuality's cultural variability, sexual science constitutes, in Hirschfeld's view, the sole reliable tool for coping with the "internationality of all sexual problems of humanity."⁴¹ Moreover, as Hirschfeld was careful to point out, "only the objective, scientific grasp of the human being and sexuality" can become the pathbreaker "for the complete realization of humanity's sexual rights."⁴² The attainment of this goal, however, presupposes a radical re-

³⁸ "symbolistischen und idealistischen Erklärungen" / "*nachträgliche* Konstruktionen" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 12; emphasis in original).

³⁹ "Jedes Volk (und jede Religion) hat die Überzeugung, daß seine Sitte Sittlichkeit im *objectiven* Sinne sei" / "jede andere Sitte als mehr oder weniger unsittlich" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 12; emphasis in original).

⁴⁰ "den Ergebnissen sexualbiologischer und sexualsoziologischer Forschung" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 12).

⁴¹ "Internationalität aller sexuellen Menschheitsprobleme" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 308).

⁴² "nur eine objektive wissenschaftliche Menschen- und Geschlechtskunde" / "für die volle Verwirklichung der sexuellen Menschenrechte" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 12).

conceptualization of sexual difference, which leaves behind all known or imaginable closed schemes of sexual distribution. Ultimately, the way towards achieving sexual justice for the whole of humanity begins by acknowledging the nature-given and empirically ascertainable sexual uniqueness of individuals.

9. Given the overall libertarian imprint of his sexology, Hirschfeld was particularly interested in considering the role played by the initial nomadism of humans in the historical emergence of their impetus towards freedom. Accordingly, Hirschfeld's references to the liberatory figure of Moses⁴³ are less significant than the remarks he made on the nomadic heritage of the Jewish people while visiting the Falasha region in Upper Egypt. In view of this imposing geographical and historical landscape, Hirschfeld began his reflections by indicating that "the now sedentary nations, before finding a homeland and shelter, roamed around completely free, without fixed abode."⁴⁴ Consecutively, Hirschfeld clarifies his stance on primal nomadism by asking the rhetorically formulated, but substantive question, as to "whether it was this atavistic origin—whose consequence is the drive toward freedom, united with a certain disquiet—, which even now is so deeply rooted in all human beings, [whether it was] this drive into the vastness, which is so difficult to curb in the long run."⁴⁵ Against the backdrop of these quasi-speculative clues, Hirschfeld returns to the specific case of the Jewish people, underscoring that they are the historical descendants from the "nomadic tribes," which roamed "thousands of years ago between the basins of the

⁴³ Although Hirschfeld seldom cites the Hebrew Bible directly, in *Weltreise* he mentions Moses in three passages related to the biblical Exodus: Hirschfeld, 1933, pp. 286; 322; 351.

⁴⁴ "die jetzt sesshaften Völker [...], bevor sie Heimat und Stall fanden, ausnahmslos freizügig, ohne festen Wohnsitz herumschweiften" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 329).

⁴⁵ "ob es nicht doch dieser atavistische Urgrund ist, als dessen Folge der Drang nach Freiheit, verbunden mit einer gewissen Unruhe, noch jetzt so tief in allen Menschen wurzelt, dieser Zug ins Weite, der sich so schwer auf die Dauer eindämmen läßt" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 329).

Nile, Euphrates and Jordan River."⁴⁶ In an aside that adds plausibility to his reconstructive tale of Jewish origins with the aid of material history, Hirschfeld observes that "the waving white cloak of the Bedouins calls to mind the *tallit*, which pious Jews still wear today in religious services and – in the coffin, presumably as an immemorial heirloom of their past Bedouin-like tribal garb."⁴⁷

10. In his approach of the prehistorical origins of the Jews, Hirschfeld was intent on establishing a link between the "drive into the vastness" suiting nomadic wanderers and the characteristically Jewish form of restlessness. Once again, Hirschfeld conveys his stance with the aid of a pointedly formulated question, namely, "whether the Ahasverian unrest of the Jews is still an heirloom from their nomadic immemorial past."⁴⁸ By owning the adjective *Ahasverian*, Hirschfeld was effectively not only rebuffing the Christian denigration of the endless (and thus, from a Christian perspective, unredemptive) quest on which Ahasver had embarked, but also re-inscribing the legendary figure within the history of Jewish nomadism and Mosaic liberation. Hirschfeld's unsettling of the Christian anti-Jewish mytheme accords well with his pronounced interest in surviving Jewish communities that had led an exilic existence for centuries, if not millennia, throughout the world.⁴⁹ Although, as already

⁴⁶ "Nomadenstämme" / "vor Jahrtausenden zwischen den Stromgebieten des Nil, Euphrat und Jordan" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 329).

⁴⁷ "der wehende weiße Mantel der Beduinen [erinnert] an den 'Thallit', wie ihn die frommen Juden noch heute beim Gottesdienst und – im Sarge tragen, vermutlich als uraltes Erbstück ihrer einstigen beduinenähnlichen Stammestracht" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 329).

⁴⁸ "ob nicht die ahasverische Unruhe der Juden [...] noch ein Erbstück aus ihrer nomadischen Urzeit ist" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 329).

⁴⁹ *Weltreise* clearly reflects Hirschfeld's personal interest in the presence of Jews throughout times and places. Characteristically, he indicated upon his arrival in New York that its two million Jews build the largest Jewish settlement ever (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 16). In Shanghai, Hirschfeld met Arthur Sopher, a Bagdad Jew, who—along with Edward Isaac Ezra—had published a book on a Jewish community that had reportedly settled in China after the destruction of the First Temple by Nebucadnezar (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 83; Ezra & Sopher, 1926). During his

indicated, Hirschfeld rejected the solution offered by political Zionism to the hardships of banishment and dispersion,⁵⁰ he attached a strikingly personal significance to his stay in Palestine and in the city of Jerusalem. Thus he noted, "I admit that taking leave from no other place during my trip was more difficult for me than from Jerusalem, that the farewell from no other country was harder for me than from Palestine."⁵¹ In a related strain of thought, Hirschfeld praised the realms of China, India and Egypt as "artful marble colossi,"⁵² but he accorded "the 'Holy Land'"⁵³ the uniqueness of "a fine, delicate ivory miniature."⁵⁴ Clearly reflecting his Jewish self-understanding regardless of ideological clichés, Hirschfeld echoes Isaiah's diction and metaphoric, when he punctuates that "the ancient land of the new promise"⁵⁵ remained for him—a "world wanderer through times and zones"⁵⁶—"a highlight, from whose radiant luminosity he could not detach himself so easily and swiftly."⁵⁷

visit in Calcutta, Hirschfeld ascertained, not without surprise, the existence of Jews with black skin (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 278). While in Egypt, Hirschfeld pointed out that in the splendor period of ancient Alexandria a third of its population was Jewish (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 341).

⁵⁰ Hirschfeld makes apparent his critical views on the Zionist movement in *Weltreise*, when, discussing the territorial issue, he points to the extremely difficult position in which Zionism has placed Judaism in Palestine (Hirschfeld 1933, p. 384). Hirschfeld also remarks that the conspicuous demeanor of Zionists in Palestine is one of the reasons why many Christians and Arabs are friendlier to each other than to Jews (see Hirschfeld, 1933, pp. 386-387).

⁵¹ "ich gestehe, daß ich mich auf meiner Weltreise von keiner Stätte so schwer losgerissen habe wie von Jerusalem, daß mir von keinem Lande der Abschied so schwer fiel wie von Palästina" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 350).

⁵² "kunstvollen Marmorkolossen" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 350).

⁵³ "das 'Heilige Land'" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 350).

⁵⁴ "eine feine, zarte Elfenbeinminiatur" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 350).

⁵⁵ "das alte Land der neuen Verheißung" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 389).

⁵⁶ "Weltenwanderer durch Zeiten und Zonen" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 350).

⁵⁷ "ein Glanzpunkt [...], dessen strahlender Leuchtkraft er sich nicht so leicht und schnell entziehen kann" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 350; see Isaiah 2:2-3, 5; 60:1-3).

11. Hirschfeld's personal attachment to Jerusalem and pre-Israel Palestine did not compromise his staunch sense of German belonging. Despite the worsening situation for German Jewry in the early 1930s, Hirschfeld continued to consider himself an "advocate"⁵⁸ and "representative of German science."⁵⁹ As regards his personal background, Hirschfeld not only mentioned his "Pommeranian homeland"⁶⁰ and "German mother tongue,"⁶¹ but also avowed without reserve his German national sentiments.⁶² According to an anonymous and undated report quoted by Manfred Herzer,⁶³ Hirschfeld even owned in private conversations some kind of German ethnicity.⁶⁴ The document also adduces, however, that Hirschfeld had to defend himself against "being now called a Jew, and for this reason despised and persecuted by the Nazi pigs."⁶⁵ Although Herzer considers this utterance, along with Hirschfeld's alleged reference to "the Mosaic stigma"⁶⁶ as indicative of his disidentification from Judaism,⁶⁷ such a conjecture cannot be validated by anything the sexologist wrote about his relation to Judaism and his own Jewishness. Moreover, it is well to note that, in the passage Herzer cites, Hirschfeld is not revoking or denying his Jewishness, but

⁵⁸ "Verfechter" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 15).

⁵⁹ "Vertreter deutscher Wissenschaft" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 93).

⁶⁰ "pommerschen Heimat" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 334).

⁶¹ "deutschen Muttersprache" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 345).

⁶² See Hirschfeld, 1933, pp. 91, 189, 351-352.

⁶³ The shelf mark of the document Herzer quotes reads: Nachlaß Blüher K 14, Berliner Staatsbibliothek.

⁶⁴ See Herzer, 2001, pp. 54-55. This asseveration, if true, would seem to resonate with Hirschfeld's contentions in *Weltreise* to the effect that the Chinese consider "us" (i.e. the Germans) as their fellow sufferers (see Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 63), and that the ear nerves of the Chinese must be differently constructed from "ours" (i.e. those of the Germans) (see Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 105). Like other prominent Jewish scholars and intellectuals of the time (see, for instance, Bauer, 1991; Bauer, 1995), Hirschfeld conveyed occasionally his sense of German national consciousness and pride (see Hirschfeld, 1914).

⁶⁵ "jetzt Jude genannt und deswegen von den Nazischweinen geächtet und verfolgt zu werden" (Herzer, 2001, p. 54).

⁶⁶ "dem mosaischen Stigma" (Herzer, 2001, p. 54).

⁶⁷ See Herzer, 2002, p. 54.

defending himself against being *called* a Jew with a view to persecuting him. Reports on incidents of this kind have the ring of plausibility, especially if one considers the widespread habit among Germans—fascists or otherwise—to use the term *Jew* as an insult, and to invoke Jewish race and ethnicity for defamatory purposes. Hirschfeld's rebuke of anti-Semitic prejudice and insults, however, did not prevent him from castigating Jewish beliefs and practices he deemed contrary to the rights of the individual. The document cited by Herzer illustrates the matter when referring to Hirschfeld's critique of the Jewish and Christian practice to force unconsenting children "into a religious straightjacket."⁶⁸ Far from indexing a recantation of the religion of his birth, Hirschfeld's occasional critical outspokenness towards Judaism resonates with his attempts to rethink its core tenets along the lines suggested in some of the most consequential passages of *Weltreise*.

12. As an unmistakably Jewish figure in German public life, Hirschfeld had a clear, but nuanced position on the issue of assimilation, a topic that had been heatedly debated in Germany since the times of Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) and the *Haskala* movement. Hirschfeld's elaborations on the issue begin by mentioning that he viewed "the Zionist experiment" under certain circumstances "quite sympathetically."⁶⁹ Hirschfeld actually went as far as to admit that Zionism and assimilation do not necessarily exclude one another "as a means to resolve the Jewish question."⁷⁰ In gauging Hirschfeld's complex stance, it is well to take into account that he differentiated between three types of Jewish assimilation. While the half-assimilationists are citizens of Jewish heritage "firmly rooted in their country of birth,"⁷¹ the complete assimilationists do not so much follow outwardly "the natural law of mimicry," as seek "an

⁶⁸ "in eine religiöse Zwangsjacke" (Herzer, 2001, p. 55).

⁶⁹ "das zionistische Experiment" / "durchaus wohlwollend" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 358).

⁷⁰ "als Lösungsmittel der Judenfrage" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 391).

⁷¹ "fest in ihrem Geburtslande wurzeln" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 391).

inner blend by generative means."⁷² Going beyond these alternatives, Hirschfeld personally advocated what he termed "the assimilation into humanity."⁷³ While dispensing with "making the slightest essential difference between the nations,"⁷⁴ this higher form of assimilation acknowledges value distinctions "only between individual human beings," and, concurring with Swiss Bahá'í writer Auguste Forel (1848-1931), looks forward "to the United Nations of Earth."⁷⁵ As Hirschfeld conveyed in all desirable clarity, the assimilation into humanity he propounded does not contradict Jewish particularity and sense of belonging, as long as they are subordinated to the fundamental ethical value of humaneness. This ideal, which, like justice itself, can only be approached asymptotically, constituted for Hirschfeld the guiding principle of Judaism on its way towards realizing that "just being a human being, this seeming regression, actually is the greatest progress."⁷⁶ At the antipodes of any form of Jewish self-suppression or self-dissolution, Hirschfeld's own re-conceptualization of assimilation pursues the conscious and thorough appropriation of the implicit axiology that has steered the course of Jewish history all along. From this vantage point, the fulfilment of Judaism's "great human mission" depends on its steady integration into the living bond of the universally human, in correspondence with the sexologist's pithy insight that "Life kneads the dough."⁷⁷

13. Hirschfeld expands on the issue of assimilation in the last pages of *Weltreise* in connection with the notion of *bridge*, a leitmotif of the volume and one of the key terms of

⁷² "dem Naturgesetz der Mimikry" / "eine innere Verschmelzung auf generativem Wege" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 391).

⁷³ "die Menschheitsassimilation" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 392).

⁷⁴ "zwischen den Völkern nicht den geringsten Wesensunterschied macht" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 392).

⁷⁵ "nur zwischen einzelnen Menschen" / "an die Vereinigten Staaten der Erde" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 392).

⁷⁶ "Nur Mensch sein, dieser scheinbare Rückschritt wäre der größte Fortschritt" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 392).

⁷⁷ "Das Leben knetet den Teig" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 359).

his anthropological thought. Thus Hirschfeld utilizes the metaphor of the *bridge*, for instance, when discussing the creativity that enables overcoming "the existing oppositions between human beings, nations and countries."⁷⁸ Furthermore, he mentions the phrase "bridge of understanding"⁷⁹ in connection with the global cultural function of the English language in the twentieth century. More importantly though, Hirschfeld's deploys the term *bridge* in his survey of the accomplishments achieved by Hellenistic philosopher and biblical scholar Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE – c. 50 CE). In praise of this towering figure of Jewish intellectual history, Hirschfeld remarked:

"This Greek Jew made the greatest efforts in his writings and discourses to build a *bridge* between, on the one hand, Greek philosophy, life wisdom and moral teachings—while rejecting Greek polytheism—, and, on the other, Mosaic monotheism—while rejecting the outgrowth of Jewish rituals—. Only those dared to tread such a *bridge* who were not ensnared in confessional or partisan issues."⁸⁰

Given Hirschfeld's admiration for the "rarity of [...] mediatory natures"⁸¹ such as Philo's, it is safe to assume that the ancient philosopher became for the sexologist the exemplar of his own attempt to conciliate the monistic philosophies of Bruno and Spinoza with the ethical Messianism of Israel's prophets. Resonating with Philo's mediatory endeavors, Hirschfeld's philosophical re-inscription of the continuities of sexuality and race within monistic Nature eventually transitions into the ethical acknowledgement of the sexually and racially

⁷⁸ "Die vorhandenen Gegensätze von Mensch zu Mensch, von Volk zu Volk, von Land zu Land" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 392).

⁷⁹ "Verständigungsbrücke" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 360).

⁸⁰ "Dieser griechische Jude gab sich in seinen Schriften und Reden die größte Mühe, zwischen hellenischer Philosophie, Lebensweisheit und Sittenlehre unter Ablehnung des hellenischen Polytheismus auf der einen Seite und de[m] mosaischen Monotheismus unter Ablehnung überwuchernder jüdischer Ritualien auf der anderen Seite eine *Brücke* zu schlagen, die nur die nicht in Konfessions- und Parteiwesen Verstrickten zu betreten wagten." (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 342; emphasis added).

⁸¹ "Seltenheit solcher Mittlernaturen" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 342).

unclassifiable individual: *per scientiam ad justitiam*.

14. On Hirschfeld's assumptions, the matrix of Judaism as the worldview of a wandering people is marked by a form of temporality that unfolds from an irrecoverable origination toward an ever-future fulfillment. Within this framework, historicity emerges as the consciousness of a liberating process that undermines the undialectical fixity assigned to theological or anthropological oppositions, and by so doing, opens up the way toward their possible conciliation. While Hirschfeld commends the connectivity enabled by the construction of bridges of understanding and the principled delineation of a "middle course",⁸² he also warns against the ontic fixation and eventual idealization of such quintessentially provisory instrumentalities as vain attempts to withdraw them from the pervasiveness of the Heraclitean "panta rhei."⁸³ Although Hirschfeld acknowledged past attempts to overcome the chasms that organize the finite blueprints of sexual and race distribution, he also pointed to their counterproductive tendency to hypostatize the in-between forms initially designed to bring about mediatory fluidity. Consequently, Hirschfeld chose the template of natural continuities, which underpins Darwinian evolution theory, as a tool for conceptualizing the distribution of the potentially infinite diversity of sexes and races without

⁸² Signally, Hirschfeld underscored the mediatory role of Judaism between the contrasting conceptions of corporeality upheld by lust-accepting Islam and ascetical Christianity: "Einen Mittelweg zwischen beiden stellt die Mutterreligion beider, das Judentum dar: links von Moses Mohammed, rechts Jesus." (A middle course between both is represented by the mother religion of both — to the left of Moses, Mohammed; to his right, Jesus) (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 355).

⁸³ Hirschfeld, 1926, p. 538. From Hirschfeld's vantage point, Judaism has not the vocation to play an exclusive mediatory role in soteriological history, but to build bridges of understanding. As he at times conveyed, his dialogic approach of existing religions contrasts with the self-understanding of dogma-based Christianity. Not by chance, Hirschfeld viewed with sympathy, for instance, the Hindu philosophy of religion, which builds *bridges* between polytheism, pantheism and monotheism (see Hirschfeld, 1933, pp. 249-250), as well as the inter-confessional activities of the Rotary Club (see Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 138).

recurring to the artificiality of categorial fixations. Since sexual and race differences are not marks of homogenous taxonomical groups, but traits constantly merging with one another in ever different proportions to configure the irreducible distinction of individuals, Hirschfeld's paradigm shift as regards the two fundamental ambits of human difference purports acknowledging that all human beings are, as regards their sexuality, "intersexual variants,"⁸⁴ and, as regards their race, "mongrels."⁸⁵ Discarding on principle any specific supplementations of closed taxonomies, Hirschfeld advanced a non-finite distributive scheme that, from the outset, reckons with the ever-increasing diversification of sexually and racially determined individuals as they emerge from Nature.

15. Unlike the trans-historic, meta-sexual and dematerialized conception of *liberation* forwarded by Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger (1880-1903),⁸⁶ Hirschfeld's notion of liberation was closely associated with this-worldly ethical endeavors. The defining characteristic of the "liberation of humanity" envisaged by Hirschfeld results from having overridden the source from which religion emerges: the "fear for the future and for each other."⁸⁷ While

⁸⁴ "intersexuelle Varianten" (Hirschfeld, 1986, p. 49).

⁸⁵ "Bastarde" (Hirschfeld, 1935a, p. 8). The translators of *Racism* render the German term as "hybrids" (Hirschfeld, 1938, p. 198).

⁸⁶ See Weininger, 1980. In correspondence to his overarching design to supersede humanity's biological, matter-bound condition, Weininger postulates that man's liberation from sexuality implies overcoming his dependency on the alterity of women (see Weininger, 1980, p. 456). The soteriological process he envisages culminates in a meta- (or trans-) sexual form of Messianism, purporting that the realization of "ein drittes Selbes" (a third Self) beyond man and woman constitutes humanity's ultimate aim (Weininger, 1980, p. 457; see Weininger, 1980, p. 595). At the antipodes of Weininger's ontological de-potentialization of female otherness, Hirschfeld's sexual-emancipatory program embraces the boundless sexual diversification of humanity not only as a natural factuality accordant with Darwinian evolution theory, but also as an ethical value to be preserved throughout the cultural development of the species.

⁸⁷ "Erlösung der Menschheit" / "Angst vor der Zukunft und vor einander" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 144).

generally adhering to the views on fear as the origin of religion propounded by Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711-1776),⁸⁸ Hirschfeld admitted that we still know very little about "the psychological primary causes of religious sentiments."⁸⁹ This self-critical avowal, however, did not hinder Hirschfeld from regarding "the fear-motif of man, the anxious fear of the unknown, of the future"⁹⁰ as an anthropological constant, echoed, for instance, in what biblical theologies term the "fear of God."⁹¹ Since Hirschfeld dissociated prosaic *fear* (Furcht) from the sense of *awe* (Ehrfurcht) as the human response to the sublime, religion derives, in his view, from the "quite common bodily fear to lose life and love as the supreme possession, as the highest value."⁹² Assuming that "*fear and flight*"⁹³ provide a sufficiently plausible etiology of religious belief systems, Hirschfeld forwent the Freudian-inspired conception of

⁸⁸ In *The Natural History of Religion* (1757), David Hume wrote: "We may conclude therefore, that, in all nations, which have embraced polytheism, the first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind. [...] No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work upon such barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity" (Hume, 1964, pp. 315-316).

⁸⁹ "die psychologischen Urgründe religiöser Empfindungen" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 354).

⁹⁰ "das Angstmotiv der Menschen, bange Angst vor dem Unbekannten, vor der Zukunft" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 291). Hirschfeld's stance seems to mirror the "maxim," which, according to David Hume, "is proverbial, and confirmed by experience": "*Ignorance is the mother of Devotion*" (Hume, 1964, p. 363; emphasis in original).

⁹¹ "Gottesfurcht" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 354).

⁹² "ganz gewöhnliche körperliche Angst, Leben und Liebe als den höchsten Besitz, als das Wertvollste zu verlieren" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 354).

⁹³ "*Furcht und Flucht*" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 355; emphasis in original).

religion as being essentially "a sublimated sexual drive, an erotic equivalent."⁹⁴ While admitting that religion has attempted to strengthen its claims by associating itself throughout history with the forces of Eros, Hirschfeld considered these forces as being, *re vera*, the immanent potencies of Nature, and thus unfit for validating the transcendence religion promises. Having rejected, on the basis of philosophical monism, the salvific claims raised by religions and their theologies, Hirschfeld advanced the transcendent notion of "*an endless chain of love*"⁹⁵ holding together the whole of creation. Dismissive of religious fear and other-worldly consolations, Hirschfeld's universal erotics of immanence posits the "urge for freedom"⁹⁶ as the driving force of a Messianic—albeit non-theistic—conception of temporality, which remits to the same prophetic sources that sustained Marxism, the Zionist project, and the radical feminist program proposed by Shulamith Firestone (1945-2012).⁹⁷

16. As could be expected, Hirschfeld's reflections on nomadism and the drive toward freedom shed light on the Semitic/Hebraic derivation of his own scientific and emancipatory undertakings. Setting the stage for his precisions in this regard, Hirschfeld courageously reminded his readership in 1933—the year of the Nazi rise to power—

⁹⁴ "sublimierter Geschlechtstrieb, ein erotisches Äquivalent" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 354).

⁹⁵ "*eine unendliche Liebeskette*" (Hirschfeld, 1928, p. 542; emphasis in original).

⁹⁶ "Drang nach Freiheit" (Hirschfeld, 1933, pp. 231, 329).

⁹⁷ The closing paragraph of Shulamith Firestone's classic feminist treatise reads: "The revolt against the biological family could bring on the first successful revolution, or what was thought of by the ancients as the *Messianic Age*. Humanity's double curse when it ate the Apple of Knowledge (the growing knowledge of the laws of the environment creating repressive civilization), that man would toil by the sweat of his brow in order to live, and woman would bear children in pain and travail, can now be undone through man's very efforts in toil. We now have the knowledge to create a paradise on earth anew. The alternative is our own suicide through that knowledge, the creation of a hell on earth, followed by oblivion" (Firestone, 1972, p. 242; emphasis added).

that the Ten Commandments "constitute to this day the foundation of European morality."⁹⁸ Moreover, *Weltreise* brings to mind that the Semites Moses und Mohammed were — as evinced by their rest and dietary laws—"significant hygienists,"⁹⁹ and that the Hellenic Jew Philo Alexandrinus developed valuable views on sexual hygienic in his discussion of circumcision.¹⁰⁰ Accordant with his acute sense of cultural memory and historicity, Hirschfeld consistently drew attention to the Jewish and non-Jewish contributions in the remote and recent past to the understanding of sexuality,¹⁰¹ the "ur-phenomenon, around which revolves the rest of human life with all its institutions."¹⁰² While Hirschfeld was generally prone to understate the import and originality of his own epistemic pursuits, his publications and extensive lecturing garnered him in many quarters the reputation of being the leading sexologists of his time. Thus, upon his arrival in America, Hirschfeld was greeted as "Dr. Einstein of Sex,"¹⁰³ and later in his journey, he was addressed by Indian scholars as "the modern Vatsayana of the West,"¹⁰⁴ in reference to the author of the classic *Kamasutra*. Considering the worldwide impact his writings achieved, it is significant that Hirschfeld never concealed his reservations about biblical creationism as the uncontested onto-theological framework for all major intellectual accomplishments attained by Jews until the time of Baruch de Spinoza. As an advocate of *Aufklärung* and representative of the Jewish critical tradition, Hirschfeld contended in general that religiously sanctioned prejudices were, the world over, tenaciously upheld "however nonsensical they may be."¹⁰⁵ At the same time, Hirschfeld left no room for doubt that his shift away from revelational

⁹⁸ "bis zum heutigen Tage die Grundlage der europäischen Moral bilden" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 286).

⁹⁹ "bedeutende Hygieniker" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 293).

¹⁰⁰ See Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 292.

¹⁰¹ See Ramien, 1896, pp. 27-28.; Hirschfeld, 1926, pp. viii-x.

¹⁰² "das Urphänomen, um das das ganze übrige Leben der Menschheit mit allen seinen Einrichtungen kreist" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 5).

¹⁰³ Hirschfeld, 1931, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ "auch wenn sie noch so unsinnig sind" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 289).

monotheism towards philosophical monism was sustained by the ontological persuasion that Nature's inexhaustible potentialities are the sole source of transcendent deliverance.

17. Hirschfeld's five-volume magnum opus (see Hirschfeld, 1926-1930), as well as *Weltreise* offer abundant evidence for his interest in religion as a determinant factor in the cultural construction of sexuality. His take on religious history and his personal stance on religion, however, have not been a focus of sustained theoretical scrutiny.¹⁰⁶ As an early advocate of Darwinian evolution theory, Hirschfeld deployed a Heraclitean notion of ever-becoming Nature,¹⁰⁷ which framed his a-theological conception of history as a liberatory (and thus ethical) process of continuous transcending that debunks, on principle, the illusory finality of transcendence. Under the sign of Nature's universal metamorphism, Hirschfeld's originally geographic sense of nomadic deracination translates into his preparedness to leave behind the mental comforts of the supposedly self-evident and familiar. The kind and scope of cultural renouncement Hirschfeld envisages becomes apparent, for instance, when he maintains in his discussion of circumcision that "Nature just does not create any organs—however small—to be cut off."¹⁰⁸ A certainly more consequential instantiation of cultural relinquishment ensues from Hirschfeld's thorough deconstruction of dichotomous sexuality, the organizational axiom of Jewish-Orthodox communal life, which underlies, among other things, the prescriptions concerning the heterosexual configuration of marriages and the composition of the *minyan*, the exclusively male prayer assembly of at least ten worshipers. The specific challenges posed by Hirschfeld's critical sexology in this regard reflect his overarching concern with overcoming the asymmetric (because phallogocentric) template of binary sexual

¹⁰⁶ On the issue, see for instance, Bauer, Juli 1999, pp. 72–74; 75–77; Bauer, 2002a, pp. 86–88; Bauer, November 2006.

¹⁰⁷ See Hirschfeld, 1928, p. 538.

¹⁰⁸ "Die Natur erschafft nun doch einmal keine Organe und seien sie auch noch so klein – zum Abschneiden" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 294).

distribution that structures the understanding of sexual difference propounded by Abrahamic religions. It goes without saying that Hirschfeld's universalized conception of sexual intermediariness implies rejecting not only the existing patriarchal order, which historical Judaism shares with the Gentile world, but also the idealizing projections of matriarchy into a prehistorical past or into the utopian destiny of humanity.¹⁰⁹ The dismissal of both options constitutes a necessary prelude to the instauration of the new sexual regime, which Hirschfeld envisioned as opposed to the finitizing sexual order upheld by creational revelations and their eschatologies.

18. Despite being rooted in the social message of the Hebrew prophets,¹¹⁰ Hirschfeld's understanding of

¹⁰⁹ Possibly in the wake of the philosophical reception of Hirschfeld's reconceptualization of sexual difference among French intellectuals in the 1970s, sexuality theorist Monique Wittig refuted the presumption of naturalness generally attributed to the historically victorious patriarchy, and, at times, even to its complementary heterosexual alternative: matriarchy. Wittig dismissed both ascriptions on the same grounds: "Matriarchy is no less heterosexual than patriarchy: it is only the sex of the oppressor that changes" (*Wittig, 1992, p. 53*). Refusing to uphold matriarchal normativity, Wittig argued that homosexuality is not merely the desire for one's own sex, but "the desire for something else that is not connoted", namely "resistance to *the norm*" (*Wittig, 1979, p. 102*). For an analysis of Wittig's stance on this and related issues, see Bauer, December 2005.

¹¹⁰ In Hirschfeld's time, neo-Kantian philosopher and Jewish scholar Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) advanced the conception that prophecy—the spiritual core of Israel's creativity (see Cohen, 1978, p. 29)—provided the basis for the development of social (as opposed to "mystical") religion and social consciousness (see Cohen, 1924, p. 312). In Cohen's prophetic-centered, non-Zionistic and liberal interpretation of Judaism, monotheism evinces itself as a form of Messianism (see Cohen, 1916, p. 108), whose historical implementation as ethical socialism calls for the development of a humane and spiritual culture for all human beings (see Cohen, 1978, p. 361). Since, on these assumptions, the deliverance of humanity constitutes the ultimate meaning of the notion of Messiah as envisaged by the prophets (see Cohen, 1916, p. 111), "Prophetismus und Universalismus sind eine und dieselbe Wahrheit geworden" (prophetism and universalism evince themselves as one and the same truth) (Cohen, 1916, p. 108). Hirschfeld's understanding of emancipatory history converges

emancipatory history purported a profound transformation of the ontological and anthropological premises of Jewish Messianism. Thus, Hirschfeld's fundamental principle of ciscendence transforms the traditional notion of a divine Creator into a conception of Nature akin to the understanding of "natura naturante" (naturing nature) in Giordano Bruno's Italian oeuvre,¹¹¹ (Bruno, 2002, p. 702) and to the corresponding Latin concept of "natura naturans," which Baruch de Spinoza elucidates in *Ethica, more geometrico demonstrata* (posthumously published in 1677).¹¹² Correspondingly, the man/woman disjunction and its subsequent suppletion by alternative sexualities yield to Hirschfeld's in-finitizing scheme of uniquely configured, hermaphroditic sexualities. Although the closing paragraph of *Weltreise* makes no explicit reference to the issue of sexual difference, it does point to dis-alienating love as the keystone of Hirschfeld's historicized monism, when it declares:

"Only human love can bring back Lost Paradise, the Golden Age, only human love can form humanity's organism, created on the basis of Freiligrath's words of hope:

'Despite all that, despite all that—the time comes
despite all that,
When all around man holds out his brotherly hand to
man
despite all that!'"¹¹³

with Cohen's stance on ethical Messianism, and at the same time anticipates by several decades Erich Fromm's remodeling of Judaic ethical consciousness without recurring to theological hypostatizations. Signally, Fromm's atheistic understanding of the biblical injunction that "you shall be as Gods" eventually led to his core contention that "in the process of history man gives birth to himself" (Fromm, 1969, p. 97; see Bauer, 2017b).

¹¹¹ Bruno, 2002, p. 702. (Bruno, 2002, p. 702)

¹¹² Spinoza, 1980, p. 132 [Pars Prima, Propositio XXIX, Scholium].

¹¹³ "Nur sie [die Menschenliebe] kann das verlorene Paradies, das goldene Zeitalter wiederbringen, nur sie kann den Menschheitsorganismus schaffen, erschaffen auf dem Boden der Hoffnungsworte Freiligraths:

'Trotz alledem, trotz alledem – es kommt die Zeit trotz alledem,
Da rings der Mensch die Bruderhand dem Menschen reicht

For Hirschfeld—the Darwinian thinker and socialist—the topoi of the Lost Paradise and Golden Age present throughout the Western literary canon are only seemingly turned to the past. Time being essentially irrecoverable, they are, in truth, clued references to the futurity, which the verses by German poet Ferdinand Freiligrath (1810-1876) epitomize.¹¹⁴ From this perspective, the irreducible diversity of loves that science ascertains calls for the end of closed schemes of sexual categorizations and the beginning of humanity's post-categorical humaneness.

19. While sexology became the main focus of Hirschfeld's intellectual pursuits for four decades, his numerous contributions on race—published from the late 1920s on—never became a full-blown treatise, due, not the least, to the circumstances surrounding his life as an exile before his unexpected death in Southern France.¹¹⁵ Not unlike his sexological writings, Hirschfeld's texts on race were premised on a conception of natural continuities necessitating the re-conceptualization of race differences as a matter of strict individual distinction.¹¹⁶ Signally, Hirschfeld considered the

trotz alledem! "" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 392).

¹¹⁴ See ADDENDUM I.

¹¹⁵ Hirschfeld's first comprehensive treatment of race is included in the second volume of *Geschlechtskunde* (Hirschfeld, 1928, pp. 527-659 [= chapter XIX]). Further elaborations followed in *Phantom Rasse. Ein Hirngespinnst als Weltgefahr* [The race phantom. A chimera as world danger], the general title of the installments that were published in Prague between 1934 and 1935 in the German-language journal *Die Wahrheit*. Finally, a text closely related to, but not identical with the serial publication was translated into English, edited and posthumously issued as book in 1938 under the title *Racism*. Both the installments and the book are indispensable sources for assessing Hirschfeld's reaction to the rising menace of Nazi "Aryanism."

¹¹⁶ In a written intervention of 2003, Herzer pointed out that Bauer had demonstrated in his study "Magnus Hirschfeld: *per scientiam ad justitiam*" how the sexologist deployed an individualizing perspective in dealing not only with sexuality, but also with race, when confronting the "Aryan" ideology of Hitlerian fascism. As Herzer further details, Hirschfeld attained therewith a completely new approach towards the critique of every form of racism: "Neuerdings konnte Bauer zeigen, daß Hirschfeld in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit der Rassenideologie der

philosophical views on taxonomy upheld by French naturalist and foremost pre-Darwinian evolution theorist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) as anticipations of his own critique targeting the classificatory segmentation of natural continuities, and the subsequent elevation of the resulting excisions to the rank of ontic factualities. In this connection, Hirschfeld adduced a pregnant passage in Lamarck's *Philosophie zoologique* to the effect that "with regard to the infinite fullness of inherited characteristics and forms, all classifications of living beings are ultimately only 'artificial instrumentalities': Nature herself knows neither classes nor species."¹¹⁷ Combining Lamarck's views on the inherent artificiality of taxonomies with Darwin's remarks on the absence of leaps in living nature,¹¹⁸ Hirschfeld debunked the prestige attributed to sexual and racial chasms as though they were nature-given or godly-sanctioned. Undaunted by the unthinking majorities that ignored or rejected the epistemic shift he brought about, Hirschfeld became one of the few twentieth-century intellectuals who perceived, and responded to, the need for a novel conceptual and symbolic order of the two fundamental markers of human difference. In the new world-kinship Hirschfeld envisioned, the continua of sexuality and race are no more thwarted by the phantasmal hiatuses inherited from the proto-religious self-representations of primitive man. Consequently, the

Hitler-Faschisten [seine] individuierende Perspektive auch auf die Rassenfrage angewendet und so einen völlig neuen Ansatz zur Kritik jedweden Rassismus gewonnen hat" (Herzer, December 2003, p. 72; for Bauer's basic line of argument in this regard, see Bauer, December 2002a, pp. 89-90). These precisions notwithstanding, Herzer's 2017 biography avoids—inexplicably—a proper discussion of the emancipatory entailments of Hirschfeld's critical reconceptualization of race.

¹¹⁷ "mit Rücksicht auf die unendliche Fülle ererbter Eigenschaften und Erscheinungen, [...] alle Einteilungen der Geschöpfe im letzten Grunde nur 'künstliche Mittel' seien: die Natur selbst [...] kennt weder Klassen noch Arten" (Hirschfeld, 1935b, p. 7; see Hirschfeld, 1928, p. 654; Hirschfeld, 1938, p. 249). The passage Hirschfeld paraphrases reads in Lamarck's original text: "[la] classification des animaux [...] est un produit de l' art [...] que, malgré les apparences contraires, [...] ne tient réellement rien de la nature" (Lamarck, 1809, p. 103).

¹¹⁸ See ADDENDUM II.

conception of sexuality and race Hirschfeld propounded consistently nullified the anthropological assumptions of global organizations such as the *International Olympic Committee*, whose most prominent founding father was Pierre de Coubertin (1863-1937), Hirschfeld's almost exact contemporary.¹¹⁹

20. The ancient Jewish Messianic promise of a liberating futurity eventually became for Hirschfeld the template of an open-ended—and thus non-eschatological—conception of history, whose inner workings rely not on the banality of limitless material progress, but on the always present challenge of ethical fulfillment. While Hirschfeld's scientific and emancipatory achievements were intended for the benefit of humankind, he never lost sight of the fact that the tensions between the universality of his theoretical claims and the avowed particularity of their Jewish origination made his life and oeuvre privileged targets of anti-Semitic rage. It is certainly not by chance that, toward the end of his life, Hirschfeld advanced in an interview that took place in Nice, France, "a medical explanation"¹²⁰ for the resiliency of the Jewish character. In this context, Hirschfeld posited that the Jewish nation has "the strongest nerves," for they have been strengthened "through its pains and troubles."¹²¹ In an afterthought, he then linked his bio-psychological estimate to what was effectively his personal take on the survival that Israel's Covenant grants for a "thousand generations" (לְאֵלֶּף דּוֹר)¹²²: "Its solid nerves will lead this people to *eternal endurance*."¹²³ The notion of Jewish resiliency already played a role in *Weltreise*, as Hirschfeld depicted the past and present survival of Jewish communities in Bagdad, China, Elephantine or South India. With this line of argument Hirschfeld was lastly underscoring his

¹¹⁹ See ADDENDUM III.

¹²⁰ "eine medizinische Erklärung" (Hirschfeld, 1945, p. 27).

¹²¹ "die stärksten Nerven" / "durch seine Leiden und Plagen" (Hirschfeld, 1945, p. 27).

¹²² Deuteronomium 7: 9

¹²³ "Die soliden Nerven [...] werden dieses Volk zur *ewigen Ausdauer* führen" (Hirschfeld, 1945, p. 27; emphasis added).

consequence-laden assumption that exilic nomadism constitutes the founding and still valid matrix of Jewish history and thought. Since for Hirschfeld nomadism was not just a matter of renouncing territorial rootedness, his oeuvre emerges as a reasoned invitation to leave behind once and for all the familiar convictions about sexuality and race that have disfigured, since time immemorial, the individual's uniqueness.

ADDENDUM I

The verses Hirschfeld cites at the end of *Weltreise* are taken from a lyrical text by Ferdinand Freiligrath titled "Trotz alledem," which was an adaptation of a poem written by Robert Burns (1759-1796), Scotland's national bard. Originally captioned "Is there for Honest Poverty," Burns's poem has become mostly known as "A Man's a Man for a' That" (1795). Freiligrath's German rendering was first issued in 1844. Four years later, it appeared in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, a newspaper published by Karl Marx in Cologne, Germany. The strophe quoted by Hirschfeld corresponds to the final verses of the poem, which in the English original run:

For a' that, an' a' that
 It's comin yet for a' that,
 That Man to Man, the world o'er
 Shall brithers be for a' that.¹²⁴

Therewith Burns was possibly echoing the way in which the term *kingdom* (βασιλεία) invoked by the non-christological Jesus in the *Lord's Prayer* recapitulates the Jewish notions of the Coming World (עולם הבא) and the Coming Time (עתיד לבוא).¹²⁵ This notwithstanding, Burns's definitive version of "A Man's a Man for a' That" (1795)¹²⁶ contains no term comparable to the German notion of *Zeit* (i.e. "time"), which is mentioned in the translation Hirschfeld

¹²⁴ Burns, 2001, p. 513.

¹²⁵ See Matthew 6:10; Luke 11: 2.

¹²⁶ Burns, 2001, pp. 512-516.

references. Moreover, the term *Zeit* does not occur in Ferdinand Freiligrath's German rendition of the strophe from December 1843,¹²⁷ nor in his revised version of the poem published five years later.¹²⁸ In 1845, however, the *Rheinische Jahrbücher zur gesellschaftlichen Reform* published a poetical florilegium that included as motto of one of its contributions a portion of the poem that corresponds to the citation Hirschfeld adduces in *Weltreise*.¹²⁹ The second part of the first line Hirschfeld cites is identical with the one included in the *Jahrbücher's* version: "es kommt die Zeit trotz alledem."¹³⁰ Given the considerable popularity of *Trotz alledem* in socialist circles, it is not surprising that different versions were in circulation even at the beginning of the twentieth century. Since Hirschfeld does not mention the source of his translation, it can only be ascertained that it does not correspond to any of the variations included in Freiligrath's poetry volumes published in his lifetime. Against this backdrop, it would seem that Hirschfeld opted for a German version of the strophe that explicitly mentions *Zeit* as a means of highlighting the this-worldly (i.e. non-eschatological) temporality that informs the "panhumanism and cosmopolitanism"¹³¹ on which the ethnological descriptions of *Weltreise* rely. From this vantage point, Hirschfeld's own "yearning for Zion"¹³² evinces itself as a Messianic drive toward a cultural futurity that foregoes, on principle, any claims to territorial rootedness.

ADDENDUM II

In *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859), Darwin adduces on six occasions what he terms the

¹²⁷ Freiligrath, 1844, p. 99.

¹²⁸ Freiligrath, 1849, p. 68.

¹²⁹ Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 392.

¹³⁰ Püttmann, 1845, p. 366.

¹³¹ "Panhumanismus und Kosmopolitanismus" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 392).

¹³² "Zionssehnsucht" (Hirschfeld, 1933, p. 389).

old canon of natural history: "Natura non facit saltum."¹³³ Notwithstanding the impact of Darwinian theory on Hirschfeld's *Sappho und Sokrates* (1896), his earliest sexological treatise, his volume on *Geschelechtsübergänge* (i.e. sexual transitions)¹³⁴ does not mention Darwin among the sources of its motto concerning natural continuities. The explanatory footnote on the issue appended to the first chapter also omits any reference to Darwin. It seems safe to assume that in both contexts Hirschfeld sought to emphasize the pre-Darwinian provenience of the continuity principle. Thus, Hirschfeld attributes on the book's cover the phrase "Tout va par degrés dans la nature et rien par sauts"¹³⁵ to German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716), who had used the formulation in *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* (written in 1704, but published only in 1765). The title page of *Geschlechtsübergänge*, however, assigns the same sentence—not quite correctly, if one considers its exact wording—to "Comenius, Leibniz, Linné." Moreover, the aforementioned footnote in the first chapter indicates that the Latin axiom "natura non facit saltus" does not go back to antiquity, but was first formulated in this form by Carl von Linné (1707-1778)—the Swedish botanist, zoologist and founder of modern taxonomy—in *Philosophia botanica* (1752).¹³⁶ After underscoring that the basic conception at stake had already been articulated by Leibniz as conveyed on the cover, Hirschfeld adduces two further authors who had expressed similar views on Nature prior to the philosopher. Firstly, Hirschfeld mentions Czech pedagogue Amos Comenius (1592-1670), the father of modern education, who in a treatise of 1638 had maintained: "[...] Natura & Ars, nusquam saltum faciunt, nusquam ferunt."¹³⁷ Going further back in time, Hirschfeld then cites from a text originally published in 1613 in Lyon, France, under the title *Discours véritable de la vie, mort, et des os du*

¹³³ Darwin, 1985, pp. 223, 233, 236, 263, 435, 445.

¹³⁴ Hirschfeld, 1913.

¹³⁵ Leibniz, 1978, p. 155 [IV, 16,12].

¹³⁶ Linné, 1792, p. 27.

¹³⁷ Comenius, 1638, A § 41.

géant Theutobocus, but without mentioning Jacques Tissot as its author. Hirschfeld only quotes the last eight words from the following passage: "*Operatur natura quantum, et quandiu potest, sans neantmoins faire aucun sault ab extremis ad extrema: natura enim in suis operationibus non facit saltum.*"¹³⁸ The reference to *Discours véritable* in *Geschlechtsübergänge* reads: "var. hist. et litt. IX. 247."¹³⁹

ADDENDUM III

Renowned authors such as British socialist poet and essayist Edward Carpenter (1844-1929) and Swiss psychiatrist and myrmecologist Auguste Forel (1848-1931) concurred with Hirschfeld in calling to question the validity pervasively attributed to dichotomous sexuality in mainstream culture.¹⁴⁰ Their critical contributions, however, had no incidence on the stance taken by Pierre de Coubertin and the *International Olympic Committee* in their publications and organizational activities. Having operated from the outset with the unexamined assumption that human beings can be adequately categorized as being either male or female, the *Olympic Games* introduced, from 1908 on, increasingly sophisticated procedures for reinforcing compliance with the binary paradigm of sexual distribution. Of late, the issue of sexual categorizations has been debated in connection with South-African world class runner, twice Olympic gold medalist and same-sex married Caster Semenya (born 1991). Given her manly looks, the media have raised doubts over the last decade about her female sex assignation, at times even suggesting that she was "too fast to be a woman."¹⁴¹ The journalistic curiosity—largely uninformed about Darwin's universalization of hermaphroditism—¹⁴² has

¹³⁸ Tissot, 1859, p. 248.

¹³⁹ Hirschfeld, 1913, p. 18, footnote.

¹⁴⁰ See Carpenter, 1912; Forel, 1907; Forel, 1908.

¹⁴¹ Ginnane, 2010.

¹⁴² Charles Darwin paved the way toward a biology-based, non-binary conception of corporeal sexual distribution, when remarking around 1833 in his *Notebooks*: "Every man & woman is hermaphrodite [...]"

focused on details of the athlete's anatomy, physiology and medical condition, while dodging the scrutiny and critique of the role that the man/woman dichotomy plays in the world of sport. While the Olympic Movement has conspicuously sanctioned the dichotomous sexual scheme, its initial recourse to a paradigm of distinct races has been less obvious but undeniable upon closer analysis of the sources and hermeneutics of the main Olympic symbol: the five interlaced rings created by Coubertin in 1912. Indeed, the colored rings that grace the white background of the Olympic flag epitomize one of the most salient chapters in the historical reception of the ideas, which German physiologist and anthropologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) propounded concerning the presumed five fundamental races of humanity as they correlate with the five inhabited continents.¹⁴³ Certainly not by chance, the widespread interpretive assumption in the 1940s was that each of the five colored circles corresponded to a specific continent, and therefore, to the race assignable to its native human dwellers. Contrasting with such views, however, the 2018 version of the *Olympic Charter* states that the Olympic symbol of the five interlaced circles "represents the union of the five continents and the meeting of athletes from throughout the world at the Olympic Games."¹⁴⁴ While stressing the integrative aspect of the Olympic competitions, the document leaves unchallenged the still lurking presumption of a correspondence between the discontinuous "continental" races and the symbolic circles on the flag. Given the discrepancy between the purportedly "natural" chasms organizing the distribution of sexes and races, and the science-based, albeit counterintuitive template of sexual and race continua, it is

(Darwin, 1987, p. 384 [Notebook D (1838), No. 162]). Decades later, in *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871), Darwin elaborated on his initial assertion, detailing that in their being, human individuals replicate their lineage from "some extremely remote progenitor of the whole vertebrate kingdom [that] appears to have been hermaphrodite or androgynous" (Darwin, 1981, Part I, p. 207).

¹⁴³ See Blumenbach, 1779, pp. 63-64.

¹⁴⁴ *Olympic Charter*, 2018, p. 23.

significant that the "rainbow" flag created in 1978 by US-American artist and vexillographer Gilbert Baker (1951-2017) appears suitable for evoking the exuberant diversity, which Hirschfeld's in-finitization of sexual and race taxologies had brought to light. By closer consideration of Baker's flag, however, it becomes apparent that it fails to convey the uninterrupted color fluidity of natural rainbows as a symbol of the continuous differential nuances marking the individual's sexual and racial constitution. The juxtaposition of the flag's six (or in some versions eight) well circumscribed strips of color, suggest an incremental expansion of an initially closed set of alternatives, not their outright dissolution. Signally, the rainbow flag's color discontinuities were preserved in the way the White House was lit up on June 30, 2015 to commemorate the US Supreme Court's decision to legalize same-sex marriage. Against this backdrop, it is all the more significant that Black US-American poet and radical lesbian feminist Audre Lorde (1934-1992) sought to undo the postulatory hiatuses that inform the prevalent notions of sexuality and race. Indeed, in her mytho-poetical reflections on the West-African representations of the divine Rainbow Serpent—also known as Da Ayido Hwedo and Oshumare—, Lorde conveys that her iridescent chromatism reflects the essential fluidity that grants unity to all diversities. Accordingly, Lorde's poetical and essayistic oeuvre draws on an ontology of continuous gradations, designed to surpass the ubiquitous categorial compartmentalizations, which, to this day, structure sexuality and race as the two main ambits of human difference.¹⁴⁵

Abstract

German-Jewish sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld (1868-1935) created a vast corpus of work that challenged all finite schemes of sexual and race distribution on the basis of a Lamarckian/Darwinian-inspired notion of natural continuities. Thereby, the conception that sexualities and races can be adequately determined by means of taxonomic subsumptions

¹⁴⁵ See Lorde, 1997; Bauer, 2018.

under closed sets of categories is superseded by the notion that sexual and race differences are a matter of strict individual distinction. Against this epistemic backdrop, the present study focuses on *Die Weltreise eines Sexualforschers*, the report on a world trip Hirschfeld undertook between November 1930 and April 1932. Since, to avoid persecution by the Nazis, Hirschfeld never returned to Germany after completing his journey, *Weltreise* was issued in Switzerland in 1933, the year of Hitler's rise to power. Widely regarded as one of the grounding texts of sexual ethnology, Hirschfeld's travelogue comprises his most elaborate reflections on how the experience of nomadism and exilic displacement indelibly marked the character of the Jewish people. More specifically, the initial wandering existence of the Jews molded their conceptualization of history as a temporal unfurling from an irrecoverable origination toward an ever-future fulfillment. In the context of Jewish nomadism, the psychological primacy of time facilitated not only the principled relinquishment of spatial/territorial rootedness, but also the counterintuitive preparedness to leave behind the familiar and habitual for the sake of unprecedented futures. Hence, Hirschfeld's reasoned renunciation of the immemorial patterns of sexual and race difference implied a radical reconceptualization of the human. As a form of prophetic, albeit atheological Messianism, the deliverance Hirschfeld envisions dissolves the anthropological illusions fostered by categorial fixations and calls for an ethics of this-worldly transcending unhindered by the phantasmal definitiveness of eschatological transcendence.

Key words:

Binary sexuality; Darwinian evolution; monism; "Natura non facit saltum"; prophetic Messianism; race theory and racism; sexology; sexual intermediariness; schemes of sexual distribution; universalized hermaphroditism.

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
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The concept of terror in Jean Baudrillard's social ontology

Spiros Makris,

Assistant Professor in Political Theory

University of Macedonia

& Visiting Scholar

University of Brighton

From turbo-capitalism to globalization

This article is about Jean Baudrillard's theoretical approach on the phenomenon of terrorism. Undoubtedly, the question of terrorism and terror in general gives us a pretty chance to have a comprehensive insight in Baudrillardian thought as a whole. In Marxian and Derridean jargon, it could be said that a specter haunts above late capitalism and contemporary globalization, the specter of the magnificent social thinker Jean Baudrillard. The French sage has put terrorism and especially *White terror* at the heart of his social and political analysis about Western civilization and particularly with regard to neo-capitalism, in the era of globalization and global power. Either his famous notion of *turbo-capitalism* or his critical concept of *implosion*

cannot be properly understood without an examination of how he perceives the phenomenon of terrorism on the whole (Baudrillard, 2010 and Baudrillard, 2012).

Baudrillard's thought is so fascinating (or so *seductive* in his own terms) because he has a penetrating character. Sometimes it looks so extreme because, as he asserts, the extreme social and political phenomena can be scrutinized only by using an extreme theory (Woodward, 2010: 67). Actually, he has the spiritual power to analyze the contemporary social phenomena in-depth beyond the conventional wisdom. Moreover, he thoroughly explores the ambivalent meaning of the neo-capitalist signifiers by revealing the slight shades of the conceptual similarities and differences of the dominant cultural notions. Furthermore, he sheds plenty of analytical light on the etymological and ontological aspects of the contemporary thorny social questions, by paving the way to a very radical approach of politics, aesthetics, sexuality and society, as an integral whole (Baudrillard, 1993).

Without doubt, Baudrillard is perceived now as a key thinker on contemporary cultural, social and political theory and because of this, he has been effortlessly incorporated in the so-called *canon* of contemporary critical, literary and postmodern thought (Bertens and Natoli, 2002; Lane, 2006 and Ritzer, 2007). Especially his contribution on the controversial topic of terrorism and terror, broadly speaking, is seen in the last decades more and more as an absolutely accurate, almost prophetic, intellectual approach on the phenomenon of globalization and global power, long before contemporary capitalism entered a phase of self-catastrophe (Baudrillard, 1990). In this sense, the horrific case of Covid-19 could be considered as a crucial explosive step towards this destructive and fatal condition that Jean Baudrillard defines as “after the [capitalist] orgy” (Baudrillard, 1993: 3).

However, Jean Baudrillard is not a prophet. According to his own words, he is a social metaphysician or a new social metaphysician, i.e. a *pataphysician* (Baudrillard, 2007: 85). In other words, it can be said that he is an inspired social theorist who always works under a state of imaginative

spiritual vigilance and/or affective perceptiveness, in the sense of a thoughtful awareness, vision and perspicacity. It goes without saying that in order to grasp his extraordinary way of theoretical thinking, first of all we ought to comprehend the specific way he looks at the *system of objects* surrounding him as a social anthropologist with an extreme ontological and phenomenological imagination (Baudrillard, 1996 and Mills, 2000). In this respect, his seminal contribution on the thorny topic of terrorism in the globalization era must be considered in fact as an accurate study on the ontological, existential, phenomenological, anthropological, metaphysical and even theological attributes of contemporary humanity. Despite the fact that he puts Western capitalism at the epicenter of his *metacritical* analysis, it must be noted that, through the examination of the nature of neocapitalist globalization, he is interested in the fate of the globe as a whole. In this vein, his thought takes an actual ecological character (Baudrillard, 1994).

Baudrillard points to a significant critical change of human behaviour in the era of late capitalism. More specifically, he displays how the traditional *homo sapiens* (if a homo like this ever truly existed) is gradually transformed into a sui generis *homo criminalis*. From this point of view, international terrorism is not but the allegoric, parodic and ironic demonstration of this sort of contemporary man. Actually, he carefully detects the turning point of this crucial anthropological transition in the historical moment when modern capitalism entered into the phase of what he defines as *turbo-capitalism* (Makris, 2018). This phase of late capitalism denotes a self-catastrophic *agony* of global (i.e. Western) power to keep its hegemonic status around the world (Baudrillard, 2010). This is a definitely paradoxical phenomenon, because the hegemons achieve partly this aim by permitting the overwhelming *majority of the silent masses* to lead the social and political life in a total implosion (Baudrillard, 2007a). Thus, the agony of power is not but the fatal and suicidal agony of global masses to occupy, once more, a dominant position in the historical becoming (Makris, 2019).

This paradoxical, ironic and ultimately parodic condition of *power/anti-power* process is the main theme of Baudrillardian socio-political thought. International terrorism and global terror by extension, must be seen just as a paradigmatic prism, through which we can clearly and without hallucinations see this critical phenomenon of neocapitalist implosion in its most dangerous and self-catastrophic aspects. From Machiavelli to Spinoza to Nietzsche to Freud and Baudrillard, the whole history of Western modernity is conceived as a huge impulsive movement of global silent masses towards *inertia, coma* and finally both a carnivalesque and cannibalistic self-catastrophe (Baudrillard, 2010a). Global power and international terrorism are considered by Jean Baudrillard as the two faces of the same ontological, phenomenological, anthropological and geopolitical coin. In this pataphysical mirror, each side can be regarded as the representative reflection of the other. Therefore, in the Baudrillardian perspective, Western globalization is approached like an empty mirror and/or signifier, where both global power and international terrorism are seen as the dual expression of a transparent and ventriloquous Evil (Baudrillard, 1993; Baudrillard, 2010; Baudrillard, 2010a and Baudrillard, 2012).

However, it is necessary to clarify here two essential points of his pataphysical analysis. Firstly, in Baudrillard's terms, criminality in the era of neocapitalist globalization is neither a sort of abnormality, as in the case of traditional Criminology coming from the theoretical School of Cesare Beccaria (Beirne, 1993), nor a kind of a genealogical discourse analysis of crime, akin to the positivist Criminology brought to the fore by Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1995). For Baudrillard, the contemporary parodic, ironic and self-catastrophic criminality, must be perceived rather as a deep cultural symptom of the systematic (in the sense of a dominant *system*) *mutation* of contemporary neo-capitalism in a system of transparency of Evil. From this point of view, this radical and extreme approach (and this is the second point concerning his analysis) must not be regarded as a shock (in the sense of a theoretical *surprise*) within the

intellectual ranks of modern social and political thought, but as an absolutely constructive, imaginative and fruitful development of Critical Theory in the era of late capitalism. Despite the fact that Razmig Keucheyan talks about a kind of *political nihilism*, Baudrillard's Nietzsche-inspired social theory signifies a turning point towards a so-called 'New Critical Theory' in the era of globalized capitalism (Keucheyan, 2013: 58).

From Hannah Arendt to Frankfurt School to Giorgio Agamben and Enzo Traverso, the understanding of modernity throughout the 20th century is chiefly based on the core ontological and theological assumption that European and, by extension, Western civilization has prepared its self-catastrophe, starting this process of decadence with the violent establishment of *colonialism* and *imperialism* across the globe (Arendt, 2004; Agamben 1998 and Traverso 2016). Thereby, the two World Wars and also, of course, the phenomenon of *Totalitarianism* are seen as the climax of this ontological, anthropological and cultural crisis of the Western civilization as a whole (Traverso, 2016a). In the postwar period, both international terrorism and White terror, as far as Baudrillard is concerned, continues this paradoxical route of Western self-catastrophe, through the parodic and ironic emergence of the transparency of Evil. The culmination of hypermodern violence is taking place within the TV screen and the Media. For Baudrillard, this ontological and cultural shift indicates the transition of humanity to the condition of an absolute political void. At the end of the day, the Western state has been *desocialized* and remains empty without any social reference. State power now in the sense of Western *hegemonism* is transformed into pure terror. Actually, political power as hegemony symbolizes the tragic limit of self-destruction. The political sphere is destroyed. The political disappears and turns into an empty image that is broadcasted unstopably into the Media screens (Baudrillard, 1993: 75-80 and Baudrillard, 2010).

The self-deification of Western culture, either as a kind of hubris or as arrogance or as a Promethean *metaphysical rebellion* in Albert Camus' terminology (Camus, 2000: 29), is

taking place through the systematic fabrication of a potential fatal enemy; see for example Samuel Huntington's narrative about the clash of civilizations (Huntington, 2002), which threatens the existence of the West itself. Transparency of Evil suggests that the Western and/or White terror has been doubled in a pataphysical, ironic, parodic and, in the last analysis, allegoric sense. West, as the initial inspirer and executor of material and psychological terror, exports terrorism on the edge of the world: i.e. colonialism, imperialism, post-colonialism and finally the phenomenon of neoliberal globalized hegemonism with catastrophic consequences in the wild life, nature and climate change. Covid-19 must be regarded only as a potential apex of this whole neocapitalist process. In this vein, the whole world has been transformed into a huge transparent threshold, inside and outside of which are the two faces of Western self-catastrophic Janus. The enemy is only a suicidal pretext before the final implosion. As the Freudian drive of death, the self-catastrophic energy of Western civilization (or, in other words, the famous Spinozian *conatus*) overcomes every agonistic or optimistic anti-power of love and life (Freud, 1961).

Neocapitalism and the spirit of terror

This paradoxical phenomenon of turbo-capitalism, which only by Rosa Luxemburg has been understood properly, as far as the so-called traditional Marxists are concerned, must be seen as the continuous explosion of a creative catastrophe (in Marx's jargon) that leads the entire globe to an ironic and parodic self-catastrophe (Baudrillard, 2010). Not even international terrorism, as a duplicated *simulation* of the Western evilness, can hold back the strong impulsive powers of Western implosion. In this respect, Baudrillard is the first contemporary social theorist since the times of Rosa Luxemburg who has clearly comprehended the self-catastrophic instinct of late capitalism in the long historical era of colonization, imperialism and neoliberal globalization.

By using the fruitful epistemological and analytical toolbox of psychoanalysis, linguistics, semiology, post-structuralism and the postmodern approach, he built a constructive theory about this Western irony or *pastiche* (in the sense of a Western operetta), which reaches its culmination with the bizarre carnivalesque and cannibalistic phenomenon of turbo-capitalism (Baudrillard, 2010a). Actually, the agony of global power via the suppressed energy of silent masses poetically looks like the wild and prolonged scream of an entrapped monster (see the Minotaur of capitalism) before its death rattle.

Undoubtedly, his book about 'Carnival and Cannibal or the Play of Global Antagonism' is a critical work within the Baudrillardian corpus (Baudrillard, 2010a). Perhaps, it is the most representative for his whole theory about turbo-capitalism and Western globalization. In this short treatise, which must be regarded as a pure *pearl* [a term used by Hannah Arendt for Walter Benjamin's oeuvre (Arendt, 1983: 193)] of the late phase of his thought, Baudrillard summarizes all his theoretical concepts and ideas concerning the notion, as well as the nature of global power and/or global *hegemony*. In this few-paged text, with his amazing poetic prose, he illustrates the specific content of Western civilization and its basic material and symbolic realities and/or potentialities. It is worth noting here that Baudrillard situates his social thought between Walter Benjamin (i.e. the founder of Critical Theory and Cultural Studies) and Jorge Luis Borges (i.e. the founder of postmodern approach). It is not an exaggeration to claim that the importance of this text within Baudrillard's work is comparable to the significance the section about fetishism of commodity has in Marx's 'Das Kapital'. In fact, both of them include the whole theoretical system of each thinker within a few pages.

It is interesting that the text starts with a reference to Marx's famous distinction between authenticity and farce in human history (Baudrillard, 2010a: 3). As a matter of fact, Baudrillard analyzes modernity, late capitalism and globalization by using the well-known Marxian pattern of *alienation*. International terrorism is approached as an

alienated by-product of the Western (White) terror. Therefore, it could be said that it is quite difficult, almost impossible, to grasp the phenomenon of contemporary terrorism if one does not previously have the theoretical opportunity to understand his radical theory about the nature, the structure and the function of global power in late modernity in-depth (Baudrillard, 2010). It is clear that behind the phenomenon of anti-Western terrorism he puts the phenomenon of Western terror. The former is considered as the historical result of the carnivalization and/or cannibalization procedure of the Western violent expansion across the globe. In this vein, the latter is perceived as an equally violent process of carnivalization and/or cannibalization coming just from the side of the so called non-Western powers. The whole thing looks like a parodic, ironic and allegoric *fatal* game and/or strategy of power/anti-power (Baudrillard, 1990). Thus, at the end of the day, these who have cannibalized the others are cannibalized by them in a frantic *orgy* of (anti)terrorism (Baudrillard, 2102: 3). To put it in Baudrillardian terms, the whole story could be conceived as a *transtragic* realization of the Hegelian *master-slave* dialectic.

Baudrillard presents the phenomenon of international terrorism as a fatal game of mutual violence in the action/reaction pattern (see Michel Foucault on this topic) which is actually the *fatal strategy* of self-destruction (i.e. implosion). To put it simply, he defines terrorism as a fatal game of mimetic violence. The global power game or the global antagonism game tends to be a game of parody, a grotesque game of power/anti-power that eventually is fatal for both sides (West and the Rest). He sees neoliberal globalization as the climax of this grotesque parody. To put it differently, globalization is seen as the apex of modern farce. The authentic modernity ends as a parodic farce, i.e. as a game of pure *stupidity* (Baudrillard, 2010a). In this sense, as a genuine cultural anarchist, he strongly assumes that the only opportunity we have to efficiently resolve the paradoxical riddle of global power as a game of stupidity is to abolish it (Baudrillard, 2010). What is at stake for him is

not the refusal to be dominated (see Lefortian Machiavelli on that issue) but the refusal to dominate (see Philip Pettit on this topic and the whole republican tradition of political thought that is culminated philosophically in the neo-Aristotelian thought of Hannah Arendt, Cornelius Castoriadis and Zygmunt Bauman as well).

In symbolic terms, *carnivalization* (i.e. the West or White terror) and *cannibalization* (i.e. the Rest or international terrorism) can be considered as the two ugly faces of the same coin. At the end of the first part of 'Carnival and Cannibal or the Play of Global Antagonism', Jean Baudrillard uses an ethical terminology in order to signify the actual size of civilizational decay: *abasement*, *mortification*, *abjection* and so forth (Baudrillard, 2010: 25). This global power/anti-power fatal game takes place on a transparent mirror, i.e. the *transparency of evil* (Baudrillard, 1993). Recalling the title of the second part of the book (Baudrillard, 2010a: 31), the gloomy time of globalization and terrorism in the wider sense of the word (see for example the case of Covid-19), must be regarded as the bizarre time when we are witnessing the simulated fatal game of a *ventriloquous Evil* (I guess that this poetic phrase reflects in one way or another the well-known Freudian *unheimlich*).

As far as Baudrillard is concerned, the critical question of international terrorism does not concern either right-wing extremism or, even more so, the radical Islam-driven terror attacks, but by contrast, constitutes a deeper ontological and phenomenological phenomenon that is connected with the nature of the Western neocapitalism itself. From the mid-1970s onwards until the end of his life in 2007, the eminent French social thinker built an entire theory about modern condition that is perfectly summarized by the poetic expression of *turbo-capitalism*. For Jean Baudrillard, international terrorism is not a simple symptom of religious fundamentalism, but a constituent feature of the Western civilization itself. As we have seen above, in his postmodern social onto-theology, he defines terrorism as the *transparency of Evil*. From this specific point of view, terrorism and by extension terror are no longer the evidence of a radical

religious or racist attitude, but the emergence of the gradual implosion of the silent and de-politicized global masses that, in the era of neoliberal globalization, under a state of a frenetic and paradoxical *paroxysm* (while at the same time maintaining the façade of *inertia*), are moving towards self-catastrophe (Baudrillard, 1998; Baudrillard, 2012 and Baudrillard 2007a).

The *spirit of terrorism* must be perceived as the self-apotheosis of the terroristic violence of the global power in the age of neoliberal capitalist globalization. In Hannah Arendt's own terminology, the transparency of Evil signals the absolute hegemony of the *banality of evil* (Arendt, 2006). "Terrorism", Jean Baudrillard points out, "like viruses [see for example Covid-19], is everywhere. There is a global perfusion of terrorism, which accompanies any system of domination as though it were its shadow" (Baudrillard, 2012: 8). In other words, for Baudrillard, international terrorism must be seen as the other side of global hegemonic power. Following in the footsteps of the theoretical and reflexive tradition of Critical Theory, he approaches terrorism not as a mere element of the so-called 'return of God' since the 1970s (Kepel, 2004), but as a fundamental ontological, phenomenological and theological characteristic of the Western neo-capitalism per se. In fact, terrorism is conceived as the global system's own fatal limit. It is well-known that Baudrillard treats the systems as organisms that are governed by the attribute of *reversibility* (Coulter, 2010: 181). Sometimes he substitutes this aspect with the notion of *seduction* (Baudrillard, 1990a). In this respect, every social and political system includes its self-catastrophic powers. Thus, terrorism is nothing but the limit of globalization (Butler, 2010: 215).

Baudrillard's critical contribution in the contemporary social theory

It is sad that Baudrillard was on the margins of the French intellectual scene throughout his life. Nevertheless, as

in the case of Jacques Derrida, he was internationally recognized as an eminent social thinker, especially in the Anglophone world. Unfortunately, this is the gloomy destiny of the social and cultural theory pioneers. Baudrillard is and still remains the great theorist of late modernity, looking at it through the paradoxical and sometimes bizarre lenses of post-structural and postmodern perspective. Actually, he must be conceived as an *anti-philosopher* (Makris, 2018). In this sense, anti-philosophy means a Nietzsche-inspired way to deconstruct both the meanings and the things surrounding us, by using as a theoretical vehicle the linguistic and poetic tools of *irony*, *parody*, *pastiche* and *metonymy*. It goes without saying that Baudrillard's theory about the *extreme phenomena* must be read only as an extreme writing itself (Baudrillard, 1993 and Coulter, 2010a: 240). In this case, philosopher does not work as a mainstream thinker who builds a kind of conventional metaphysics, but as a strong *provocateur* of spiritual vigilance, mental disobedience and creative visionaries (see pataphysics). Even if the anti-philosopher heralds, as a strange siren, the advent of a dystopia, the symbolism of liberation from our fatal *illusions* is still obvious (Baudrillard, 2000).

Baudrillardian oeuvre needs new and radical approaches. My strong feeling is that until today we have not properly developed its theoretical potentialities, especially these concerning the topic of an open and bold West *self-criticism*. From this point of view, it could be argued that Baudrillard's social thought could function as a true inspiration of *self-knowledge* for the whole venture of Western modernity in the last 200 years. Naturally, I am not saying that Western modernity is the worst of both worlds, but on the contrary, I am asserting that Western modernity must go through the difficult process of a *reflexive catharsis* in order to reformulate its principles and goals for the foreseeable future. Given that condition, Baudrillard could be seen as the first new critical theorist in the so-called postmodern era (Keucheyan, 2013). From another point of view, Baudrillard, just like Jürgen Habermas (Habermas, 1997: 38-55), urges us to complete the *unfinished project of Modernity* (Baudrillard,

1987 and Bishop, 2010: 132-135). This hard and tough job cannot be a painless procedure, especially when the spirit of terrorism and Evil dominates across the globe (Baudrillard, 1993 and Baudrillard, 2012). So, Baudrillard's social theory gives us the reflexive opportunity to carry this project out through a Nietzschean *joyful* process, where a sophisticated pessimism or even *nihilism* creates a spiritual regeneration to the extent that it brings to the fore the messianic and hopeful event of an earthly *revelation*. By and large, this is the paradoxical content of the Baudrillardian social onto-theology (Baudrillard, 1994: 159).

It could be claimed that Jean Baudrillard steadily continues the *epic* thought of Walter Benjamin, by offering us critical conceptual tools, so that we regenerate the world through a conscious *self-explosion* (see implosion). Without doubt, this will be an actual turning point in Western metaphysics insofar as it will denote the clear *paradigmatic shift* from a Cartesian to a post-Cartesian epistemology, when human knowledge is no longer a matter of pure wisdom, but rather, as Hannah Arendt says, a matter of *courage*, in line of Homer's perspective. In my view, Baudrillard is a courageous human being, especially with regard to the critical and thorny question of international terrorism, as he had the courage to shed considerable light on the Western inclination to self-catastrophe. Long before the crucial problem of Islamic fundamentalism came to the fore, the West had taught the *technique of terror* in a biopolitical and hegemonic way (Baudrillard, 2010). Jean Baudrillard has the courage to trace the monster that the Western civilization hides deep inside its cultural basement (see the myth of Minotaur, the concept of uncanny in Freud and so on).

During the last few decades, the so-called *Baudrillardian Studies* have been entered into a new and constructive phase of interpretive and discursive development, because of the deep changes that *Fourth Industrial Revolution* causes to late capitalism. However, while Baudrillard's approach, concerning *hyperreality* and *simulacra* (Baudrillard, 1994), has been fulfilled in one way or another, it can be argued that we have to distill the Baudrillardian corpus more,

especially with regard to a *post-foundational* elaboration of *the social* and, by extension, *the political* (Makris, 2019) Baudrillard must be perceived as a pure onto-theologist of the social in the era of globalization (Makris, 2018). As in the case of Derrida or in the similar case of Bauman (Makris, 2017) late Baudrillard is tending to be a radical social and/or political theorist, insofar as he is interested more and more in the critical question of global power and its fatal agony in late capitalism (Baudrillard, 2010). In this specific vein, my suggestion is to approach him as a pioneering social thinker who follows in the footsteps of Critical Theory, by rejuvenating the field of *Cultural Studies* as a whole. It could be claimed that Baudrillard is not so much a co-founder of postmodern theory, as the *re-founder* of Critical Theory in the era of globalization. It is no coincidence that the last decade has seen more and more the use of the notion of *New Critical Theory* (Keucheyan, 2013). Therefore, concepts as *silent masses*, *implosion*, *turbo-capitalism*, *agony of power* and so forth, show that Baudrillard and his radical socio-political thought are deeply situated within the fruitful soil of Continental Philosophy. In this sense, even though he took his distances from vulgar Marxism, he remains a diligent *cultural post-Marxist* thinker (Buchanan, 2010: 46), who enriched his initial intellectual potentialities with the arsenals of postwar approaches: psychoanalysis, structuralism, linguistics, semiology, post-structuralism and postmodernism (Gane, 1991: 126; Best and Kellner, 1991: 111; Kellner, 1994; Connor, 1997: 51 and Malpas, 2005: 89).

Baudrillard's *prose* stems from the rhetoric tradition of Russian Formalism and Roland Barthes' linguistic radicality (Culter, 2012). Baudrillardian oeuvre must be considered as a pure literary corpus. It is close to the Bakhtinian perspective. The carnivalesque element (humor and chaos) in Mikhail Bakhtin's thought, which was a *carnivalization of literature* (humor, epistemology), is transformed in Baudrillard's work into a *carnivalization of violence* (ontology, chaos). Jean Baudrillard is a poet in a broad sense. Baudrillard's contribution is critical in the so-called *linguistic turn* (Rajan, 2002). As Martin Heidegger before him, Baudrillard

introduces to the field of postwar Continental Philosophy, a new ontological toolkit, which is expressed through poetic language. His poetic onto-theology does not concern the ontic aspects of modernity (e.g. Media, information technology and so on), but the ontological nature of late neocapitalism in the era of globalization. Actually, he tried to study the extreme phenomena of violence, through the extreme language of a poetic social theory (Coulter, 2010b: 157 and Smith, 2010: 159).

Abstract

This article is about Jean Baudrillard's theoretical approach on the phenomenon of terrorism and terror in the era of neocapitalism and globalization. The eminent French social thinker puts terrorism and especially *White terror* at the heart of his onto-theological and cultural analysis of Western modernity, particularly with regard to the notion of *global power*. We ought to explore further his critical theses on the *spirit of terrorism*, if we really want to grasp, not only the phenomenology of terror across the globe, but first and foremost, the true origins of the violent global hegemony around the world and how Western modernity still shapes the Kafkaesque biopolitical, economic and aesthetic machinery of globalization in the 21st century.

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**Han Fei Zi & Machiavelli;
a comparison of the political and moral
views under the prism of the 21st century**

Lampros I. Papagiannis,
Assistant Professor
Department of Greek Studies
Faculty of European Languages & Cultures
GDFUS, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China

Introduction

Many books and even more articles have so far examined the relationship between Western and Chinese philosophy from various points of view either as an attempt to bridge the gap or focusing on the similarities and differences between specific philosophers or schools of philosophy. The comparison between Niccolò Machiavelli and Han Fei Zi is not an exception, as the resemblances the two bear would be impossible to go unnoticed. The homonymous work by Han

Fei Zi (*Han Fei Zi*¹) does, indeed, bring to mind Machiavelli's *The Prince*, yet there seems to be a general impression (to the extent of a misunderstanding perhaps) that has lead people to consider these two thinkers as ruthless and relentless authors that considered the absolute domination of the emperor as second to none. Thus, this article shall focus on the very ideas expressed in the two works (not without taking under consideration the historical background and the political conditions of the time), analyse them and suggest a political/philosophical interpretation in an attempt to restore their fame and also make a comparison to the political situation today.

Niccolo Machiavelli

Niccolo Machiavelli was born in the kingdom of Florence in 1469 and died in 1527. All the elements concerning his life and work indicate that he wished to see the unification of Italy, an idea particularly expressed or implied in the *Prince*. The use of multiple examples from his time as well as classical antiquity demonstrate an educated person (though most scholars agree that he could not read Greek despite Florence being a centre of Greek scholarship). The book was dedicated to Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici, ruler of Florence at the time.

Han Fei Zi

Han Fei Zi's life is blended with myths, something rather common for antiquity in China. However, most scholars agree that he lived between 280 and 233 B. C. during the Han and Qin dynasties in a period named Warring States Period that implies the never-ending battles among the seven kingdoms of the vast empire before the unification under the Qins. Han

¹ From this point on when the name appears in italics, we shall refer to the text by Han Fei Zi.

Fei Zi belonged to the so-called Legalist School and, like Socrates, was executed by poison.

The Prince

Machiavelli's political treatise is nothing unlike any other political treatise written in antiquity and it highlights several elements expressed by future authors, although some consider him to be the first to have been placed *within and of the historico-political conjuncture that faced him*². Should we take into account the Aristotelian idea of man as a social creature³, the *Prince* could even be seen as an effort for the smooth organisation of the society; indeed, its practicality places Machiavelli much closer to Aristotle than, for instance, the theoretic (and to an extent idealistic) attempt for a perfect society in Plato's Republic or, perhaps, Zeno's Cosmopolis⁴. Moreover, Machiavelli does not seem to neglect Aristotle's axiomatic triptych: Nature, Ethos, Logos⁵, though somehow differentiated and adjusted to the political situation of 16th century Europe. It is logical to assume that the militarist spirit that turned central Europe into an endless battlefield shaped Machiavelli's concept of the Aristotelian Nature, possibly considering the human nature as with an invincible desire for control. Likewise, Ethos is a means of putting the idea into practice (through habituation) in order for the new prince to sustain his hegemony. For instance, Machiavelli warns the prince not to change the laws or the tax-system in the newly-conquered region or he is sure to face rebellion⁶, although the language of the conquer must be established. As a means of strengthening his opinion, the philosopher gives a number of examples of conquered states that did not rebel,

² Althusser, Louis, *Machiavelli and Us*, trans. by Gregory Elliot. London: Verso, 1999, p. 17-19.

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, A, 1252a.

⁴ Zeno the Stoic.

⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, F, 1332 a & b.

⁶ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 3.

such as the Persian states after the death of Alexander the 3rd⁷.

The Prince also discusses friendship and the role of the Church in the organisation of the state and how this could favour the new ruler; however, it is not friendship in its original Greek/Renaissance concept that Machiavelli has in mind, Wood claims, but rather "a *tenuous, external bond of self-interest*"⁸. Religion, too, does not seem to play the role of faith or religious truth⁹, but what seems to be the main concern for Machiavelli is that the religious authority is not involved in the state-governing, a type of (complete?) distinction between the two powers, about which the discussion is still on nowadays.

In spite of the significance of friendship and religion, the cornerstone of the hegemony for Machiavelli is the army. Hence, he does not neglect to advise the ruler to keep his mind constantly occupied with the military cases¹⁰. The local army is always better than mercenary, as the latter can be lazy and without motivation (other than salary), while the assisting army may be too ambitious and take over the power¹¹. More often than never, Machiavelli blames the past rulers for the tragic situation of Italy (the separation of the Italian kingdoms), as they did not pay the attention needed to the military matters during times of peace until it was too late, expressing his desire to see his country united¹².

Undoubtedly, some of the opinions expressed in the *Prince* exceed the boundaries of the norm and could be considered radical, however the unsteady political situation does not allow Machiavelli to include moral concepts, such as justice or equality, in his work and he focuses on power and political steadiness instead. In a way, Machiavelli expresses with his attitude what Thomas Hobbes declares around one

⁷ Ibidem, 4.

⁸ Wood, Neal, "Introduction", in Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, New York: Da Capo Press, 1965, p. 59.

⁹ Skinner, Quentin, *Machiavelli*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 63.

¹⁰ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 14.

¹¹ Ibidem, 12 & 13.

¹² Ibidem, 23-26.

hundred years later, though he does not take it to the extreme; *justice is a meaningful notion in times of peace, but in times of war it is time for power and deceit*¹³. He disapproves of the unethical means of acquiring the power (the example to avoid is Agathocles who conquered the power in the city of Syracuse in Sicily by means of deception) and recommends a balanced attitude between cruelty and mercifulness (as in the example of Scipio). It is hatred that must be avoided by all means, Machiavelli teaches in the end of chapter 17¹⁴. Moreover, a prince must have the critical mind to choose his ministers wisely and avoid those who constantly flatter him¹⁵.

To sum up, Machiavelli's political ideas may, indeed, sometimes appear extreme in order for the goal to be achieved, but the whole treatise must be seen within its time. On the contrary, the sheer concentration to the goal without taking into account the norm and the complete lack of the moral factors that define humans as such, is nowhere to be found, though the treatise is open to multiple (ideological among others) interpretations.

Han fei Zi

As mentioned above, Han Fei Zi lived in an era almost equally unstable as did Machiavelli. Nonetheless, some believe that the written law came out of this situation as the central power found the up-until-then unwritten rules *inadequate as a ruling tool*¹⁶. Thus, it comes as no surprise that his work contains radical opinions, recommendations to the emperor to be ruthless and in order to gain power and to impose his authority. Nevertheless, the points in the *Han Fei Zi* that reach such extremities are only a handful, while most

¹³ Hobbes T., *Leviathan or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* (translated into Greek), Gnosi, Athens, 1989, p. 198.

¹⁴ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 17.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 23.

¹⁶ Lundahl, Bertil, *Han Fei Zi. The Man and the Work*, Stockholm: East Asian Monographs, 1992, No. 4, p. 8.

of the treatise explains the political situation of the time and contains some original ideas regarding politics and power, strongly influenced by the dominant Chinese philosophical concept, the Tao (or Dao)¹⁷, even though the term itself might not appear often. The first principle under which the Tao appears is the notion of knowledge of good and evil. Han Fei Zi advises the Emperor to be capable of fully comprehending the difference between the two¹⁸ and to be able to balance things, an idea possibly from Mencius¹⁹. Furthermore, Han Fei Zi expresses some progressive ideas as he consults the Emperor to do away with any sort of plots and schemes and defend the law²⁰ and the equality of the citizens before the law²¹.

Contrary to these progressive ideas, however, several aspects of the *Han Fei Zi* indicate a totalitarian behaviour that suggests that the Emperor does not allow others to gain power or he will be overthrown²², putting the blame on his ministers so as to appear unmistakable²³ and being ruthless and merciful at the same time by preserving the right to

¹⁷ Tao means road or path and it is the most important philosophical concept in ancient China. It has been used by the Taoists (Lao-Zi, Zhuang-Zi), but also from the Confucianists (Confucius, Mencius) and by Mo Zi. Needless to say, Tao takes different philosophical aspect depending on which school uses it. It is more obscure and metaphysical in Lao-Zi and Zhuang-Zi, while it bears aspects of social norm defining the relationship between the citizen and the Emperor and among the citizens in Confucianism.

¹⁸ *Han Fei Zi*, 27.

¹⁹ Ibidem, 37. An example is given in the *Mengzi*, Mencius' book. "Someone asked Mencius: *The Rituals say that a man is not allowed to touch a woman, but what if your sister-in-law is drowning? Will you not save her by touching her?* Mencius replied: If your sister-in-law is drowning and you do not save her by touching her, you are no better than a wild beast", *Mengzi*, IV, 1.

²⁰ *Han Fei Zi*, 36.

²¹ Ibidem, 43.

²² Ibidem, 59-62.

²³ Ibidem, 28. In this respect, it has been claimed that *Han Fei highlighted the conflict between the interests of the ruler and his ministers as something of prime importance in statecraft and public administration* (Goldin, Paul. 2001. "Han Fei's Doctrine of Self-Interest." *Asian Philosophy* 11.3: pp 151-159, p. 151-153).

punish and demonstrate approval²⁴, the meaning of which is clearly to appear powerful.

The bottom-line of the *Han Fei Zi* is the nature of man, as this treatise that begins as a political one, soon becomes a journey into the depth of the human nature. In this respect, Han Fei Zi seems rather reluctant to express a solid opinion, but he is limited to indicate that the Emperor is there in order to ensure that people will not be allowed to do evil, as they cannot be trusted that they will do good²⁵. Thus, not unlike Machiavelli, Han Fei Zi does not associate power with justice (these two seem irrelevant), nor is he interested in the distinction between the two, while his principal interest is the solid structure of the society under the kingship of the Emperor.

Han Fei Zi and Machiavelli today

It is very much questionable whether a philosopher, an author or a politician can think outside the mentality set by the boundaries of the given culture of his/her era and place. The proximity of the political views of Machiavelli and Han Fei Zi, as briefly presented above, leaves little to the imagination as to why the two were associated to the extent that Machiavelli is often referred to as "the Italian Han Fei Zi" or vice-versa. But how would these two philosophers fit in the 21st century, a century of undoubtedly severe and rapid political changes, including, but not limited to, the economic and military dominance of USA, the rise of Asian economy and the threat of the collapse of the EU more imminent than ever?

Although these treatises should not be treated as a manifest or as a ruler's do's-and-dont's checklist, the general concepts, I argue, must be interpreted in comparison with the works of other political theorists of the past in order to seek the development of the society. Surprisingly or unsurprisingly, some of the ideas of the past are

²⁴ Ibidem, 47.

²⁵ Ibidem, 169.

diachronically modern and a modern society can potentially benefit from them. The critical eye of the ruler who must choose his ministers wisely and in favour of the state is a political virtue for a ruler today, yet not less of a virtue for the citizen who must always be an active part of the society; the inevitable preparation for war and the keen eye to prevent warfare before it even begins through diplomacy; the equality towards the law and the ability to balance things; these are the very concepts that both Machiavelli and Han Fei Zi have brought to the surface and that we must ensure that we follow whether as active politicians or as equally active citizens. In this way the state can become the connecting force that moderates the inequalities of the society, as Lenin indicated²⁶, while the preservation of capitalism in moderation could prevent what Deleuze and Guadari had feared, the destruction of the social body²⁷.

As a last comment, I would like to attempt to restore the name of Han Fei Zi and Machiavelli as they have been associated with totalitarian ideas in a form of "the end justifies the means". The interpretation attempted above indicates that this is only partially true and thus inaccurate. Many of their opinions are oriented towards the common good for the state, whereas the radical advice for the emperor should be seen as a symbolism for public security against foreign or domestic foes. Hence, it comes down to the reader of these treatises to interpret the political views as radical or not.

²⁶ Lenin V. I. O., *State and revolution* (translated into Greek), Synchroni Epochi, Athens, 2012, p. 67 & Collected Works, Volume 25, p. 381-492.

²⁷ Deleuze G. & Guadari F., *Capitalism & Schizophrenia; Anti-Edipus* (translated in Greek by K. Chatzidimou & I. Ralli), Rappa, Athens, 1983, p. 23 (Also the English edition translated from French by R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane, preface by Michel Foucault, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983), p. 42.

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The epistemological basis of Mathematics: A discovery or an Invention?

Antonis D. Papaoikonomou,
PhD, Laboratory Teaching Staff
Department of Political Sciences
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Introduction

In recent years the debate on the status of mathematical science has grown remarkably. There has been going on an academic conflict between realists and relativists, that is, between those who view this science as a rationalist description of the world that converges with the truth and those who argue for the social construction of the world, with the present scientific field being one of the many possibilities (Wilder, 1986). Typically, scientists and philosophers of the science are realistic, arguing for the existence of a precise and true model of real-world description, while social and cultural theorists, on the other hand, support a relativistic view of science and believe that all knowledge of the world is socially constructed (Anapolitanos, 2005).

The Pythagoreans placed the numbers above human intervention. Plato, influenced by them, saw mathematical objects eternal and unalterable. He argued that the objects of knowledge, the objects that could be defined, existed but did not have to be identified with anything in the sensible world. They existed in an ideal world, beyond space and time. They are the famous Platonic "Ideas" (Shapiro, 2006). On the opposite side are the idealists, the empiricists, the nominalists, the fundamentalists and the advocates of the Constructivism and the Theories of the Mind. Idealists believe that mathematical objects exist but depend on the human mind, either individually or as a part of the common mental structure of the human species. The Empiricists argue that these objects come from the "abstraction" of the physical substrate of natural objects, which we observe and know through our senses. The Nominalists admit that mathematical objects are merely linguistic constructions or, in their extreme version, that these objects do not exist at all. Finally, the Intuitionists, Constructivists, and supporters of the Theory of the Embodied Mind, have spoken of mathematical objects which are purely mental constructions and do not exist in any real sense except in the human mind. Hinduism argues that only predictions can be made about mathematical objects and not final judgments about them, since what we know, for example, for all natural numbers is the process of constructing them, step by step and not the whole as a whole. This is what Hilbert calls a "partial crisis" (Shapiro, 2006).

Absolute vs Relativists

These two different directions have been developed in parallel, but what has remained relatively unexplored in this debate is the fundamental academic dispute over the hypothesis of the invention or discovery of mathematics (Davis & Hersh, 1998). The absolutist view of mathematics regards them as universal, objective and certain, with mathematical truths being discovered through the intuition of

the mathematician and then consolidated through proof. Many modern mathematicians have adopted this view, including Roger Penrose in his book *The Emperor's New Mind*, and John Barrow's *Pi in the Sky* (Clawson, 2005). "Absolutists" adopt a "discovery" view and consider that mathematical "objects" and knowledge are necessary, perfect, and eternal, and comment on the "irrational effectiveness" of mathematics in providing a framework for science. They argue that mathematics should be integrated into every aspect of the world, because it is a pure abstraction stripped of everyday life that perfectly describes the patterns of nature.

The opposite view, often called as fallibilist¹, views mathematics as an unfinished and enduring "work-in-progress". In other words, new mathematical truths can be corrected, revised, changed and invented or emerged from new inventions (Eves, 1997). But who are the relativists? Many mathematicians and philosophers have contributed to this approach: first, Wittgenstein in his later works such as *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* contributes to relativism in his claim that Mathematics consists of a heterogeneous cluster of overlapping language games (Wittgenstein, 2006). These are not games in the simplistic sense, but the traditional rules of mathematics which are guided by rules and which provide the meanings for mathematical symbolism and ideas. Wittgenstein holds that we often follow rules in mathematical thinking because of proven patterns and not because of logical necessity. So Wittgenstein's contribution is to show what mathematicians do in practice, not what logical theories tell us, with the former being the steam engine of the development of mathematical knowledge.

Imre Lakatos is another relativist who believes that the history of mathematics is the basis for any philosophical

¹ The English term fallibilism refers to the epistemological position that no opinion (theory, position etc.) can ever be rationally supported or fully justified. There will always be points of potential doubt about its truth. Accurate translation could be the inevitability of human error. The term *relativistic* will be used in this paper.

foundation of this science. In his seminal work *Proofs and Refutations*, which largely consists of a fantastic dialogue within a mathematics class, students attempt to prove Euler's relation to algebraic topology, a theorem for properties of polyhedra, namely that in all polyhedra the number of their vertices K minus the number of their edges A plus the number of their faces E equals 2: ($K - A + E = 2$). The dialogue is intended to reflect the true historical sequence of proofs attempted by mathematicians to make this assumption, which have been repeatedly rejected by the use of counterexamples. Students often paraphrase famous mathematicians like Cauchy, as Lakatos notes in his extensive footnotes. What Lakatos tried to show was that he did not have a theorem of informal mathematics that was either final or perfect. This means that we should not think that a theorem is true at all, only that no counter-example has yet been discovered. Once the counterexample is recaptured, that is, something that contradicts or is not explained by the theorem, we re-formulate the theorem, possibly by extending the area in force. This is a continuous way in which our knowledge accumulates through the rationale and process of their proofs and refinements (Lakatos, 1996).

Philip Kitcher offers a further refinement of the concept of relativism in his book *The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge*. He considers that much of mathematical knowledge is based on the self-esteem of the mathematician and is not based on logical proof (Drossos, 2000). Moreover, even if the mathematical results can be proved, much of the argument remains 'silent' and relies on undiscovered mathematical knowledge which is learned through practice and which is not explained in detail. Since informal and silent knowledge in the above sense differs from generation to generation, mathematical proof cannot be absolute. In other words, maths are not simply relevant, but are created by groups of individuals who must formulate and critique new knowledge in the form of formal "conversation" before it can be considered to belong to accepted mathematical theories. These conversations incorporate the process that Lakatos describes in the evolution of Euler's equation, as well

as what happens in Wittgenstein's mathematical language games (Davis & Hersh, 1998).

The creation of knowledge is part of a wider process in which mathematical knowledge is offered to students in the form of 'conversations' in schools and universities, before they themselves become mathematicians so they can participate and produce new ones. This perspective offers an intermediate path to the dilemma of objective and subjective knowledge. According to social constructivism, mathematics is more than a collection of sub-subjective views, but less than a body of absolute and objective knowledge, which transcends human activity. Instead, it has an intermediate position (Bunt, Jones, & Bedient, 1981). Mathematics is a result of the knowledge of culture, just like the rest of human knowledge. It transcends every single individual, but not humanity, as does art, music, literature, religion, philosophy, and science.

Although relativistic views vary, they all seek to describe and illustrate mathematical naturalism, that is, in a way that applies to the real world around us (Shapiro, 2006). Unfortunately, relativism is often ridiculed by opponents who claim that mathematics may be partially or even mistakenly that since mathematics are not necessary, they are arbitrary and imaginative that the "everything goes" way and every opinion on mathematics is correct; that "invented" mathematics can be based on an impulse or a whim of the moment; and that if the social forces are those that shape the mathematics then they are dependent by the dominant ideology and prejudices, and not by an internal logic and objective.

Relativism, however, does not mean that some or all of the mathematics may be incorrect (although the results from Gödel's incompleteness theorems mean that we cannot eliminate the possibility that mathematics will produce a contradiction) (Mankiewicz, 2002). On the contrary, relativists deny that there is an absolute truth, which proves why mathematics cannot approach it. For example, $1 + 1 = 2$ is not absolutely true, although it is true provided a normal interpretation of arithmetic. Thus, in Boole's algebra the

expressions $1 + 1 = 1$ and $1 + 1 = 0$ are true. This simple example shows that the truths in mathematics are never absolute, but they always depend on the system that makes sense to them. Unlike physics, in which there is only one world for which scientists have to decide whether it is true or false, mathematics allow for many different interpretations. Accordingly, Euclid's fifth axiom (the parallel axiom: "If one line intersects two others, then these two, if extended indefinitely, will intersect since the inner angles formed are sums less than two verticals ") and its denial can be both true, but according to different mathematical interpretations (Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries). Mathematicians continuously invent new imaginary worlds without having to eliminate the older ones (Wilder, 1986).

The second critique of relativism is that if mathematics as a science is not necessary then it must be arbitrary and imaginative, based on the mathematician's capricious and instantaneous impulse. We mention the question of Roger Penrose: are the objects and truths of mathematics merely arbitrary deductions of the human mind? His answer is no, and he concludes that mathematics is somewhere there, ready to be revealed, not invented. Mathematicians like Penrose often contradict necessity with arbitrariness and hold that if relativistic mathematics is not necessary and does not have inherent characteristics, then it must be arbitrary (Eves, 1997). Consequently, what ultimately prevails in mathematics is anarchy, and everything can go into mathematics (anything goes). But according to the philosopher Richard Rorty, the opposite of necessity is not arbitrariness but randomness (Clawson, 2005). Since arbitrariness is determined by luck or whim rather than judgment and logic, the opposite of this concept is choice. So mathematical knowledge is based on randomness, because of its historical development and the inevitable effect of extrinsic forces that direct mathematicians, but it is also based on the deliberate choices and efforts of mathematicians that are founded on a deep and extensive logical process. Both randomness and choice go beyond the laws of mathematics, so it cannot be said that the development of this intellectual activity is based on either

need or necessity. Many mathematical theories are followed by logical necessity through their assumptions and adopt logical process rules, just as the sequence of moves in a chess game (Wilder, 1986). The above argument is not opposed to relativism because none of the rules of reasoning and logic in mathematics is absolute. Mathematics consists of linguistic games with deeply established rules and patterns that are both resilient and stable but open at the same time to the possibility of change. Indeed, in the long run they change.

The criticism that relativism in mathematics means that everything can be valid and that every opinion is as good as the others can be opposed to the distinction - according to William Perry - between the theory of Multiplicity and the theory of Contextual Relativism (Bunt, Jones & Bedient, 1981). Multiplicity refers to the view that every view is valid, implying that no judgment can be valid. It is an extreme form of relativism in which arbitrariness is perceived as the opposite of necessity. It is a position often weak and unsupported and is not thought to represent relativism in mathematics. Textual relativism, on the other hand, contains a set of views and points of reference in which contextual properties allow for heterogeneous comparisons and evaluations. Rational choices can be made within this context but they always depend on the existing context or system. Relativists in mathematics adopt a similar position in which mathematical knowledge is understood within the context and evaluated or justified within rule governed systems. According to this view there is a 'subcutaneous' basis of knowledge and rational choice, a context dependent and not absolute.

The above contradicts the criticism of absolute claims that invented mathematics is based on caprices and impulses of the moment and that social forces can shape mathematics according to prevailing ideology. The relativist view is more discerning and recognizes that, in part, social forces shape mathematics. But there is also a considerable degree of autonomy in mathematics, with regard to the problem to be solved and the method to be applied, as well as the criteria of proof and truth. The argument is that all this is part of

tradition and not because of an outward necessity. Some of the extrinsic forces affecting mathematics refer to applied problems that need to be solved, which have always had an effect on mathematics (Mankiewicz, 2002). Many examples can be mentioned: at first arithmetic was developed to support the tax system and trade in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and China. Contrary to the dominant concept, the oldest profession is that of the scribe and tax collector. Trigonometry and sphere geometry were developed to assist astronomy and the needs of navigation. Later mechanics and calculus were developed to improve ballistic and martial arts. Statistics were originally developed to support safety needs, agriculture, biology and medicine. More recently, modern computational mathematics has been developed to support the needs of the military in the army, in cryptography, missile and information systems. These examples illustrate how the mathematical disciplines evolved due to external needs and only after using them to solve these problems, did they specialize in systematizing methods for solving internal problems.

This historical view of relativism partly responds to the challenge of John Barrow entitled "inventionism" (Eves, 1997). According to Barry, if mathematics is the result of an invention, how is the unprecedented usefulness and effectiveness of pure mathematics justified as a language of science? But if mathematics is seen as a response to external forces and problems, as well as internally, their utility is to be expected in the future. Since mathematics studies simple structures at ever-increasing levels of abstraction, but structures which correspond to practical problems, it is not surprising that their concepts and their methodological tools help us organize our understanding of the world and the patterns within this.

Epilogue

The confrontation between those who believe that mathematics was discovered and those who believe that it

was invented will not stop. Conflicts of this kind, such as between idealists and realists and between dogmatic and skeptical, last for over 2500 years. However, the relativistic position that qualifies in this paper, while considering mathematics to be random and historically variable, also emphasizes the fact that mathematical knowledge is largely autonomous, stable and necessary. Once humanity invents something and creates rules for it, such as chess, number theory, or the Mandelbrot space, the applications and patterns that really emerge are amazing. But this does not alter the fact that we invented the "game" in principle. Maybe it was a very great invention. As the 18th-century philosopher Giambattista Vico said


The greatest truths we can know for sure are the ones we invented.

Mathematics is certainly one of them. So the answer is in everyone's mind. Here is the view that *"the typical mathematician is a Platonist on a daily basis and a Formalist on weekends. This means that, when dealing with mathematics, he is convinced that he is dealing with an objective reality of which he is trying to determine properties. But when he is challenged to give a philosophical interpretation of this reality, he finds it easier to pretend that he does not eventually believe in it"* (Bunt, et al., 1981, p. 309).



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Philosophy of Yoga and Ayurveda: A Parallel

Rina Avinash Pitale Puradkar,
*Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy,
R. J. College of Arts, Science and Commerce (Autonomous)
[Affiliated to University of Mumbai]*

Yoga and Ayurveda are both closely connected fundamentally holistic disciplines rooted in Vedic tradition. They intersect in the somatic and psycho spiritual wholeness. Yoga focuses on spiritual integration through self transcendence culminating in self realization. Ayurveda focuses on psychosomatic integration through comprehensive health care culminating in openness to self transcendence and self realization.

Yoga and Ayurveda are two interrelated branches of the same great tree of Vedic knowledge that encompasses all of human life and the entire universe. In this regard, it is important to understand the respective roles of Ayurveda and Yoga in the Vedic system. Yoga and Ayurveda are not merely two separate but related healing disciplines of India. Each has its unique place and function, but each overlaps into the other on various levels. Ayurveda is one of the four Upavedas or secondary Vedic teachings, along with Gandharva Veda (music), Sthapatya Veda (directional science), and Dhanur Veda (martial arts). These Upavedas

apply Vedic knowledge along specific lines to supplement the Vedic quest for wholeness and liberation. Ayurveda is probably the most important of these because it addresses all aspects of healing and well-being for body and mind.

Some thinkers say, that Patanjali, who compiled and codified the Yoga Sutras in the centuries just before or just after the first millennium, also outlined the Charaka Samhita, one of the foundational texts of ayurveda. But yoga and ayurveda share even more than that. Both reinforce the philosophy of Samkhya, which gives us a map of the universe and an explanation for how cosmic consciousness manifested itself into form.

Samkhya is dualistic system, that, everything can be categorized as either Purusha (pure consciousness) or Prakriti (matter or form). All physical existence derives from prakriti, which has three qualities, known as gunas: sattva, tamas, or rajas. From these three qualities arise the five elements, as well as the senses, the sense organs, the motor organs, the mind—24 universal principles in all. Ayurveda's methods are based on these principles. When all are balanced, the individual is healthy. When something is imbalance, the disease process begins. Most yogis are aware of ayurveda's concept of the tri doshas such as kapha (earth/water), pitta (water/fire), vata (air/space). The ayurvedic treatments such as shirodhara have found its way into spas and studios in modern times. Ayurveda encompasses a vast range of diagnostic techniques and remedies such as tongue analysis, cleanses, herbology, mantra, and even gem therapy.

In this classical Vedic scheme, ayurveda is the Vedic system developed specifically for healing purposes. There is no other Vedic system of healing apart from ayurveda. Yoga is the Vedic system of spiritual practice or sadhana. All Vedic sadhana or spiritual practice involves some form of Yoga practice. This means that Yoga is not originally or inherently a medical system. It does not address either physical or psychological disease or their treatment in a primary manner. Yoga aims at relieving spiritual suffering, which it defines according to the kleshas or spiritual afflictions starting with ignorance (avidyà) of our true nature as pure consciousness,

which leads us to a false identification of ourselves with our transient bodies and minds. Yoga is an inner spiritual practice, what is called sadhana in Sanskrit. This does not mean that we cannot use yoga as a medical therapy, but this is not its primary intent or orientation. But to do so we need to apply yoga in a different manner than what it was originally meant to be.

Ayurveda is Vedic science of healing for both body and mind. Yoga is Vedic science of realization that depends upon well functioning body and mind. Both discipline developed together and have always been used together. Yoga and Ayurveda are far more than physical exercise or bodily healing system as we tend to view them today. Both classical Yoga and Ayurveda looked at whole human being not only as body but both mind and soul. Both address all our needs from physical health and well being to enfoldment of our higher consciousness. Integral yoga is traditionally called panch kosa yoga and integral ayurveda is called as panch kosa ayurveda meaning yoga and ayurveda of five sheaths which refers to the physical body, prana, mind, intellect and soul as well as our higher self. It is defined as yoga and ayurveda of three bodies (physical, astral and casual) or body, mind and soul. Yoga builds upon the foundation of ayurveda and similarly ayurveda is unfulfilling to the human psyche as it is evolved towards self realization. The practice of two sciences is necessary for the achievement of their independent goal. It is said, yoga rest upon ayurvedic medicine for its health implications, ayurveda rely upon yoga for it's for its mental and spiritual dimension.

For ayurveda, three doshas, which describe as how the building blocks of the life unstable yet follow certain specific pattern. For yoga three gunas are more primal qualities that regulates subtler realm to control the direction of all life activities. In yoga and ayurveda, the universe is seen as manifestation of these three fundamental biological properties. The first property possesses creativity that expresses itself as movement in which element air and space is predominant. In ayurveda this property is known as 'Vata'. In yogic literature this same biological property is

refined into higher subtler form of energy called ‘prana’, which governs rhythm, motion and sensitivity of the mind. The second property is transformation which expresses itself as energy or vitality through the element of fire and water, called ‘pitta’ in ayurveda. Tejas is a refined form of pitta that creates discernment, the higher function of mind composed of the essence of light. The third property is preservation, which expresses nourishment through the elements of water and earth called ‘kapha’. Ojas is the refined form of kapha providing the foundation of all nurturing qualities that become immune system, breast milk and placenta. The ayurvedic practitioner finds life force in food and all other manifestations of the material world. For example lack of vata would be directly experienced as excessive moisture while an overabundance of vata would be experience dryness- raw foods not consumed enough will increase mucous while in excess increase dryness. Ayurveda believes that food is the primordial substance from which the body is created, nurture and ultimately will dissolve in it.

The study of ayurveda tells us how changes in diet, lifestyle, exercise and spiritual practices of yoga promote health and longevity. Ayurveda directs us to live a life of fulfillment as stated in Charka Samhita in section Sutrasthanam Chapter I Sutra 55, “The body and mind constitute the substrata of diseases and happiness (positive health). Balanced utilization (of time, mental faculties and the object of sense organ) is cause of happiness.”¹

In this classical Vedic scheme, ayurveda is the Vedic system developed specifically for healing purposes. There is no other Vedic system of healing apart from ayurveda. Yoga is the Vedic system of spiritual practice or sadhana. All Vedic sadhana or spiritual practice involves some form of Yoga practice. It does not address either physical or psychological disease or their treatment in a primary manner. Yoga aims at relieving spiritual suffering, which defines according to the

¹Mukunda Stiles, ‘*Ayurvedic Yoga Therapy*’, Lotus Press USA, first edition 2007, ISBN- 978-0-9409-8597-1

kleshas or spiritual afflictions starting with ignorance (avidya) of our true nature as pure consciousness, which leads us to a false identification of ourselves with our transient bodies and minds. Yoga is an inner spiritual practice, what is called Sadhana. If our aim is to turn Yoga into a medical system, in the Vedic scheme this requires turning Yoga in the direction of ayurveda. Yoga for healing should be applied according to ayurvedic guidelines of diagnosis, treatment, and health maintenance if we want to keep yogic healing within the scope of Vedic knowledge. In fact, there was never any yogic system of medicine in India apart from ayurveda historically, not only among the followers of the Vedic tradition but also among the followers of non-Vedic traditions.

Patanjali Yoga Sutra have sections like Samadhi Pada, 'section relating to Samadhi or deep meditation', Sadhana Pada, 'section relating to spiritual practice', Vibhuti Pada, 'section relating to yogic powers', and Kaivalya Pada, 'section relating to liberation'. The yogic exploration of consciousness, the subtle energies of prana and mind, and various types of spiritual practices are all inter-connected. Yogic texts contain discussions of meditation, concentration, mantra, ritual, pranayama, asana, and related factors but as part of spiritual practice, not as a therapy.

We do not find any Chikitsa Padas or therapy sections in the usual Yoga texts. The term Chikitsa does not occur in the Patanjali's Yoga Sutras and is not a major topic of concern in Yoga philosophy too. The concern of classical Yoga is Sadhana, not Chikitsa, which is regarded as the field of ayurveda. In Yogic texts we do not come across a discussion of disease, pathology, diagnosis, or treatment strategies apart from the approach of ayurveda. What we do find commonly in Yogic texts are discussions of the pranas, senses, mind, nadis, and chakras, worship of deities, discussion of the inner Self and nature of consciousness, as well as the types of samadhi or inner absorption. Some yogic texts regard disease as one of the main obstacles to yoga practices.

Both of these sciences have eight branches: Ashtanga yoga and Ashtanga ayurveda. The two have a common

understanding of health of the body being dependent on the health and balance of the mind. They share virtually the same metaphysical anatomy and physiology, which consists of 72,000 nadis (subtle channels), seven main chakras (energy centers), five bodily sheaths and the kundalini shakti (energy). Yoga is believed to be a natural way of healing. The basic principle of ayurveda is based on the shloka: 'Yat Pinde Tat Brahmande' (from the Puranas) which means that the microcosm is equal to the macrocosm. In other words, whatever is within us, in our cells, is equivalent to that which is in the universe. This understanding sparked an overwhelming sense of gratitude in me, knowing that every aspect of nature has the answers to good health.

Yoga and ayurveda are sister sciences that developed together and repeatedly influence each other. They are integral part of great system of Vedic knowledge which states that the entire universe is One Self and that the key to cosmic knowledge lies in our own minds and hearts. Yoga is a first and foremost a science of self realization. It provides key to all spiritual development mainly through meditation and other yogic practices by acquiring the knowledge of our true nature beyond time, space and sufferings. Ayurveda is primarily a science of self healing aim at relieving the diseases of body and mind. It is self healing means it helps in restoring wholeness with our inner self as its ultimate goal, which is a spiritual healing. Ayurveda's aim is to alleviate both bodily and mental diseases and promoting both psychological and physical well being. Yet the ultimate goal of classical ayurveda, like classical yoga is self realization the highest form of self healing. Ayurveda helps us to attain optimal health not for materialistic enjoyment but to provide wholesome foundation and sufficient energy to pursue the yogic health.

The link between yoga and ayurveda is 'prana' or 'life force'. Yoga is intelligence of prana seeking greater evolutionary transformations, while ayurveda is its healing power seeking to consolidate the life systems it has already developed. Both yoga and ayurveda together are complete

discipline, which can transform our existence from the physical to the deepest spiritual levels of our being with extraordinary vitality and creativity on all levels.

Modern Yoga therapy largely consists of the application of Yoga asanas as an adjunct physical therapy for the treatment of diseases as primarily diagnosed and treated by modern medicine. Yoga therapy as asana therapy does not unfold the full healing potential of classical Yoga and its many methods. It keeps Yoga subordinate in a secondary role, reduced primarily to a physical application. A full application of the methods of Yoga for healing purposes, we need a complete medical system that follows the philosophy, principles, and practices of Yoga, and that can employ not only asana as a therapy but also pranayama, pratyahara, dharana, dhyana, and samadhi, and which follows a yogic life style (yamas and niyama). Ayurveda develops its view of the body and mind, and nature and healing from the background of Yoga philosophy as outlined through the twenty-five tattvas of the Samkhya system. Ayurveda provides us a complete mind-body system of medicine in terms of all aspects of diagnosis and treatment that reflects a Vedic and Yogic approach, values, and wisdom.

A real Yoga therapy must consider all eight limbs of Yoga. It cannot just isolate the physical aspects of Yoga like asana. Otherwise it is caught in the same type of physical reductionism that too often occurs in modern medicine. In this regard, not only asana has important therapeutic application, but all the limbs of Yoga. The first two of the eight limbs of Yoga, the yamas and niyamas, the yogic principles and practices of right living, provide the foundation necessary to sustain any spiritual or healing practice. They also provide an ideal code of conduct for doctors, therapists, and Yoga teachers. Asanas are the 'external medicine' of Yoga. It primarily treats musculo-skeletal disorders, but indirectly can benefit many other conditions and can provide an ideal form of exercise for everyone. Yet without the proper diet, its healing potentials are limited, as bodily activity is going to reflect the nutrition

the body receives. Asana works best in the context of Ayurvedic dietary and life-style recommendations.

Pranayama can be called the 'internal medicine' of Yoga. It brings prana or vital energy directly into the body and can be used to direct prana in various ways as needed. Pranayama directly impacts the doshas or biological humors of Ayurveda (vata, pitta, and kapha), which are modifications of prana. Pranayama primarily treats conditions of the respiratory, circulatory, and nervous systems but through these has a powerful impact on all physical and psychological conditions. Pranayama is a great aid for the use of herbs and functions much like them to correct the movements of energy within our physiological and psychological systems.

As all forms of healing involve altering the movement of prana and increasing the healing power of prana, pranayama is a primary and direct form of healing for body and mind, whereas asana is secondary and indirect. This means that a real Yoga therapy even for the physical body must emphasize pranayama over asana and employ asana in the context of pranayama. Pratyahara is the internalization of energy necessary for deep healing or for true meditation to occur. If we have not reached the stage of pratyahara, we are still not really practicing Yoga as a sadhana or spiritual practice. In pratyahara, one withdraws the prana and mind within. For real healing, the body and mind must be put in a relaxed state and the energy directed within. Many forms of treatment like massage or panchakarma are largely simulated forms of pratyahara, putting the patient into a condition of deep rest in which all toxins can be removed from the body.

The internal practices of Yoga (dharana, dhyana, and samadhi) or the inner aspect of Yoga are primarily for treating the mind and used in Ayurveda mainly for dealing with psychological disorders. This means that classical Yoga therapy is primarily a psychology employing mantra and meditation. Yoga as applied according to Ayurveda is one of the most powerful approaches for healing the mind and emotions that is available in the world today.

I would like to conclude that, it is necessary to reintegrate yoga and ayurveda in order to bring out the full healing and spiritual potential of each. Bringing ayurveda into yoga provides a yogic and Vedic system of medicine to allow for the full healing application of all aspects of yoga. For a truly holistic and spiritual approach to medicine and healing, we need both Yoga and ayurveda.

This reconnection of Yoga and Ayurveda will also provide the basis for a real dialogue with modern medicine addressing not only specific therapies but also the real causes of disease and how to maintain health and well-being in society. It can add a spiritual and preventative dimension to modern medicine as well as adding important new keys for the understanding of disease and for applying natural therapies. Both yoga and ayurveda teaches that we should pray or chant daily universal prayers for peace and great healing energy. “May all beings find happiness, may all be free of disease, may all see what is auspicious, and may no one suffer, Aum peace, peace, peace.”²

Abstract

Yoga and Ayurveda are both closely connected fundamentally holistic disciplines rooted in Vedic tradition. They intersect in the somatic and psycho spiritual wholeness. Yoga focuses on spiritual integration through self transcendence culminating in self realization. Ayurveda focuses on psychosomatic integration through comprehensive health care culminating in openness to self transcendence and self realization. Yoga and ayurveda are sister sciences that developed together and repeatedly influence each other. They are integral part of great system of Vedic knowledge which states that the entire universe is One Self. In this paper I am try to explore how both yoga is a science of self- realization and ayurveda is a science of self-healing which leads to spiritualism.

KEY WORDS: Yoga, Ayurveda, Three gunas, Three Doshas, Self realization, Self healing, Prana, Healing Power, Ashtanga Yoga.

² ॐ सर्वे भवन्तु सुखिनः सर्वे सन्तु निरामयाः।सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चिद्दुःखभाग्भवेत्।ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः।’ David Frawley, ‘*Yoga and Ayurveda: Self-healing and Self-realization*’ Motilal Banarasidas publishers private ltd, Delhi-110007, ISBN-81-208-1699-4

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The Vital Momentum and Morality in Henri Bergson

Triantafyllos Sermetis,
Doctor of Philosophy
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Introduction

In the history of philosophy, the Vitalism¹ or Theory of Momentum appeared in two meanings: the broader and the more specific. In the broader meaning of Vitalism, life is perceived as a force that exists autonomously in the world. In particular, contrary to the mechanistic conception according to which life is considered as a set of natural phenomena that can be explained by the laws that follow the events of the mineral world according to Vitalism, life cannot be fully explained, at least by these laws.

¹ The Vitalism was a dominant stream of Western European thought in the early 20th century. The most important representatives was Bergson, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer. The reader can look it up in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

All the perceptions of life that were formed in the second half of the 19th century, in contrast to analogous theories formulated in earlier times, such as in the Renaissance with Nehemiah Grew², in the Middle Ages with Francis Glisson (1599-1677)³ and Henry More (1614-1687)⁴, and even in Antiquity with Pythagoras, Aristotle and Galen⁵, were called neo-vitalism. A typical representative of this theory is Henry Bergson, who attempted to re-formulate the theory of energy that derived from unproven reasoning. Bergson's Vitalism is strongly opposed to Darwin's model of evolution and natural selection. Darwinism was not the only mechanistic model as was the case with naturalism, the other great theory of life explanation. Bergson criticizes those who were only concerned with the functional activity of the living being and tends to believe that physics and chemistry provide the opportunity for a full knowledge of biological processes. He takes the view that the evolutionary process is not only an artificial examination of repetitive behaviors that are detached from the whole and cannot be related only to the mechanistic perception of life⁶. Although he criticizes teleology, and especially radical teleology, however, he accepts it to some extent, without fully adopting it⁷.

For Bergson there are two types of knowledge, which were developed by a vital impetus during development and then separated by their growth. These are the noesis and the instinct⁸. The various aspects of the mechanistic conception of life are logical constructs of the mind. The function of the noesis is to establish relations between things, which has as

² Grew N., *Cosmologia Sacra*, Ed. W. Rogers, S. Smith and B. Walofort, London 1701.

³ English Anatomist, one of the few in his time who believed in the power of internal energy.

⁴ An English theologian and philosopher who opposed Descartes' dualism and claimed that there was a fourth dimension that was in the spirit and he used the strange phrase "essential spissitude [untranslatable]" to describe it.

⁵ He believed in a vital force that nourishes the human body

⁶Bergson H., *Creative Evolution*, pp. 47-48, trans. K. Papagiorgis- G. Prelorentzos, ed. Polis, Athens 2005.

⁷Also see, pp. 50-51.

⁸Also see, p. 136.

its primary reference to the inorganic, the static, and the solid. The mind connects continuous non-moving images to create motion. *“Everything that is fluid in reality»*, remarked Bergson, *«escapes the mind for the most part, while that which is life itself completely escapes»*⁹.

Consequently, we need another means, besides the mind, in order to be able to capture the essence of life itself and this means, according to Bergson, is the instinct. Instinct is of primary importance. For Bergson it is not just a reflex that does not contain any kind of noesis. It is, by all means, different from the noesis, even if the noesis falls into unconsciousness. The instinct potentially includes the noesis and with the instinctive momentum of life, it can be concretized into ideas. This can only be explained scientifically in a different way, not that of the noesis but of the "sympathy"¹⁰. While the mind deals with matter mechanically, in relation to cause and effect, the instinct works organically. Thanks to the instinct, which is essentially the process of life itself¹¹, we are able to perceive life from within and realize that it is an autonomous and spontaneous creative momentum. In the generative power of life, there is a potential consciousness. If this consciousness is activated and developed more broadly, it will deepen itself completely. To the extent that we have awareness of the instinct, we understand the essence of life. I have attempted to outline the concepts existing in Bergson's philosophical system above. To understand the Vital Momentum and the morality element and how they are interrelated, it is necessary to analyze, as far as possible, the four successive steps of his philosophy. Duration, Memory, inside Vision and Vitalism¹² constitute a philosophy of life, relocating epistemologically, at the beginning of the 20th century, whether the mechanistic model explaining the world interprets life or not.

⁹ Also see, pp. 153-154.

¹⁰ Also see, p. 172.

¹¹ Also see, p. 163.

¹² Deleuze G., *The Bergsonism*, p. 25, trans. G. Prelorentzos, ed. Scripta, Athens 2010.

The Vital Momentum

For Bergson, then, the world is the product of an uncontrollable force, the Vital Momentum. Initially, the Vital Momentum was manifested in certain physicochemical compounds and was subsequently separated in three different directions and, thus, three basic types of life were created: plants, insects and vertebrates. The movement transmitted by this energy, as it encounters obstacles from impermeable starting material, is sometimes diverted and sometimes divided. It always finds resistance to matter and that is the constant struggle¹³. "*Life is a momentum*", Bergson says. The development of the Vital Momentum was the creation of human being. The vital impulse that exists in every type of life in human is manifested in two ways: as noesis and as instinct.

The noesis enable us to divide reality in order to get to know it. In particular, when we try to know an object or an event, the noesis allows us firstly to distinguish it from the rest of the reality, then to immobilize it in some of the phases it goes through and then, after fragmenting it, to distinguish it in its parts. Knowing the parts that make up an object, we know the object itself.

This method of proof, has, according to Bergson, a major disadvantage. By isolating things, dividing them and immobilizing them, we separate them from one of their essential traits: movement, flow. We can conceive motion only by instinct. The instinct is sympathy¹⁴. Empathy¹⁵ is perceived by Bergson as a vital energy of universal power, which differs in all beings and especially in human beings,

¹³ Also, *Creative evolution*, p. 243.

¹⁴ In the history of philosophy, the concept of sympathy has a different meaning from the psychological meaning of the term, which is one feeling the pain of another. In Philosophy, the universal power permeates the whole world and affects all beings: one body can influence another body at the other end of the world. The term "sympathy" was systematized by the Stoic philosophy. Neo-Platonists have adopted this concept and so did Giordano Bruno in the years to come.

¹⁵ Also see, p. 173.

being able to reflect on itself and lead us to the secret of the knowledge of life¹⁶. Our instinct reveals another kind of knowledge, knowledge in all its depth, Insight, and the ability to reflect on its object¹⁷. Insight is the instinct of self-consciousness. It is neither a feeling nor an inspiration. Insight is the immediate knowledge of consciousness without one or more mediations that the noesis presupposes as reasoning¹⁸. For Bergson, Insight is a method, and indeed a "precise" method, in order to establish it as a theoretical philosophical faculty in contrast to the scientific precision. The relationships of the Vital Momentum with Duration and Memory would remain indefinable without the aid of the Insight. The Insight method is followed by three rules. The first is about creating problems. It is fundamental, according to Bergson, to control false and true problems. The false problem is one that is ready within a society. The real problem is compounded by a free-willed dynamic idea. The second rule is to discover the true differences in nature. Bergson himself constantly uses dualisms to discover the true nature of the problems. Typical examples of dualisms are the notions of instinct - noesis, memory - matter, continuous - discontinuous, contraction - dilation, etc. Finally, the third rule establishes the meaning of Insight. Insight presupposes Duration· in order to understand real time the noesis conception of Duration is essential¹⁹. We can better understand the difference between noesis and insight if we consider time. There are two forms of time: Spatial time, which we conceive with the noesis abstractly and which is distorted, and, on the other hand, there is the sheer Duration we conceive with the instinct itself²⁰. One direction of time is based on the spatial area passing through multiplicity,

¹⁶ Also.

¹⁷ Also.

¹⁸ Bergson H., "The Philosophical insight", trans. K. Papalexandrou, journal *Epoptia*, issue 1, April 1976, tribute to the question "What is philosophy", pp. 23-32.

¹⁹ Husson L., *L' intellectualisme de Bergson*, pp. 6-10, ed. P.U.F, Paris 1947.

²⁰ Bergson H., *An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, p.131, trans. K. Papagiorgis, ed. Kastaniotis, Athens 1998.

quantity, degree difference, discontinuity and order. The other direction of the time of Duration is determined by contraction, merging, qualitative difference in nature, internal organization and internal potential multiplicity²¹. Spatial time is the object of our noesis. With the latter, we divide the time into individual units, years, months, days, hours, etc. The abstract, however, is more interested in the deterioration of organisms. The mathematical calculation of time examines a specific moment. When this specific moment is examined from one point in present up to another one in the future, there is always time missing, no matter how many times this specific moment is divided. Therefore, the outer time measured in this way is a world dying and reborn in a perpetual cycle. As a consequence, by becoming static, time alienates itself from its essence, which is the flow, and becomes a form of space. With such a time, however, it is impossible to depict evolution, the characteristic of life²². The evolution of creation and the evolutionary phenomena in general, constantly flowing in a continuous motion and which, according to Bergson, constitute life itself, by no means can they be subjected to mathematical calculation or be measured by equation²³.

The real time, then, is Duration, and especially True Duration²⁴. The past and present of a living being are embedded in an organic memory²⁵. These two contract in the inner world. The two fundamental characteristics of duration are continuity and heterogeneity²⁶. According to this reasoning, Duration is not an experience shaped by external representations but an expanded experience, an experience that includes the conventional experience²⁷. This time is not shared but it is a continuous whole, which, depending on our mental mood, sometimes moves faster in joy or slower in

²¹ Also see, pp. 230-231.

²² Also see, *Creative evolution*, p.35.

²³ Also see, p. 33.

²⁴ Worms F., *Bergson ou les deux sens de la nie*, p. 64. ed. P.U.F., Paris 2004.

²⁵ Bergson H., *Matiere et memoire*, Camille Riquier, Paris 2008.

²⁶ Robinet A., *Bergson*, p. 28, ed. Seghers, Paris 1965.

²⁷ Also see, p. 29.

anguish. Consequently, we are dealing with a perpetual present, the past being integrated into the present. Therefore, evolution is a continuation of the past and the present that works restrictively, that is, uniting. These fluctuations, which are a key component of real time, of Duration, can be captured not with our noesis but with our Insight in a direct and instinctive way. Duration is Life in its essence and is at first memory, consciousness and freedom. The "at first" potential. Under what conditions does duration become an act of self-consciousness and voluntary self-determination? Bergson answers: The Vital Momentum impulse "passes" successfully only to human. In this sense, human is indeed "the reason for the existence of all mankind"²⁸.

We have already pointed out that the Vital Momentum is branched out and divided into various forms in the beings of the world. We have also stressed that the external form of time contains multiple points identified by the categories of noesis. Duration, as a memory of the past and the present, is determined by its unity. Therefore, the questions arise: Is human personality one and the same or multiple? Is the energy ultimately one or divided? And, if that is the case, what procedure is followed? After all, what is the vital momentum for Bergson?

If a person claims that their personality is unified, then the parts of their soul, which are composed of feelings, sensations and representations of the exterior "revolt and complain". When they are characterized by multiplicity, then "consciousness revolts". This can be a state of one's self²⁹. Therefore, personality can be characterized as multiple unity and a single plurality. The unity of the inner world manifests itself as a plurality of outer matter and one interferes with the other. This is the inner depth of ourselves³⁰. The momentum, revealed as life, is activated by gradual steps, when it comes into contact with matter. To the extent that this momentum is triggered when it penetrates matter, it is

²⁸ Bergson H., *Two Sources of Morality And Religion*, p. 165, trans. V. Tomanas, ed Nisides, Thessaloniki 2006.

²⁹ Also see, *Creative evolution*, p. 246.

³⁰ Also see, p. 246.

separated and branched into a plurality. The activation of the momentum has a potentiality into the multiplicity. Consequently, the actuation involves a movement towards the physical exterior. In other words, time enters matter. Depending on the density of matter, the duration varies and is divided into manifolds. The characteristic of Duration is that it differs only externally, but because of its great power, it can potentially explode inside the living being. This presupposes the unity that focuses on an originating global momentum. When Durability appears in this way as a momentum, then it is life. Therefore, the more this explosive energy is released, the more life there is inside it.

Based on my reasoning, the fundamental tenets of Bergson's philosophy appear to be an interplay of individuality with matter. In addition, one could argue that there is inter-subjectivity interrelated in the field of society. To the extent that momentum is differentiated in its unity and according to its qualitative escalation social morality is transcended, then the subject is opened to "an elsewhere". On the contrary, when the subject is submitted to a restrictive sociability of hierarchical morality values, the potentiality of triggering the impetus for life is deactivated. Consequently, Bergson's personalized Vital Momentum is directly linked to society and to its morality, either open or closed.

Closed Morality

Bergson contrasts the form of open society with that of closed society. In contrast to a closed society, which is not evolving but it remains static by recycling the same features, without incorporating new ones, open society is dynamic in the sense that, responding to the new conditions, it assimilates new elements next to the old and it eliminates any of its old ingredients that are not compatible with new situations. A key feature that motivates societies is morality, whether closed or open. Social morality is individually determined by closed or open souls.

In particular, according to Bergson, a closed society mimics nature in its organization. This organization that presupposes indestructible rules or laws. In a sense, the laws enacted in a society resemble the laws of nature³¹. For a philosopher, of course, there is a fundamental difference between the laws of nature and the laws of society. In the first case, the law compels whereas in the second it orders. In the first case, one cannot escape but in the second case, one can escape the order³². The potential dimension that can be brought about in a closed society between natural and social law is bridged by religion, institutionalizing the injustices resulting from precepts, artificially adding societies to an identity of natural and social law³³. These laws are terms that take the form of obligation and duty. Habits introduce discipline to individuals, as long as they perceive social identity to be the natural order³⁴. When a person turns to himself, he realizes his freedom to satisfy his desires. In such case, he does not think of others. Then, a socially accumulated competitive power that goes against one's desires appears. Contrary to individual motives, this power draws the individual towards itself in proportion to the laws of nature. Thus, the individual, rather than being liberated, submits to a necessity. The fact that a person is conscious that he or she can act freely, but still does what is necessary, is called obligation³⁵. On the basis of the above reasoning, it is concluded that religion, as an institutional expression of a society, aims at imposing obligation to the individuals of a society. In a closed society, the individual, as the cell of that society, submits to a morality obligation, constituting a body with society. A closed morality, whose religion is static, institutional, restricts morality in order to achieve social cohesion. Nature has made certain species evolve in such a way, that individuals who belong in these species cannot exist

³¹ Bergson H., *Two Sources Of Morality And Religion*, p. 11, trans. V. Tomanas, ed. Nisides, Thessaloniki 2006.

³² Also see, p. 11.

³³ Also see, pp. 12-13.

³⁴ Also see, p. 13.

³⁵ Also see, p. 13.

on their own. They are fragile and require the support of the community. The example of bees, used by Bergson, depict these societies. I can argue that there are bodily needs that must be fulfilled. The power of these needs is the source of closed morality. Due to these needs, the rules of closed morality are rigid. Kant's morality philosophy has its source in these needs. The survival of the community requires strict obedience; it is categorical imperative. Thus, the will is not self-determined but it is identified with the Word of nature. However, although Kant's categorical imperative is supposed to have universal validity, according to Bergson this is not the case³⁶. He argues that morality restraint is limited and specific. Closed morality is really about the survival of a society, the society in which the individual acts³⁷. It therefore excludes any other society³⁸. For Bergson, closed morality is bound for conflict situations. The static religion, the religion of closed morality, is based on what Bergson calls "mythical function"³⁹. Mythical function is a specific function of imagination that generates voluntary hallucinations⁴⁰. Mythical function produces the sense of a panoptic presence that follows us and invents the images of gods. These images then ensure strict obedience to closed morality. In other words, they ensure social cohesion.

This attitude is the attitude of a person and a society wrapped up in themselves. The souls here rotate in an individual social circle. When a person defends his personal interest over the social, which is a natural process, a closed society can only be conflictual.

Therefore, the archetype of a closed society is the community of gender or race, in which everything is governed by religion and magical-religious prohibitions. Correspondingly, power and general social life operate on such terms and, as a consequence, individuals cannot take

³⁶ Kant I., *Critique of practical reason*, p. 78, trans. K. Androulidakis, Athens 2004.

³⁷ Kant I., *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of morals*, p. 34, trans. G. Tzavaras, Athens 1982.

³⁸ Also see, p. 116.

³⁹ See, *Two Sources Of Morality And Religion*, p. 85.

⁴⁰ Also see, p. 86.

the initiative. Community-society, that is, functions almost like a biological organism, in which individuals play the role of body members. Everything remains uniform, stable and unchanging; there is no individual freedom, no creativity, no possibility for evolution to higher social forms⁴¹.

Open Society

Open is the society in which individuals are entitled, and often obliged, to make personal decisions on all issues. The issue of open society is a huge revolution in the way social life and activity are structured, yet it encounters the reaction of closed societies that exist and are supported by two categories of people, the insecure and the selfish⁴².

⁴¹ Popper K., *The Open Society and its Enemies*, p. 108, trans. E. Papadaki, Athens 2003.

⁴² Also see, p. 31. In this work, Popper criticizes Plato's State, but also Hegel's and Marx's. Popper argues that the emergence of the open society of classical ancient Athens triggered the reaction of the closed (oligarchic) societies of Greek antiquity, led by Sparta. According to Popper, Sparta's policy was based on the following principles, which characterize all closed societies.

- Defending the internal organization of society and avoiding any external influences that could lead to the laxity of the rigid religious community taboos on which it was structured.
- Anti-humanism, that is, protection of the community from all kinds of egalitarian, democratic and other ideologies of individual progress.
- State self-sufficiency, that is, independence from trade and exchange.
- Anti-ecumenism that is, maintaining the difference between our "own" race and all others, as well as avoiding admixture with the subordinate (inferior) tribes.
- Sovereignty and enslavement of neighboring communities, states and peoples.
- Avoiding excessive expansion of the state so as not to lose its unitary character.

Popper concludes that the above-mentioned six principles underlying ancient Sparta's policy are also the principles of the politics of modern "closed" societies of the 20th century, having in mind mainly the so-called "socialist" societies, until the late 80s. "We now know that whenever the post-spartian states, especially the empires (Macedonian, Roman,

I had pointed out that the Vital Momentum in human is divided into noesis and instinct. The habits of a social morality are rooted in the instinctive nature of human, whereas intelligence is a tool of choice for laws, as a categorical imperative, which the disciplined individual strictly obeys within the society. This is the "whole of obligation"⁴³ that is not based solely on noesis, but on a demand of latter as a kind of "potential instinct,"⁴⁴ as Bergson typically says. Therefore, sociality can only exist in intelligent beings, but it is not founded on intelligence. Social life begins with the noesis but does not stem from it. We see at this point that there is a gap between the noesis and society. To the extent that there is a factor linking the distance between noesis and society, the case of open society is potentially activated. What mediates, according to Bergson, is emotion, or rather, I would say, creative emotion. He criticizes extreme rationality, which removes emotion from the object and views it as a reflection on a mental representation⁴⁵. The concept of emotion in Bergson has nothing to do with noesis or instinct. It distinguishes two types of emotions that have a common characteristic, thymic. The first kind of emotion is related to the idea of a performance. The representation provokes a post-convulsion in the inner world. This depiction is not clearly distinguished from the noesis. This is what Bergson calls "sub-intelligence emotion"⁴⁶. This emotion is mainly concerned with psychology⁴⁷. The second kind of emotion is not associated

Byzantine, Ottoman, etc.) violated these rules, they were subversively influenced. But even in today's times, we can appreciate that the Soviet "closed society" ultimately failed because it reproduced itself.

⁴³ See, *Two Sources of Morality And Religion*, p. 25.

⁴⁴ Also see, p. 155.

⁴⁵ Also see, p. 34.

⁴⁶ Also see, p. 36.

⁴⁷ The first studies of the concept of emotion in the science of psychology, from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, focused on its physical-organic dimension and on the subjective awareness of the subjective changes it produces. The key position in this approach, influenced by James's ideas (but also by Darwin's thinking and the primacy of biology at the time), was that man senses a stimulating stimulus and reacts to it as he experiences physical changes whose

with fantasies or with representational functions of the material surface⁴⁸. It precedes and takes priority over time "and for the relation of the one that gives birth to the one that is born"⁴⁹. That is, the emotion itself creates its ideas. That's why Bergson will say that "Creation means emotion"⁵⁰. There is the movement of consciousness and the Memory is activated at duration. This emotion is creative for three reasons: a) Because it expresses the whole creation, b) because it creates itself, and c) because it transmits this creativity to other people. Undoubtedly, this emotion is nothing more than an originating archetypal cosmic energy, which, when activated, frees human from any closed society and makes him a co-creator in the movement of all creation. Undoubtedly, the creative emotion requires gradual steps in every human being as much as creative power permeates matter⁵¹. When uncontrolled cosmic power is realized and transformed into creative emotions in some souls, these souls are privileged. In fact, the Insight into the noesis is born⁵². In this sense, human penetrates and accesses material that is impenetrable, in the first instance, with open creative wholeness. The great souls, according to Bergson, are the souls of artists and mystics⁵³. The mystic through this vital momentum of creativity permeates God Himself, intuitively inventing an expression that belongs to creation. It expresses the whole of creation and, thus, weaves the plan of an open society that passes from one soul to another.

consciousness is emotion, namely the body that informs the mind that the subject is moved. In this first psychological approach, emotion is perceived as a "bridge" between body and mind. The body experiences stimuli and human being is moved as he or she represents them in his/her noesis. James W., *The Principles of Psychology*, ed. Harvard University Press 1981.

⁴⁸ Worms F., «James et Bergson: lectures croisees», pp. 54-58, journal *Philosophie*, 64.

⁴⁹ See, *Two Sources Of Morality And Religion*, p. 37.

⁵⁰ Also see, p. 37.

⁵¹ Also see, p. 187.

⁵² Also see, p. 168.

⁵³ Also see, p. 188.

Conclusions

In the first part of the study, when I referred to Duration, Memory⁵⁴ and Vital Momentum, there was no obvious connection between the concept of morality and dynamic society in the first place. Duration, therefore, as a continuous inner time defines a qualitative potential multiplicity within the world, from which the cosmic memory integrates as one all degrees of multiplicity within that potentiality. Vital Momentum activates this potential and is expressed as creative emotion of many degrees, up to the line of highest level of creativity that Vital Momentum acquires self-consciousness. Creative emotion is, in my view, the defining element of Bergson's philosophical system. The logical sequence of his philosophical thought, starting from "*An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*", going to "*Matter and Memory*" and then to "*Creative evolution*" and ending in his work "*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*", confirms the escalation of his thinking. It aims to free human beings from social necessities and redirect them to a mystic path, where insight plays the determinant role as a conception of the real. To activate the Insight, it is preceded by the element of emotion, which does not accept the representations, but diffuses itself into beings and things as a force of universal creation. The aim of the philosopher is voluntary freedom perceived as existential freedom. In order to achieve this goal, a necessary prerequisite is to divert it to another 'place', which, according to Bergson, is called "Duration". This conception of time that is not announced is an element of another world that does not only have time but, also, space.

In light of Bergson's philosophy, the Vital Momentum directs human to another mentality. There is an area where freedom can take place, potentially leading to voluntary self-determination and revolutionary self-consciousness,

⁵⁴ See, Worms F., *Introduction à Matière et mémoire de Bergson*, ed. P.U.F., Paris 2008.

transcending the abyssal chaos of zero. Considering such a possibility, a static social situation may be completely overthrown.

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Abstract

Bergson's Duration, Memory, Insight, and Vital Momentum are clearly linked to the element of morality. Duration, as continuous inner time, defines a qualitative potential multiplicity within the world and it enables the cosmic memory to integrate all degrees of multiplicity. Vital Momentum activates this potential and it is expressed as the creative emotion of many stages, up to the line of the highest level of creativity that the Vital Momentum becomes self-conscious. Creative emotion is a key element of Bergson's philosophical system. The aim of the philosopher is voluntary freedom, which is perceived as existential freedom. To achieve this goal, a necessary prerequisite is to divert it to another location, known as "Duration". Bergson attempts to overturn a static social situation by pointing to a different philosophical path.

Keywords: Vital momentum, Duration, Insight, Memory, Creative Evolution, Morality, Noesis, Open society, Closed Morality, Categorical imperative



Reconciliation of Gandhi-Ambedkar Debate through Gadamer's Hermeneutics

Amita Valmiki,
Associate Professor and Head,
Department of Philosophy,
R. J. College of Arts, Science and Commerce (Autonomous),
[Affiliated to University of Mumbai]

Martin Luther King (Jr.) said, “Gandhi was inevitable. If humanity is to progress, Gandhi is inescapable. He lived, thought and acted, inspired by the vision of humanity evolving toward a world of peace and harmony. We may ignore Gandhi at our own risk.”¹

C. D. Naik said, “There have been many saints and Mahatmas, who interested themselves in ameliorating the lot of untouchables, but none before has correctly diagnosed the disease. Dr. Ambedkar alone tracked to its source and prescribed the proper treatment.”²

¹ Green, Jen, *Gandhi and the Quit India Movement*. Raintree Publication, UK, 2014, pp. 53.

² Naik, C. D., *Thoughts and Philosophy of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar*. Sarup and Sons, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 04.

The two highly venerated and revered personalities of pre and post Independent India, M. K. Gandhi and B. R. Ambedkar, denounced all types of hierarchies – be it patriarchal, racial, class or most notably caste system; that is the *Charturvarna*, popularly known as *Varna* System in traditional Hindu society. The *Varna* system comprises of four castes, the *Brahmins* (the priestly community), the *Kshatriyas* (the royal or warrior community), the *Vaishyas* (the farmer or trader or merchant community) and the *Shudras* (the helpers or service providers). The *Varna* system resembles to Plato's concept of *Ideal State* (in *Republic*) with three divisions, namely the philosopher-kings, the soldier community and the artisan or labourer or worker community. Plato, unlike in *Phaedo*, emphasizes on the virtue of *justice* (in *Republic*) if all the three communities work in harmony. *Varna* system in fact is the same. It is a social stratification of the classes as mentioned in Hindu texts, most notably in *Manusmriti* (the *Laws of Manu*) that lays down codes, norms and laws for individual and individual classes in an ideal society. [It is also called the *Dharma Code of Manu*; *dharma* meaning *duty*, *obligation* or *cosmic law or order*. It is known to have been written by Bhrigu who refused to disclose his name in *Manusmriti*.] Leaving apart the historical authorship of the *Manusmriti*, the text is highly revered, acknowledged and enforced from the time of its inception around circa 100 CE. That much to the background, the text has enormous significance till date. This is highly disquieting. The allegations are same as they were levied on Plato's *Ideal State* division as it fosters the feeling of master-slave concept. [Though Aristotle saved his teacher's theory by saying it is nothing but *division of labour*. As mentioned by Gerard Naddaf, "In his inquiry into the definition of justice and its effects on the individual soul, Plato proposes to seek the principle behind the logical development of an actual state. Since individuals are not self-sufficient, it is agreed that the state originates and develops according to the principle of the natural division of labour,

that is, the notion that each individual should perform a single task for which each has a natural aptitude.....”³]

The same defense for *Varna* system is found the holy scripture of Hinduism – the *Bhagavad Gita* [written around 400 BCE and 200 CE, where the authorship still remains a mystery. But legend has it that it was spoken by Lord Krishna and authored by Vyasa, a sage.] In the *Gita*, Krishna says, “The four-fold order was created by Me according to the divisions of quality and work. Though I am its creator, know Me to be incapable of action or change.” (Chapter IV, verse 13) And further elaborates as which caste has to do what.

Then the question arises, who are these ‘untouchables’ and where they came from? Almost in the beginning of the medieval period, the two major groupings developed, namely the *survarnas* – those belonging to the four *varnas* (caste), and *avarnas* – those not belonging to any *varna*. The *avarnas* are known as *dalits* (the broken/oppressed) in contemporary times and were assigned to do menial jobs of scavengers, rearers of unclean animals like pigs, curers of hides of dead animals, sweepers, drainage cleaners, and the like. From former times to almost the present times they were and are degraded, loathed and hated. They are considered as *untouchables*.

Many medieval mystic/saints and social reformers and later under British Rule the modern social reformers fought for their rights. In this context two names come to the forefront – one is Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948) and the other Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891-1956).

M. K. Gandhi led the frontline in India’s independence struggle that actually began in South Africa in around 1893; and it continued when he returned to India in 1914. But his ‘non-violent civil disobedience’ struggle against British rule was accelerated from 1915 upto the British left India in 1947. Gandhi was the founder-father of *Sabarmati Ashrama* at Ahmedabad, Gujarat (India). He was born in an upper caste

³ Naddaf, Gerard, *The Role of the Poet in Plato’s Ideal Cities of Callipolis and Magnesia*. Kriterion vol. 48 no. 116, Belo Horizonte (Brazil) July/Dec. 2007.

Modh-Baniya (the *Vaishya* caste, the trader/merchants' caste) in a Gujarati *Vaishanava* (worshipping Rama and Krishna as incarnations of Lord Vishnu) Hindu prosperous family. Giving this background of Gandhi's early life is to bring to the light that Gandhi came from an elite caste of Hindu society. But *Sabarmati Ashrama* was open for all irrespective of caste, class, race or gender distinction, including the untouchables.

Gandhi believed in the *Varna* system and traces its existence before actually it was discovered. Gandhi was a proud Hindu, and had respect to the *laws of nature*. According to him, through the laws of nature Indians have risen from mundane to spiritual level. In the Western world, they prospered materialistically because of these *laws of nature*, but he was of the firm belief that India has rose to spiritual heights due to these *laws*. And *varna* system is a motivator to establish 'social welfare' [as called *Loksamgraha* in the *Gita*.] According to Mazumdar, "In the Gandhian concept, *Varna Dharma* occupies an important position. *Varna Dharma* is such a scientific social device which like that of division of labour makes the society strong, accurate and well coordinated. The science of *Varnashramadharma* is based on profession linked with the hereditary factors."⁴

But in simultaneity Gandhi was completely averse to caste system that camouflaged into *varna* system. According to him caste system had distorted the *varna* that created a gross adverse and abrogating picture of Hinduism all over the world. This is how the fall of the ancient religion took place. It not only disfigured Hinduism in perversity but also brought about the down fall of economy by bringing about unemployment and poverty. It also advocates untouchability, the hulking evil in Indian society, vitiating the complete social texture of Hindu society. Mazumdar notes further, "He (Gandhi) did not believe in the so-called caste system. To him, not only truth was God or God was truth, but man in

⁴ Mazumdar, Sukhendru, *Politico-Economic Ideas of Mahatma Gandhi: Their Relevance in the Present-Day*. Gandhian Studies and Peace Research Series – 20, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 28.

flesh and blood was an embodiment of God to him. His *Karma* (service) was always for the downtrodden and suffering masses. He was never lodged in the petty considerations of high and low castes.”⁵ So it is out rightly clear that Gandhi despised caste system and untouchability but justified *Varna* system based on the potentials of an individual and also that the *Varna* system advocated *division of labour*. [This reminds of Plato’s *Ideal State* concept.] So his fight for freedom and struggle for independence go hand in hand with his fight against caste system, more specifically the ‘untouchability’. As noted by Das, “He (Gandhi) kept conditions in the recruitment of volunteers of the freedom movement that anybody who believes or practices caste system would not be qualified to join the freedom movement. So, people who revolted against the British had to forego the superstition of caste barrier.”⁶ In fact Gandhi called the untouchables *Harijan* meaning *Children/People of God*.

But Dr. B. R. Ambedkar completely contradicted Gandhi though the aim remained same. Ambedkar was born in a Dalit Mahar (Scheduled Caste, known in his times, the untouchables) Maharashtrian family. His father worked for British-Indian Army, but he got education with many difficulties because of his social status. Through scholarships awarded to him he continued his studies in United States, Britain and Germany. He refused the prestigious Baroda Public Service job as he was ill-treated by the upper caste Hindus. He was a lawyer, so started his practice in law and also started teaching. He was appointed as Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee of Independent India. This background of Ambedkar’s life is essential to know how he could lead the movement for *dalits* and asked for equal rights for all. He openly denounced Gandhi’s views on untouchability and wrote a book *What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables?* (1945). He quotes Thucydides, the Athenian Historian and General, ‘It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be

⁵ Ibid. pp. 29.

⁶ Das, Ratan, *The Global Vision of Mahatma Gandhi*. Sarup and Sons, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 208-209.

your slaves?’ in the beginning of his book. Since he came from the *dalit* family, he had suffered the pain and agony of untouchability. Therefore he resigned as a Law Minister from the parliament as he could not find discrimination and inequality eradicated from Hindu society (and for several other reasons). Therefore in 1956 he renounced Hinduism as his religion along with two hundred thousand *dalits* and adopted Buddhism as their religion; and wrote a book *The Buddha and His Dhamma* (posthumously published in 1957). His *Neo-Buddhist* movement was a socio-political movement that propagated equality and justice, especially to the oppressed *dalits*. Some of the core ethical theories of Buddhism he could not accept therefore he radically re-interpreted the religion as a *New Vehicle (Navayana)* or *Neo-Buddhism*. Ambedkar out rightly denied the two legendary Hindu epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* as these epics, he thought, emboldened the caste system by glorifying the upper two castes and always belittled and humiliated the lower castes.⁷

At this juncture it is very important to know that these stalwarts in their own way had very firm take on marginalized *dalits* and eradication of caste system. But they stood on the extreme polls. The point that is very conspicuous is, was Gandhi completely against caste system? And if he supported *Varnadharma*; isn't it inherently suggested that he favored caste only conceptually considering 'ideal system for a *Utopian society*'? As such *varnadharma* is taken to mean that it is an ideal system for newly structured social and religious realms. On the other hand Ambedkar was of the opinion that the term '*varna*' embroils into contaminated social hierarchy that leads to nothing but oppression and corruption. In fact the agendas at hand for Gandhi and Ambedkar were on different footings. Gandhi

⁷In the preface of his book *The Buddha and His Dhamma* Ambedkar writes, '.....Another question is being asked: why I am inclined towards Buddhism....The direct answer to this question is that I regard the Buddha's Dhamma to be the best. No religion can be compared to it. If a modern man knows science must have a religion, the only religion he can have is the Religion of the Buddha. This conviction has grown in me after thirty-five years of close study of all religions.' [Rattu, 1995, pp. 96.]

was more involved with the freedom struggle; and most of the time surrounded and addressed the elite of Hindu society. Ambedkar, on the other hand, personally suffered the humiliation under the upper caste Hindus. Therefore his first and foremost agenda was to fight for the rights of untouchables.

Gandhi glorified Hinduism. He believed in the concept of '*dharma*' that played a pivotal role in the *varna* system also. He shared his views on dharma, often translated as 'duty' to Tolstoy. And *dharma* was highly emphasized in the philosophy of the *Bhagavad Gita* to which Gandhi followed adherently. Chatterjee notes in her book that Ruskin's view on different kinds of work to be given equal footing; also "the parable of the talents in the *New Testament* confirmed him in his belief that all hold their talents in trust for the good of society. In this way, as was laid down in the *Gita*, he linked the *dharma* of the individual with *Loksamgraha*, the welfare of all."⁸

As such Gandhi desired to establish *swaraj* (Home Rule) and according to him *swaraj* is not achievable if untouchability is not eradicated. This can be deduced from what he noted in *Young India*, "Non-cooperation against the government means cooperation among the governed and if Hindus do not remove the sin of untouchability there will be no *Swaraj* whether in one year or in one hundred years. If I invite the depressed classes to join the movement of Non-cooperation, I do so because I want them to realize strength. *Swaraj* is unattainable without the removal of the sin of untouchability."⁹ Therefore Gandhi was also against reservation for the dalits as Ambedkar demanded as he thought that the divide is already created among the Hindus and the Muslims, one more divide can ruin India. Also that Gandhi, after returning from Africa did not accelerate the pace for his movement against caste system as he thought the Indian masses were yet not ready to give up their age-old

⁸ Chatterjee, Margaret, *Gandhi's Religious Thought*. The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983, pp. 20.

⁹ Kumar, Raj, ed., *Essays on Dalits*. Discovery Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 99.

tradition. Therefore the movement took gradual pace and later Gandhi openly proclaimed his anti-caste views. (Kolge, 2017)

Ambedkar was absolutely against class stratification, be it *varna* or any other system. And *varnadharma* belonged to Hinduism. Therefore according to him, Gandhi never went against caste system *per se*. Roy has denounced Gandhi in her book *The Doctor and the Saint: The Ambedkar-Gandhi Debate: Caste, Race and Annihilation of Caste*. (2019) She notes that there are so many issues that are tackled at international level – like racism, sexism, terrorism etc., why caste has not been taken up by the international forum? And the answer is – it is because of Hindu mysticism, spiritualism, non-violence, and many other related factors; but mainly because of Gandhi, who is glorified as *Mahatma* (the Great Soul) who supported Hinduism vehemently. In fact she mentions Ambedkar saying that Hinduism for *dalits* is nothing but ‘a veritable chamber of horrors.’ Roy says if an author has to use terms for a group of people as untouchables, backward classes, scheduled caste, and other backward classes to characterize our fellow human beings is nothing like living in a chamber of horrors. In fact words like ‘*dalits*’ or ‘*Harijan*’ is also quite humiliating as it is for the *dalits* to escape from the blemish of caste. Does the term *Harijan* give the *dalits* the equal status with the upper caste? Ambedkar could not accept the term *Harijan* for the same reason. Roy’s contention is an admirer of Hinduism can never give up caste system. Hinduism believes in reincarnation and transmigration of soul; an individual’s present birth is the consequence of the *karma* (actions) of the previous birth. So an individual born in upper caste means the person had performed extremely good actions in the previous birth; likewise in the descending order for lower caste person. And therefore Ambedkar could never reconcile his views with Gandhi’s views as he thought Gandhi being a proud Hindu would not and cannot bastion a movement that is anti-Hindu. For him fighting against British and establishing India as Sovereign Secular Democratic Republic is nothing but a farce; as after imperialist regime, the *dalits*

will have to tolerate and suffer the ‘upper-caste regime’. Their situation remained same. For him the dalits never had freedom in pre, during and post British rule. In fact in one of his interviews (1955) he mentioned Gandhi as a hardcore orthodox Hindu; therefore annihilation of caste was never his agenda. This is too obvious in his vernacular writing *Dinbandhu* (in Gujarati where he supported *Varnashramadharma*) which Gandhi did not express in his weeklies (in English) *Young India* and *Harijan* where he spoke of democracy that was well appreciated by the Western world. In his interview he said, “I know Gandhi better than his disciples. They came as devotees and only saw the *Mahatma*. I was an opponent and I saw the bare man in him. He showed me his fangs.”¹⁰ Gandhi’s most popular movement was *Satyagraha* (Soul Force); and that made the oppressed more docile and quiet on their sufferings.

Ramachandra Guha has vividly described the difference between Gandhi and Ambedkar, “Gandhi wished to save Hinduism by abolishing untouchability, whereas Ambedkar saw a solution for his people outside the fold of the dominant religion of the Indian people. Gandhi was a rural romantic, who wished to make the self-governing village the bedrock of free India; Ambedkar an admirer of city life and modern technology who dismissed the Indian village as a den of iniquity. Gandhi was a crypto-anarchist who favoured non-violent protest while being suspicious of the state; Ambedkar a steadfast constitutionalist, who worked within state and sought solutions to social problems with the aid of the state. (2010.33)¹¹ From the quote of Guha would it be just to criticize Gandhi for favouring Hinduism; or to criticize Ambedkar for being a rationalist and constitutional?

According to Rathore, Gandhi was against slavery, as Indians were under British imperialism. But *dalits* were slave under the majority community (the Hindus), and also under

¹⁰ BBC, December 31, 1955.

¹¹ Pföstl, Eva, ed., *Between Ethics and Politics: Gandhi Today*. Routledge, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 148.

British Rule. Therefore the *dalits* were “slaves of slaves”.¹² So the point is very clear, Gandhi and Ambedkar could never reconcile their ideological differences.

Can one try to see the whole scene from hermeneutical point of view? Why Gandhi was not interpreted literally, with its original and first version writing and so was Ambedkar? From Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach the difference between these two masters can be resolved and reconciled. Gadamer employs orthodox and modest method in his hermeneutics and that he engages in ‘philosophical dialogue’ that remains objective but at the same time maintains practicality. Can we employ Gadamer’s hermeneutics to Gandhi’s and Ambedkar’s writings? The ‘idea of *phronesis*’ that is ‘practical wisdom’ coming from Plato will bring worth of Gandhi and Ambedkar’s writings together. Gandhi had his own prejudices towards Hinduism from Ambedkar’s point of view and Ambedkar had his own prejudices towards untouchables from Gandhi’s point of view. Looking from Gadamer’s point of view one can interpret both prejudices more from *phronesis* and arrive at ‘existential practical wisdom’. Through his hermeneutical approach both – in the writings of Gandhi and Ambedkar one can pull out historical and linguistic positioning of human understanding that opens up the layer to reveal the Being who is the foundation; and the ‘Truth as event is discovered’, the experiential truth and not the derived or deduced truths. The caste system which these stalwarts completely deny; and the method they implement to erase caste system, where Gandhi uses Satyagraha as a method and Ambedkar uses the Constitutional method, both tried their best to eradicate caste system and establish experiential practical wisdom, making the whole method turn into ‘an event’. How much they were successful is completely other point. But the differences can be reconciled.

For example, few of the quotes from the masters:

As Gandhi says, “*Varna* has nothing to do with caste. Down with the monster of caste that masquerades in the

¹² Rathore, Aakash Singh, *Dalit Svaraj: Toward a Political Theory*. icpr.in/Seminar/dalit/theory_aakash_singh_rathore, pp. 02.

guise of *varna*. It is this travesty of *varna* that has degraded Hinduism and India. Our failure to follow the law of *varna* is largely responsible both for our economic and spiritual ruin. It is one cause of unemployment and impoverishment, and it is responsible for untouchability and defections from our faith.”¹³

Ambedkar says, “Caste is not a physical object like a wall of bricks or a line of barbed wire which prevents the Hindus from co-mingling and which has, therefore, to be pulled down. Caste is a notion; it is a state of the mind.”¹⁴

Gandhi says, “I do not want to be reborn. But if I have to be reborn, I should be born an untouchable, so that I may share their sorrows, sufferings, and the affronts leveled at them, in order that I may endeavour to free myself and them from that miserable condition. I, therefore, prayed that, if I should be born again, I should do so not as a *Brahmin*, *Kshatriya*, *Vaishya* or *Shudra*, but as an *Atishudra*.”¹⁵

Ambedkar says, “There is no doubt, in my opinion, that unless you can change your social order you can achieve little by way of progress. You cannot mobilize the community either for defence or for offence. You cannot build anything on the foundations of caste. You cannot build up a nation, you cannot build up a morality. Anything that you will build on the foundations of caste will crack and will never be a whole.”¹⁶

Therefore, as Gadamer believed that the *teleos* of having a dialogue is not to have any confrontation and prove your point; but to relate, not through subjectivity, but through openness to be ready to ‘understand the other’ and create ‘a good-will.’ This is to bring wholeness, unanimity, unity and solidarity. As mentioned by Nuria Boronate, “....., Gadamer’s rehabilitation of Aristotle is not a nostalgic plead for ancient *polis*. Rather, Gadamer’s intention is to preserve

¹³ Gandhi, M. K., *Young India*, 24-11-’27.

¹⁴ Rodrigues, Valerian, *The Essential Writings of B. R. Ambedkar*. Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 289.

¹⁵ Gandhi, M. K., *Young India*, 4-5-1921.

¹⁶ Ambedkar, B. R., *Annihilation of Caste*. Gautam Book Centre, Delhi, 2008, pp. 44.

spaces where solidarity can still grow.”¹⁷ So we arrive at a dialogue through which we open ourselves to others and vice versa. And, like Socrates, a dialogue opens up the possibility to accept one’s ignorance. Therefore from Gadamer’s hermeneutics we deduce that both Gandhi and Ambedkar were against caste system and their respective critiques can arrive to various truths through method of interpreting their writings and reconcile their practical thoughts to be shared by whole of humanity. [Gandhi wrote an article in Harijan - ‘Caste Has to Go’ in November 16, 1935 and Ambedkar wrote ‘*Annihilation of Caste*’ in 1936.]

Can we therefore say that we can have the ‘Gandhian-Ambedkarite or Ambedkarite-Gandhian universal situation’ that sees no discrimination of caste, class, creed, race or gender! Through the historical to the present – the journey of both these masters is in fact the need of the hour.

Abstract:

The paper introduces the *Varna System* that is understood as *Caste System* in India and its interpretation by M. K. Gandhi and B. R. Ambedkar. Both the masters were against the caste system that has degraded Indian society by oppressing the *dalits* (the broken/oppressed), those who were known as *Untouchables* and ‘out of’ Hindu Caste System. But it is well known that both the stalwarts were completely against each other, especially their approach to eradicate the caste system. One finds critics like Arundhati Roy, Aakash Singh Rathod, Ramachandra Guha and many others, those who find either Gandhi’s views or Ambedkar’s views and their respective prejudices very controversial. The paper is an attempt to reconcile the thoughts of Gandhi and Ambedkar through Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach that brings forth, instead of debate, a dialogue between these two masters and through their writing one can foresee to establish unity and solidarity.

¹⁷ Castillo, R. del, Faerna, A. M., and Hickman, L. A., eds., *Confines of Democracy: Essays on the Philosophy of Richard J. Bernstein*. Brill Rodopi, Houston, 2012, pp. 129.

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The platonic proof of the immortality of the soul with three arguments:

- a) *the argument of anamnesis,*
- b) *the argument of the opposites,*
- c) *the argument of similarity*

Meno 80a-86c and *Phaedo* 70e-80e

Elias Vavouras,
Doctor of Philosophy,
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Introduction

In the platonic dialogues of *Meno* (80a-86c) and *Phaedo* (72e-77b) the Socratic - and of course the accepted by the Platonic view - thesis that the *knowledge* is *anamnesis* is extensively developed. The initial paradox of this position is rationalized by the aim of proving of the theories of Ideas or Separated Species and of the immortality of the soul. It is very interesting to walk around these platonic places, because the arguments that develop here will lead us to the textual

conception of fundamental platonic positions, such as the theory of Ideas, the immortality of the soul or the transcendental origin of knowledge, which are intertwined each other but also with the earlier philosophical notations of the presocratic natural philosophy or the Orphic-Pythagorean teachings¹. Our research process will begin with the presentation of the theory of *anamnesis* in the Platonic dialogues *Meno* (80a-86c) and *Phaedo* (72e-77b). The groundbreaking arguments for this position will then be presented in detail. Finally, an attempt will be made to connect these arguments with the platonic view of the immortality of the soul and of the existence of the ideas. A comparative assessment of the theory of *anamnesis* in the two dialogues as to its function and the goals it fulfills could also be significant².

1. How the position that learning and knowledge are an *anamnesis* presented to *Meno* and *Phaedo*? Why Plato resort to the theory of *anamnesis*?

The theory of *anamnesis* is first founded in *Meno*. The discussion - on this subject - begins with the stating of *Meno*

¹ Cf. Allen R. E., "Anamnesis in Plato's "Meno and Phaedo"", *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Sep., 1959), pp. 165-174. Cf., Vlastos G., "Anamnesis in the *Meno*: Part One: The Data of the Theory", *Dialogue / Volume 4 / Issue 02 / September 1965*, pp 162 – 163; Vlastos strongly disagrees with the view that the theory of *anamnesis* is a Pythagorean loan to Platon. "What the Pythagoreans did hold, and not only they but Pythagoras, is the doctrine of transmigration. But the connection of this with Plato's doctrine of recollection is so loose that one can believe in transmigration without believing in anything which includes that minimal sense of recollection I have just been discussing, indeed without having the slightest inkling of it. A doctrine of recollection was a prominent feature of the Pythagorean belief in transmigration, at least to the extent of crediting Pythagoras himself with the power to recover knowledge acquired in previous incarnations [...] This doctrine, the only one that would deserve mention in a history of the theory of knowledge, let alone mention as a milestone in this theory, is the product of Plato's genius and of his alone".

² Cf., Plochmann G. K., "Plato's *Meno*: Questions to be disputed", *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 1974 / 24 Vol. 8; Iss. 4, pp. 266-282.

that Socrates resembles the fish (probably the fish marbled electric ray / *torpedo marmorata*), which causes numbness in those who touch it³. This is exactly how Socrates conveyed the question, in which he finds himself constantly, to Meno, who numbed is no longer able to define virtue, which he could do without the questionable effect of Socrates. Then there is the divisive-sophistic paradox “No one can inquire either into what he knows or into what he doesn’t know. He can’t inquire into what he knows—for he knows it, and there is no need for this inquiry for anyone who knows. Nor can he inquire into what he doesn’t know—for he doesn’t know what it is that he should inquire into⁴.” This sophistic paradox can be disproved if the theory of *anamnesis* is valid. According to this theory, the soul acquired the knowledge before its incarnation in the body, but after this incarnation-birth it forgot everything and may regain the knowledge of an element that it forgot by the method of *anamnesis*. Thus, under the force of this method of *anamnesis* of knowledge, the sophistic-pugnacious paradox is fall to “numbness”⁵.

³ Plat. *Men.* 80a-80.b.2 *καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς εἶ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τᾶλλα ταύτη τῇ πλατεῖα νάρκη τῇ θαλαττίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν αἰεὶ πλησιὰ ζοντα καὶ ἀπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι, [ναρκᾶν]· ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. Cf. Arist. *Hist. Anim.* 620b.19-23: Ἡ τε νάρκη ναρκᾶν ποιούσα ὧν ἂν κρατήσῃν μέλλῃ ἰχθύων, τῷ ῥόπτρῳ ὃν ἔχει ἐν τῷ σώματι λαμβάνουσα, τρέφεται τούτοις κατακρύπτεται δ’ εἰς τὴν ἄμμον καὶ πηλόν, λαμβάνει δὲ τὰ ἐπινέοντα, ὅσα ἂν ναρκήσῃ ἐπιφερόμενα τῶν ἰχθύων.*

⁴ Plat. *Men.* 80e: ΣΩ. Μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ᾧ Μένων. ὀρθῶς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὃ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιοῦτῷ ζητήσεως οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν οὔδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσῃ. (Translation: Sophie Grace Chappell). https://www.academia.edu/13448466/Platos_Meno_a_new_translation

Cf., Bedu-Addo J. T., “Sense-Experience and Recollection in Plato’s *Meno*”, *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 228-248. Cf., Kraut, R., “Inquiry in the *Meno*”, *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, 1992, pp. 200-226.

⁵ Plat. *Men.* 81c-d: Ἄτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγонуῖα καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Αἴδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περι-

But *anamnesis*, although it is a mental process, is based on the data of the senses. The experience of the senses provides to the man the clues to remember the appropriate element from the realm of the rational soul. This is confirmed by Socrates through the application of this method to a slave - a young follower of Meno - who is completely ignorant of mathematical-geometric science. Under Socrates' guiding with questions-indications-diagrams, which bear no truth but help to remind the truth, the slave manages to solve the problem, even though he didn't know anything about it. Therefore, the soul of the slave once had the knowledge, but later during its incarnation in his body he forgot it and now with the method of *anamnesis* he recalled the knowledge⁶. So the soul is immortal and rational, since it survives before life and after death and it can possess cognitive and rational qualities.

In *Phaedo* the position on the *anamnesis* of knowledge returns, but from a different perspective. To support the proposition that the soul is not annihilated after death, Cebes proposes, as assistance with *the argument of the opposites*

ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὐσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα ὁ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἀνθρωποῖτάλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, εἴαν τις ἀνδρείος ἦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. οὐκ οὖν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ.

“Since the soul is immortal and has come into being many times, and since it has seen this world and the World of the Dead and everything there is, there is nothing that it has not always already learned. Therefore it is no wonder that the soul should be able to remember everything it ever knew, about everything including virtue; for the soul already knew it all before. Everything that exists is related to everything else, and the soul always already knew everything. So once the soul has recollected just one thing in this life—this recollection is what people call *learning*—there is nothing to prevent the soul from drawing out of it everything else there is to know: if we are only courageous in our quest, and do not grow weary. And so, inquiry and learning is entirely recollection. This is why we should not accept that sophistical argument of yours”. (Translation: Sophie Grace Chappell). Cf., Anderson D., “The theory of recollection in Plato’s *Meno*”, *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 1971 Vol. 9; Iss. 3, pp. 225-235.

⁶ Vlastos G., “*Anamnesis* in the *Meno*: Part One: The Data of the Theory”, *Dialogue / Volume 4 / Issue 02 / September 1965*, pp 143 – 167.

(70c-72e, see below), to formulate the well-known socratic proposition that knowledge is *anamnesis*. The Learning-knowledge is nothing more than an *anamnesis* of the knowledge that the soul has acquired in its existence before the birth, a memory (*anamnesis*) that comes out of the respondent and is not transmitted by the questioner during the application of the dialectical method. Thus, if it is true that the soul remembers the knowledge, which it didn't learn in the current but in a pre-existing reality, the immortality - but also the rationality- of the soul will be proved. By analyzing this view, the crisis is expressed that when a person comes into contact with material things, an association takes place⁷, a mental process of similarity-dissimilarity of the material thing which examined with another thing that he has in his mind or an idea related to the thing. To understand this, the example of equality is used. When comparing two sensible objects, the perception is created that their possible equality tends to approach the absolute equal, but it is never identified with it. Therefore, the knowledge of the ideal equal is not derived from empirical reality, but is inherent in the soul before its incarnation. The soul pre-existed in another, transcendental space before the genesis, where it received knowledge, and therefore the source of knowledge is not the senses or the perceptible reality, but the forgotten but rationally inscribed and through the recollection-*anamnesis* extracted knowledge brought by the soul from another - but not felt - reality⁸.

2. What are the main arguments in favor of the argument that *the knowledge is anamnesis*?

In order to adequately support the position that the knowledge is *anamnesis* (recollection), specific arguments are formulated in both dialogues. The argument in *Meno* is as

⁷ Allen R. E., "Anamnesis in Plato's "Meno and Phaedo"", *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Sep., 1959), pp. 165-174.

⁸ Zyskind H., Sternfeld R., "Plato's "Meno" 89C: 'Virtue Knowledge' a Hypothesis?", *Phronesis*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1976), pp. 130-134.

follows: Initially, there is the divisive-sophistic paradox that "No one can inquire either into what he knows or into what he doesn't know. He can't inquire into what he knows—for he knows it, and there is no need for this inquiry for anyone who knows. Nor can he inquire into what he doesn't know—for he doesn't know what it is that he should inquire into" since he doesn't know exactly what to investigate", to support the hypothesis that the investigation is impossible. The main axes of this argument are a) the questioning of the possibility of knowledge, if there is ignorance of the researched object, b) the questioning of the certainty of knowledge after the completion of the research process⁹ (80e).

The reversal of this position will be attempted by adopting the view that the knowledge is *anamnesis* (recollection), which is important to say that doesn't come from a logical conclusion of Socrates, but from resorting to an Orphic-Pythagorean myth. However, the philosopher introduces this mythical narrative in the field of rationalism and tries to prove it with logical foundations, justifying the possibility of research. For this reason, Socrates applies the method of *anamnesis* to a slave with the aim of proving that the soul has the knowledge in current reality and its pre-mortal or posthumous course. As we have seen above, the slave, although never taught geometry, manages to solve the geometric problem with the result that the Socratic argument takes the following form:

- A) The knowledge has always existed in the slave or he acquired it at some point in his life.
- B) However, the slave never acquired geometric knowledge.
- C) Therefore, geometric knowledge existed in his soul before its incarnation in the body.
- D) Consequently, the knowledge exists in both post-mortem and current existence.
- E) Human existence, whether physical or not, has an uninterrupted continuity.

⁹ Balaban Od., "The paradox of the *Meno* and Plato's theory of Recollection", *Semiotica* 98-3/4 (1994), pp. 265-275.

F) Hence, knowledge is a continuous property of the soul.

G) From the above findings it can be concluded that *εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη* (86b) that is, that the constant existence of the truth of beings in the soul also validates its immortality, here we could add that rationality of the soul is also validated¹⁰.

In *Phaedo*, two complementary arguments are used to prove the immortality of the soul, which establishes the

¹⁰ Cf., Plato, *Meno and Phaedo*: edited by David Sedley: translated by Alex Long, Cambridge University Press 2010. pp. xvii: “The theory of Recollection, which Socrates proceeds to outline, is developed with the following components:

(a) A religious doctrine (81a–c), attributed to the authority of priests, priestesses and poets. The soul is immortal, and transmigrates between incarnate and discarnate existences. This has enabled it to learn everything.

(b) An epistemological doctrine (81c–e), put forward in Socrates’ own voice. Thanks to its pre-existence, a soul can recollect knowledge which it once actively had; and because ‘all nature is akin’, one such recollection can lead on eventually to global recall. The process we call seeking and learning is in reality just this recollection.

(c) A practical demonstration of (b) (81e–85b). One of Meno’s slaves, who it is confirmed has never studied geometry, is taken by Socrates through the problem of constructing a square with twice the area of a given square, helped by diagrams (see pp. 16–22). After a series of wrong answers, whose error becomes clear to him, the slave arrives at the right answer. Yet Socrates claims to have done nothing more than ask him questions throughout.

(d) Reflections on what has been achieved and its implications (85b–86c). True opinions (along with a number of false ones) were already present in the slave. These have now been stirred up. And ‘if someone questions him about these things on many occasions and in many ways’, he will end up having full knowledge of them. That knowledge will be being retrieved from inside him, i.e. recollected. Moreover, he could extend the same retrieval to the whole of mathematics. Additionally, a byproduct of the demonstration is confirmation that the soul is immortal; but the only conclusion Socrates will absolutely insist on is that confidence in the possibility of seeking and finding knowledge is justified, and is preferable to the lazy alternative of capitulating to Meno’s paradox. Socrates and Meno can therefore if they wish resume their search for what virtue is”.

axiom that *knowledge* is *anamnesis*: the *argument of opposites* (70c-72e) and *the argument of recollection-anamnesis* (72e-77d)¹¹.

The argument of the opposites

The *argument of the opposites* (70c-72e)¹² is based on the obvious contradiction of opposite things or situations. Everything that is done is done by its opposite, because every opposite pair has two opposite forms of genesis, which obey to a circular legislative course. Awakening, for example, occurs after sleep, and sleep follows awakening. The contrast between life and death falls into this category. Therefore, just as the dead come from the living, so the living must come from the dead, otherwise the absolute death would have reigned in the universe long ago and life would have disappeared if everything had come into non-existence, while nothing would have moved towards existence: ἔστι τῶ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι (72d-e). If *the*

¹¹ Plat. *Phaed.* 72e: ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὔσα.

¹² Cf., Dilman I., *Philosophy and the philosophic life: a study in Plato's Phaedo*, St. Martin's Press, New York 1992. pp. 8:

"The Argument from Opposites

Opposites are generated from opposites.

The opposite of living is being dead.

Therefore they come from one another.

So it is from the dead that living things come.

Hence our souls must have existed in another world before our birth".

Cf., Plato, *Meno and Phaedo*: edited by David Sedley: translated by Alex Long, Cambridge University Press 2010. pp. xxvii: "Critics have exposed a number of weaknesses in this argument. In particular, the correct opposite of alive is probably not 'dead', as assumed here, but something like 'lifeless', a term which avoids the implication that new life must come from individuals who first had, then lost, a previous life. But note at least that much here depends on one's definition of 'dead'. For Socrates and his interlocutors (64c, 67d), life is the conjunction of soul and body, death their separation".

argument of the opposites is valid, the souls of the living must necessarily come from the souls of the dead¹³.

The *argument of anamnesis* (72e-77d) is a continuation of the corresponding argument of the platonic *Meno*, although here its form is quite different. The argument starts from Menon's conclusion that knowledge is an *anamnesis* and that the soul can remember - with the help of appropriate questions - what it had known in its previous existence. But here introduced the way of remembering, that is the association of an idea of a thing by the thing itself. To substantiate this proposition, the *example of equality* is introduced: a) the ideal equality (*αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*), although it is very similar¹⁴, is clearly differentiated from the possible equality of two perceptible objects. b) The sensible objects and their approximate equality are perceived by the senses, while the ideal equality is not a cognitive object of the senses, but of the rational soul¹⁵. Therefore, knowledge is *anamnesis*

¹³ Plat. *Phaed.* 70d: οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων.

¹⁴ Plat. *Phaed.* 74a: συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων;

¹⁵ Cf., Plato, *Meno and Phaedo*: edited by David Sedley; translated by Alex Long, Cambridge University Press 2010. pp. xxviii- xxix: "The bare bones of the argument are as follows.

(A) If certain conditions are fulfilled, a cognitive act counts as a case of 'recollection' or 'being reminded' (the Greek verb *anamimneskesthai*, along with its cognate noun *anamnēsis*, combines both senses) (73c-74a).

(B) There is a familiar cognitive act by which, as a result of seeing sensible equal things, one comes to think of the Form of Equal (74a-c).

(C) This cognitive act, since it exactly matches the conditions for recollection in (A), is a case of recollection (74c-d).

(D) Therefore, since you can recollect only what you previously knew (73c), the Form of Equal was known to us prior to that cognitive act (74d-75a).

(E) The knowledge of it was not acquired at any time between birth and the cognitive act (75a-76c).

(F) Nor can it have been acquired at the moment of birth (76c-d).

(G) Therefore it was acquired before birth (76c).

(H) Therefore our souls existed before our birth, and possessed wisdom (76c)".

through an associative process of the ideal forms¹⁶ of the perceptible objects that the soul experienced before its incarnation. The combination of this argument, which proves the pre-existence of the soul, with the *argument of the opposites* will validate the posthumous continuity of the souls, since each thing acquires a substance from its opposite, and therefore life comes from death¹⁷.

3. How is the argument in favor of *anamnesis* associated with the platonic view of the *immortality of the soul* and the *existence of Ideas*?

The argument of similarity

The arguments of both dialogues, therefore, if rationally validate that knowledge is *anamnesis*, prove-support the platonic view of the immortality of the soul. If the soul remembers the knowledge it possesses before and if life comes from death, then the soul is immortal both before and after human existence.

In *Phaedo*, however, the argument tends to correlate the theory of *recollection-anamnesis* with the theory of the Ideas or Separate Species. Through the association of a perceptible object with its absolute meaning, the relationship of the perceived things with their ideal models is shown (eg of the perceptible-imperfect equality with the ideal absolute equality). It would not be possible to delimit the sensible objects without their ideal forms. But the possibility of associating and therefore remembering the knowledge reduces the acquaintance of the soul with the Ideas of felt things in the pre-genesis phase. In addition, the ideal-

¹⁶ Cf. Plat. *Phaed.* 79e: ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχῇ ὁμοίωτερον εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον; Πᾶς ἄν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὄλω καὶ παντὶ ὁμοίωτερόν ἐστι ψυχῇ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μῆ. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

¹⁷ White F. C., "Socrates, Philosophers and Death: Two Contrasting Arguments in Plato's *Phaedo*", *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Dec., 2006), pp. 445-458.

intangible nature of Ideas in relation to their sensible approach leads to the conclusion that Ideas are separate from things, although they are similar to them, they are completely different from them and are outside the perceptible reality¹⁸. Therefore, if we accept that in human there is a duality of soul-body and that only the soul can come into contact with the eternal and only through rationalism sensible ideas, then the conclusion is drawn that the soul is immaterial¹⁹, rational²⁰ and clearly immortal²¹, just as the ideas²². The soul resembles immortal ideas, while the body resembles the imperfect space of decay²³. The soul can not only come into contact with ideas, because it pre-exists from the body and can perceive the ideas rationally, but also resembles them in terms of immortality. Therefore, *the argument of similarity* shows us that the soul is immortal (80a-b)²⁴.

¹⁸ Franklin L., “Recollection and Philosophical Reflection in Plato’s *Phaedo*”, *Phronesis* 2005 / 11 Vol. 50; Iss. 4, pp. 289-314.

¹⁹ Cf. Plat. *Phaed.* 67a: ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης.

²⁰ Cf. Plat. *Phaed.* 65c: Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἶπερ που ἄλλοθι κατὰ δηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων;

²¹ Cf., Plat. *Phaed.* 73a: ὥστε καὶ ταύτη ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴ τι ἔοικεν εἶναι.

²² Young D. J., “Soul as Structure in Plato’s *Phaedo*”, *Apeiron* 2013; 46(4): 469–498.

²³ Rose, L. E., Sugden, Sherwood J. B., “The Deuteros Plous in Plato’s *Phaedo*”, *The Monist* 1966 Vol. 50; Iss. 3, pp. 464-473.

²⁴ Cf., Plato, *Meno and Phaedo*: edited by David Sedley; translated by Alex Long, Cambridge University Press 2010. pp. xxxi: “Although this next argument concludes that soul is such as to be ‘altogether incapable of being disintegrated, or nearly so’ (80b), it is a very different kind of argument from the two that precede it. It is designed to assuage irrational fears that remain despite the force of those formal demonstrations, and does so by arguing that, given a Platonic bipartition of reality into physical body and intelligible Forms, soul has far more in common with the latter than with the former, and might therefore very reasonably be expected to share the Forms’ indestructibility. In a way, the argument’s most significant function is to ground what follows it (80c–84b). There Socrates professes his confidence that a philosopher’s soul will, after death, gravitate to its natural environment, the realm of Forms, whereas that of a non-philosopher, with its bodily leanings, will yearn for reincarnation”.

Conclusions

As a result of this investigation, some concluding extensions could be made.

A) In *Meno* but moreover in *Phaedo*, the process of *anamnesis*, in addition to aiming at proving the immortality of the soul, highlights the role of the human person in finding the truth. The knowledge is not a process of teaching, that is, a simple transfer of knowledge from a teacher to a student²⁵. On the contrary, personal self-action and mobilization are required. To know the truth, man cannot be a passive recipient of teachings, but personal, active participation in research is required through the empirical data, which obtained from the senses and the rational process to which they are subject²⁶.

B) In addition, the active role of the senses in finding the truth must be highlighted. Without the processing of sensory data, the application of the method of *anamnesis* would be impossible. The slave in *Meno* can reach the solution of the geometric problem only through the sensory of the perceptual shapes that Socrates carves on the ground, while in *Phaedo* the association of the absolute idea is done through contact with the senses. The senses, then, are full of truths, which are not in full form, but can lead through the rational processing of their data to the absolute truth of ideas²⁷. The senses without the ideas would have no substance, while the ideas without the senses could not be perceived. The theory of *anamnesis* could not be valid without the combination of the sense and the idea. Ideas are the standards by which the data of the senses are reliably interpreted: thus knowledge-truth emerges.

C) All this is developing under the common position of Greek philosophy that nothing comes from nothing and

²⁵ Ebert T., "Plato's Theory of Recollection reconsidered an interpretation of Meno 80a–86c", *Continental Philosophy Review* 1973 / 05 Vol. 6; Iss. 2, pp. 163-181.

²⁶ Cf., Cobb W. S., "Plato's treatment of immortality in the *Phaedo*", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 1977 Vol. 15; Iss. 2, pp. 173-188.

²⁷ Matthen M., "Forms and Participants in Plato's *Phaedo*", *Noûs*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1984), pp. 281-297.

nothing ends in nothing. (μηδέν τε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι μηδέν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεσθαι)²⁸. The theory of knowledge as anamnesis, the argument of the opposites, the associative communication of the senses with their ideological models and therefore the immortality of the soul apply only on the suggestion that nothing is born of non-existence and nothing disappears in it. Existence can never disappear²⁹.


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²⁸ Democr. A. 1 DK.

²⁹ Frede D., "The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato's *Phaedo*" 102a-107a", *Phronesis*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1978), pp. 27-41.

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Philosophical Notes

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Śankarācārya and His Philosophy

Nilachal Mishra,
Lecturer in Sanskrit
K.C.P.A.N Jr.College,
Bankoi, Odisha

Introduction

Śankarācārya was a critic of Advaita Vedānta. He was one of the greatest Philosophers of India. He was also a reviewer of Sanātan Dharma and rescued the foundering Vedic Culture and placed the Vedānta Philosophy on inflexible scriptural and sensible foundations. There is no systematic and authentic commentary on Upaniṣads and also other texts about Vedānta prior to Śrī Śankara, except the one text like Karikā on Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad by Śrī Gaudapādācārya. He emphasizes para and apara-Brahman, Jīva, Isvara, Jagat, bandha and Mokṣa and etc.

Śankarācārya was born in Vaiśākha Śudha Pañcamī in the village Kāladi near Ernakulam of Kerala State. His father's name was Śivaguru and his Mother's name was Āryambā.

Śankara, the child who was an incarnation of Lord Śiva. His family belongs to orthodox Nambūdiri Brāhmaṇa sect of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda and Taittirīya Śākhā.

The teaching of Brahma Vidyā is the main aim of Upaniṣad

The Upaniṣad is meant to teach the knowledge of Brahman and by which the ignorance removes from the mind and transmigratory existence is definitely vanished.

Tasmādājñānahānāya samsāravinivṛttaye/
Brahmavidyāvīdhānāya prārabdhopaniṣatviyam/¹

Upaniṣad, the word is denoted from the word like ‘Sad’ and which is added by the two particles ‘Upa’ and ‘ni’ and also followed by the suffix ‘Kwip’ which can destroy the bondage of birth and old age and man able to see Brahman and he can ruin the cycle of the birth systems and death, etc. and that is the main aim of the Upaniṣad.

Saderupanipūrvasya kkipi copaniṣadbhavet/
Mandīkaraṇabhāvācca garebhādeḥ śātanāttathā/²

Inquiry or Vicāra as per the view of Śankarācārya

Without inquiry, knowledge is not produced. Just as an object perceived or seen without the light.

Notpadyate vinā jñānaṁ vicāreṇānyasādhanaiḥ/
Yathā padārthabhānaṁ hi prakāśena vinā kvacit/³

Who are the self and this world is created by whom and how? And in this world what is the material by which this world made. This is the way of that inquiry (vicāra).

Ko’haṁ kathamidam jātam ko vai kartā’sya vidyate/

Upādānaṁ kimastīha vicāraḥ so'yamidṛśaḥ/⁴

I am not a body that has five elements of combinations and also not an aggregate of the senses. I am different from these. This is the way of that inquiry (vicāra).

Nāhaṁ bhūtagaṇo deho nāhaṁ cākṣagaṇastathā/
Etadvilakṣaṇaḥ kaścidvicāraḥ so'yamidṛśaḥ/⁵

Ignorance is the producer of everything, and through knowledge, everything disappears. The various thoughts are only created by the creator.

Ajñānaprabhavaṁ sarvaṁ jñānena pravilīyate/
Saṁkalpo vividaḥ kartā vicāraḥ so'yamidṛśaḥ/⁶

The concept of Brahman as per the views of Śankarācārya

As per the views of Śankarācārya Brahman is verily Brahman and equanimous, quiescent, and absolute existence by nature. Brahman is not body and nonexistence itself. The wise called it true knowledge. The description of Śankarācārya as follows:

Brahmaivāhaṁ samaḥ śāntaḥ saccidānandalakṣaṇaḥ/
Nāhaṁ deho hyāsadrūpo jñānamityucyate budhaiḥ/⁷

Brahman is not subject to any type of diseases and He is beyond all comprehension and free from all alternatives and also he is all-pervading and etc.

Nirāmayo nirābhāso nirvikalpo'hamātataḥ/
Nāhaṁ deho hyasadrūpo jñānamityucyate budhaiḥ/⁸

The Śruti is clearly declared that Brahman is only the substratum of different types of names, forms, and actions. Śankara says:

Brahmaiva sarvanāmāni rupāṇi vividhāni ca/
Karmānyapi samagrāṇi vibhartīti śrutirjagau/⁹

Brahman is like a thing that is just made of gold and it produces the nature of gold. Due to the birth of Brahman, the person has possessed the nature of Brahman also. The description is like this.

Suvarṇajāyamānasya suvarṇatvaṃ ca śāśvatam/
Brahmaṇo jāyamānasya Brahmatvaṃ ca tathā bhavet/¹⁰

The person cannot know that, He is Brahman and if he thinks, he is different from the self. And such type of thinking is contradictory thinking of the Śruti but when the person thinks that he is the self and he is the Brahman. Such a type of thinking is no contradiction to the Śruti(Veda). And this is the right knowledge and there is no contradiction which ruins the ignorance.

Īśvaraścadanātmā syānnāsāvasmīti dhārayet/
Ātmā cedīśvaro'smīti vidyā sā'nyanivartikā/¹¹

As per Śruti, there is nothing than the self in the stage of dreamless sleeping. Which is the consciousness of the knower and that is eternal? There is a knowledge of objects in the stage of waking and due to ignorance. So objects are unreal.

Jñāturjñātirhi nityoktā suṣupte tvanyaśūnyataḥ/
Jāgrajñtistvavidyātastadgrāhyaṃ cāsadiṣyatām/¹²

The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad describes Brahman that, the supreme soul is eternal who exists forever. He is formless, beginningless and He has no inside and outside of all beings and He has no life and no mind and He is pure and He is the beyond of unchangeable and also He is the beyond of everything. The description is as follows:

Divyo hyamūtaḥ puruṣaḥ sabāyantaro hyajah/
Aprāṇo hyamanāḥ śubhro hyakṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ/¹³

The Śruti in the form of Bṛhadāraṇyaka declares that the Atman which exists in all, that is declared Brahman.

Ayamātmā hi Brahmaiva sarvātmakatayā stitaḥ/
Eti nirdhāritaṃ Śrutyā Bṛhadāraṇyasaṃsthayā/¹⁴

The personal Brahman is the infinite Supreme Brahman. He covered in all the living creatures of this Universe. The person who knew him as the lord in real, He becomes immortal. The Śvetāśvataropaniṣad says:

Tataḥ param Brahma param Bṛhantaṃ
Yathānikāyaṃ sarvabhuteṣu Gūḍhaṃ/
Viśvasaikaṃ pariveṣṭitāramīśaṃ taṃ
Jñātvā.mṛtā bhavanti/¹⁵

Conclusion

From the above discussions, it is concluded that Brahman is true knowledge, and He is omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent. He is formless, beginningless, and eternal. Brahma is true and this creation (Jagat) is false. The supreme soul is unchangeable, unthinkable and He has no destruction even after the body is destroyed, and whose existence is conceived forever.

Notes

1. Upadeśasāhasrī. Part. II, Chapter. I. Sloka. 25.
2. Upadeśasāhasrī. Part. II, Chapter. I. Sloka. 26.
3. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 11.
4. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 12.
5. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 13.
6. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 14.
7. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 24.
8. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 26.
9. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 50.
10. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 51.
11. Upadeśasāhasrī. Chapter. III. Sloka. 7.
12. Upadeśasāhasrī. Chapter. VIII. Sloka. 8.
13. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. 2.1.2.
14. Aparokṣānubhūti. Sloka. 55.
15. Śvetāśvetaropaniṣad. Chapter. 3. Mantra. 7.

Abstract

Ādi Śankarācārya is one of the great Philosophers in India. He was the revivor of Sanātan Dharma. Śankara has written the commentaries about the various Upaniṣads. Śankara and His family were the devotees of Lord Śiva. He was a very genius from his childhood, and he became very competent in speaking and writing Sanskrit verses beautifully. He left his house and became an ascetic without the willingness of his lovely mother. Tradition says that Śiva was the principal god of Hindus, and was the supreme god of Śankar's family. The present paper emphasizes the Philosophy of Śankara like Brahman, Jīva, Knowledge and etc, very briefly.

Keywords-Śankara, Brahman, Upaniṣad, Śruti.

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* *For articles:* Ranson S., "Towards the learning society", *Education Management and Administration*, 20: 2, 1992, pp. 68-79.

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