

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

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

Rethinking the Arendtian Approach of the Kantian *Critique of Judgment*

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Professor,
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"Oh ! oui, surtout, la question est d'éviter le jugement "
Albert Camus, *La chute, p.82*

The study of reflective and subjective judgment has been neglected for a long duration after early Modernity up to the end of Enlightenment. Kant, was the first to re-examine in his Critiques, not only pure and practical reason, but also reflective and critical reason. Marx who sees in Kant the philosopher of the French revolution[1], following his example, in his Critique of political economy, was the first to fully explain the

[1] See Hanna Arendt, Juger, ed. Seuil, Paris 1982, p.73-74.

function of the dominant system of production of material and non material commodities. With this aim, he was led to combine objective judgments of deterministic explanation with reflective and subjective judgments of comprehension and evaluation, and thus make possible a theory based not on sensorial intuition of empirical data, but on mental intuition of praxical data such as acts, actions, interactions, etc.

By criticizing the idealism of the Hegelian logic, Marx was able to see that the lack of norms and regulative principles of reflective judgment could not be compensated by religious prescriptions, given that, by that time, the belief in science, was considered as more effective than the faith in God.

Considering the announcement of the death of God as the most serious sign of European nihilism, Nietzsche opened Pandora's box, by claiming a genealogical and critical examination of human state and its possible interpretations. Hence ontological and epistemological perceptions had to be reconsidered.

The so called European nihilism was the beginning of the complex and multilateral crisis of reflexivity, normativity, and legitimation which has had a negative impact on the lives of human beings by depriving them the capacity to reconsider what has been done in order to attain a more penetrating comprehension and a broader evaluation of the human condition in modern times. More penetrating comprehension and broader spectre of evaluation could possibly lead to a wiser and more prudent decision making. As a matter of fact, constant discouragement of reconsideration on the basis of thorough comprehension and evaluation led, the last thirty years of the 20th century, to a vicious cycle, by rendering even more difficult, if not impossible, the way out of the present crisis, in the interconnected fields of culture, politics and economy.

I

Kant, after having examined minutely the cognitive power of pure reason that gave birth to Newtonian Physics and the regulative power of practical reason defining a priori principles of morally behaving, examines the critical power of reflecting

reasoning in his famous *Critique of the faculty of Judgment*, with the certainty gained in the political essays he wrote in between, that the highest goal of the individual in its life is worthiness of a felicity which is unattainable on this earth[4].

One o f the reasons why Kant's political thought has been overlooked is related to the fact that the significance of the *Critique of Judgment has been limited* exclusively in the domain of aesthetics. Hanna Arendt by taking into account the young Marx's critique of the Hegelian thought, was able to see the political dimension of the aesthetical judgment in Kant's third Critique. Thus, she was the first of non Marxist thinkers to share her interest in both the Kantian *Critique of Judgment* and Kant's political essays, and reaffirm the separation of political action and political spectation or discourse. By insisting on their separation, Arendt tried to revise the path opened by Marxian thought leading to an epistemological re discussion of the faculty of reflective judgment and its role in the domains of esthetics and politics as well.

As our aim is to rethink the epistemological discussion on reflective judgment re-opened by Hanna Arendt, and see if her claim that the distinction of action and spectation presupposes their separation from one another is correct, we have to go back to the Kant's Third Critique and see whether reflective judgment, considered as the most significant sign of the public use of an impartial reasoning, is related exclusively with spectation or it is also related to creative processes of transformation and novelty, testified in works of art or in political deeds.

In her claim that spectator is the only one capable to see impartially what the actors really do[2] and reconsider or revaluate measures and standards of acting that reactivate free-will, Hanna Arendt overlooks the fact that all these re processes that have been gravely devaluated because of the blind primacy of accumulation of economic and political power supported by dominant positivist Paradigm. Effectively, this latter, by reverting the relation of the ends to the means, has elevated the norm of efficiency and commodification to the most valuable of the values

[4] H. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, The University of Chicago Press, 1992, 20.

[2] H. Arendt, Juger. Sur la philosophie politique de Kant, ed. Seuil 1991, p.86

expressing ends conceivable by reflective judgment. By devaluating values including ideas, symbolic images or ideals and through these, aspirations too, efficiency and commodification have been taken aw terms sine qua none for normativity and legitimacy.

Given that applied technologies, by neutralizing reflective reasoning, give rise to the massification and dehumanization of culture, art is the first to suffer, because as all possible types of creation, it is tightly interconnected with the critical power of reflective reasoning. The fact that art is seriously endangered in these conditions, has not yet been clear enough, because art is experimenting on new technologies; but in the long run, what will be seriously endangered, by loosing the capacity to conceive, to express or give meaning to the human state of things is art's own raison d' etre. The same fate is prescribed to morals and politics as well, and preludes the vanishing of democracy.

In this context, the first thing to note is that inherently subjective judgment whose importance was recognized by great philosophers of the past, from Plato to Marx via Kant and Hegel, has been underestimated by modern epistemologists in their persistent adherence to objectivity; it is on this scene that H. Arendt reexamines Kant's esthetics and political essays, in the aim to clear out the modus operandi of the critical faculty of reflective judgment.

A second thing to note is that in Kant's *Critique of judgment*, reflective judgment by referring to particulars such as works of art or natural phenomena, is not a faculty of the Practical reason which, on the base of syllogisms, dictates what we all ought to do. Moreover, related to unconscious desire or conscious free will, subjectivity is meant to be the opposite of the scientific objectivity. However, it does not necessarily indicate a merely accidental mentality, imponderable in its fluidity. On the contrary,, as it is inherent in interior sentiments shared by all or by many others, and crystallized in ideas, values or ideals which affect and orientate thinking and acting of persons and collectivities, subjectivity claims for reflective judgments' universal validity, given their engagement to sensus communis,

which by being inherent in human consciousness, is taken as an a priori principle[5].

Under these terms, reflective and subjective judgment that claims for universal validity, is in the heart of artistic, philosophical, scientific and political creativity implicating mobilization of the free will, by posing radical and pressing questions and by forcing spectators and actors who do not act blindly, to go back into the past and perform the genealogical search which is needed for giving answers sufficient and possibly true in historical and critical terms.

In transitional historical periods, the free will factor, being at its maximum, becomes primordial, and urges intellectual, moral and political judgment in order to give us a clear image of what is eventually the real situation, and what are the reasons why and what for; this reflective clarification helps spectators and actors, equally, to think of what could be better to be done and how this could become possible, in both areas of theory (cognition or contemplation) and practice (action or management); or else in both fields of truths of reasoning and those of facts that Leibniz discerned in his Monadology[6].

According to the identity principle of formal logic, truths of reasoning and those of facts have been considered as contradicting each other, given that truths of reasoning are necessary and thus their opposite are judged as impossible, whereas factual truths are contingent and thus their opposite are judged as possible. Following formal logic and its axioms, Hanna Arendt does not revise the distinction made by Leibniz between irrefutable truths of reasoning which we are not free to reject, since their opposite is not possible, and factual truths which we are free to reject. All she does is to replace the above distinction by another one between truth and signification, by claiming that these two terms do not constitute an equation capable to eliminate the radical difference between intellect (Verstand) and reflecting reasoning (Vernunft)[7].

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[5] Im. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, ed. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1960, 40:54.

[6] Leibnz, *The Monadology*, paragraphe 33 in Leibniz, *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings*, Oxford University Press (1971)235-236.

[7] H. Arendt, *La vie de l' esprit.* 1 *La pensee*, éd. PUF. (Paris 1981) 30-31. Here, H. Arendt seems to oppose to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*

In fact, it was Kant, before Hanna Arendt, who first revised the distinction between rational and factual truths by showing that factual truths are not contingent either and thus their opposite can neither be possible, by claiming universal validity for both objective and subjective judgments integrated both in the frame of free (intended and not contingent) public reasoning[8]. By doing so, Kant transgresses the Parmenidean opposition between truth and doxa; which is a decisive step for the construction of the Hegelian logic focused on the reflective reasoning, on whose ground, Marx based his critique of the idealistically founded and applied Hegelian logic.

By following this path from Marx back to Kant and by taking into account the Kantian distinction between Verstand as faculty of cognition and Vernunft as faculty of reflective thought[9], Hanna Arendt attempted to clarify the difference between freedom conceived by the intellect as mere contingency and indeterminacy, and freedom conceived by reflective reasoning as nexus finalis indicating reason's way of choosing an end which is not purely rational[10].

However, even though she is totally aware that judgment is faculty of public and free reflective reasoning whose object is human facts ("ta ton anthropon pragmata") which are meant to be the outcome of human actions, nonetheless, Hanna Arendt is strictly attached to the basic dualisms of theory and practice, or spectating and acting imposed by positivist paradigm and to all further dualities based on it, which implicate radical separations of the opposite terms such as truth and signification [11], theoretical and factual truth, subjective and objective judgment, civilization and culture etc., By doing so, she overlooks the fact that that the above dualities loose their opposing or conflicting character in the domain of reflective reasoning where judgments

where reflecting reasoning appears as another mode of real cognition of what is true

[8] Im. kant, « Réponse à la question : Qu'est-ce que les lumières? » Kant, *La philosophie de l' histoire*,, éd. Denoel/Gonthier (Paris 1947) 46-55 where Kant relates enlightenment with free and public reasoning, including both intellect and reflective reasoning.

[9] H. Arendt, *La vie de l' esprit.* 1 *La pensée*,, 74.

[10] H. Arendt, *La vie de l' esprit*, 1, L*a penséee*,,.71

[11] H. Arendt, *La vie de l' esprit*, *1 La pensée*,. 70-83.

which are meant to be regulative[12], do not divide, but discriminate the representation of the cognitive object and the cognitive and reflective subject whereupon they claim their extended validity as necessary for all and every one[13]. For this aim, there must be necessarily a purely rational, and not scientifically determinable concept that can be taken as their universal principle.

According to Kant, a purely rational concept taken as an a priori principle of reflective judgment is the concept of a supersensible substrate which lies on the base of all sensible intuition, and which is related to the unseeable human state of actions, of cognitive or political strategies or decision-making, etc. For Kant, this unseeable for both actors and spectators state of human things is humanitas[14] which invokes subjective transcedentality, and thus it is conceivable only by mental and not sensorial intuition.

Hanna Arendt does not refer to the Kantian subjective transcendentality called humanitas, given that,, in the years of sixties/seventies and in the framework of dominant cognitive Paradigm, this notion was replaced by the idea of a paradigmatic normal science. For positivism, scientific cognition and philosophical reflexivity were meant to be and remain separated within given civilization and its culture. This is a reason why Arendt could not see that scientific explanation and philosophical understanding are both mental processus undertaken by subjects who, interrelated with the objective reality, both act and spectate alternatively. Nor she could see why reflective judgment risks to be obscured or marginalised, as long as the ontological and epistemological complexity of reality behind phenomenality, remains hidden to abstract and schematic dualisms, divisions and separations.

In nowadays, positivism has been challenged by the idea of paradigmatic complex science, and complex epistemology in whose framework cognition and evaluation as well are interconnected and unavoidably complementary to each other.

Effectively, in the frame of the Complex science, which is a combination of techno-science and reflexive science, the

[12] Im. Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 226.
[13] Im. Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 185..
[14] Im. Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 57.208.

supersensible substrate related to the human state of things, does not refer to the notion of humanitas, given that this notion, in its aim to ensure inherent transcendentality, is uni-lateral, schematic and abstract. The supersensible substrate refers, now, to complexity in the core of scientific cognition and of philosophical reflexivity, which are interrelated to each other and affect both the formation, organisation, structuring or restructuring of the system of production of mental and material commodities.

Genealogically speaking, the complex Paradigm which elucidates the ontological and epistemological complexity of reality, on both theoretical and practical level, originates from the Hegelian elaboration of Kant's vision of critical faculty revised by Marx. The history of criticism from Kant to Marx via Hegel and from Marx to Complex epistemology, via the School of Frankfort, offers us a different scope inaugurating the complete vision of the multiple and interrelated faculties of public and free reasoning, and hence, it gives an end to both dogmatism based on severe dualities and extreme relativism based on loose ambiguities.

As H. Arendt insists on the separation of action and spectation, she seems to overlook the Critical tradition inherited from Kant to Marx via Hegel, and thus to ignore mental intuition which makes possible the representation of the intelligible. Opposite to sensorial intuition, mental intuition derives from free imagination related to mental and not merely cerebral functioning of the brain, and it is accepted as such by the newly born Paradigm of Complex epistemology and complex science. In its context, free imagination, taken as hyper-logic function of mind with its schemes and symbols, is able to illustrate the transcendentality of the unitas-multiplex of the three-dimensional brain/consciousness/mind which is the supersensible substrate of both sensible and non sensible (intelligible) data[15]. Reflective judgement, grounded on the complex of brain/consciousness/mind, claims to be valid for everyone acting or spectating. This is so, because the only way the critique can explain the purpose of judging beauty o sublimity in art or

[15] Ed. Morin*; La méthode*, vol.3 *La connaissance de la connaissance*, éd. du Seuil (Paris 1986) 85-.114.

justice or injustice in politics[16] and take them as teleologically defined values in the state of human affairs within history, is to take into account the immanence of these ends transformed into ideas, in the depths of human mind or of human psyche, and hence to refer to their intelligibility.

Immanence here refers to subjectivity characterized by Kant as Ideality[17]. This is the reason why beauty as a symbol of morality, and sublimity as a symbol of respect of human dignity, become both aesthetic ideas taken as principles of reflective judgment. In this sense, for Kant, taste is a metaphor of judging the sensible illustration of moral ideas, whereas for H. Arendt, taste is taken metaphorically as the sixth of the empirical senses[18]. According to Kant, judging metaphorically means that genuine taste can assume a definite form only when inner sensibility is brought into agreement with the moral feeling. That is why the true propaideutic for grounding the act of judging on taste is the development of moral ideas and the edification of moral ethos and feeling.

In relation to the Kantian aspect that reasoning is in time, but not subject to time, genuine taste is taken as invariable[19] and common to all, since beauty as morally good and justice as politically good, both claim the agreement of everyone in a historically and geographically determinable community and give pleasure or satisfaction to all those who, by sharing these ideas/values, express their own sense of humanity or of community. These ideas/values seen as orientating ends, which serve as criteria engaging the whole, make subjective and reflective judgments to be regulative.

Claiming that it is possible to transform old forms or create new ones, without obeying to inner engaging intellectual criteria, is as if we accept in advance that the processes of transformation or creation are not related nor dependent on judgment which is given rise exclusively by spectation. In such a case,, the most likely is to ignore the engaging criteria (rules) followed by the artist or the political actor because they can be revealed only

[16] *Sublimity was defined as justice by J.-Fr.Lyotard; see J.-Fr.Lyotard, L' enthousiasme. La critique kantienne de l' histoire*, éd. Galiléee (Paris, 1986).

[17] Im .Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 35 :219,.

[18] H. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's political philosophy*,.64.

[19] Im. Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 201.

after finishing the work of art. The same is true for the politician who estimates the value of his acts by their results.

In this sense, a valid subjective judgment is not inherent only in spectating, but also in acting or in creating which, of course, are not predictable according to deterministic laws, but non the less they follow rules or norms unforseeable before or during the artistic work or the political action[20]. All we want to say, here, is that, transformation or transfiguration of an old structure or form, and creation or invention of a new one are not possible, without reflective and subjective judgments given that transformation and even more explicitly, creation are spontaneous acts of an agent acting as vis formandi; by using his own reflective reasoning coordinated with free imagination which corresponds to various and multiple challenges of the environment. Otherwise, creation would be an automatic but not spontaneous process, analogous to the automatic writing which was skeptically seen after all, even by the surrealist writer André Breton[21].

The fact that transformation through negation of the old form or structure, and even more explicitly, creation of the new one are both spontaneous acts of the reflective reasoning coordinated with free imagination, intellect and regulative reasoning, explains why subjective and non determinant judgment is a matter of practicing and not of learning[22].

The free imagination factor that makes possible mental intuition of the supersensible, is the fuel or the sparkle for reflective judgment orientated by ends, ideas, values which represent the objectivated inner sensibility or the cultural feeling or stance of a specific historical age. This explains even better why we are able to judge even without having been tought how to judge. For it is mental intuition, with its schemes and symbols that makes representable the supersensible of the inner ends/ideas/values or the feeling expressing the culture in a given historical period.

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[20] Edgar Allan Poe, "The Philosophy of Composition" in *The Unabridged Edgar Allan Poe*, Running Press Book Publishers (Philadelphia 1983), 1079-1089.

[21] A. Breton,, *Manifestes du surréalisme*, second manifeste du surréalisme, éd. Idées/Gallimard (Paris1972) 115-16.

[22] Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 47:.170-71.

After all said about, we can conclude that mental intuition and its poetic or political symbolization is the mode par excellence of an interaction of reflective judgment with free imagination supplementing sensible intuition, whenever we cope not with external phenomenality, but with the immanent freedom which is its own ideality; without the internal sense of freedom obtained through aesthetic creation or political action,, subjective judgment of reflective reasoning, universally or widely valid is not possible.

II

Ideality as immanence of the inner ends/ideas/values covers the sphere of teleology identified by Kant with non empirical freedom. I Hegel in his *Philosophy of Mind*, identified the ideality of non empirical freedom with the whole range of activities of the subjective mind, in its becoming objective, and, at the end of its cycling, absolute; and finally, Marx was led to the identification of freedom with a multilateral form of action (praxis) in the complex social, political, economical and cultural reality of a given time-space of history.

Under these terms, it becomes clear that freedom, in its immanence as common axis in both life of the mind, aesthetical creation and political action, is real but invisible by the external sense of vision. The invisibility of freedom seems to contradict the sensorial representation of the cognitive object whereupon cognition is based. But H. Arendt, who develops in length the issue of the invisible activity of mind[23], refers to a sixth sense taken as basis of both empirical knowledge and reflective reasoning. Moreover, she *notifies the importance of the human sociability, id est, the importance of the fact that no one can live isolated, given that human mind cannot be practiced without society* [28]. Under these terms, she sees the kantian public space as the domain where the communicability inherent in the judgments of taste is expressed [29].

[23] H. Arendt, *La vie de l'esprit, 1 la pensée*, 85-96.
[28] H. Arendt, *Juger*, éd. Seuil, Paris, 1991, p.27.
[29] Op.cit.p. 67.

As her aim is seemingly not to oppose to the reductionism of the dominant positivist paradigm grounded exclusively on sensorial representation, Arendt is forced to identify sensus communis, which according to Kant, is the ground of reflective and subjective judgment[24], to common sense empirically conceived as the external sense of taste.

But this identification is nonetheless problematic and needs further discussion because sensus communis, interpreted by Arendt as empirical taste, cannot be taken as the ground of both empirical and reflective judgments. By grounding, as Arendt does, reflective judgment on taste taken as the most private and most incommunicable of all empirical senses, given that it cannot be easily expressed in words nor talked about[25], we forcevely eliminate discrimination which is the preeminent critical function of reflective reasoning.

Before we discuss further Arendt's separation of action and spectation or else of vita activa and vita contemplative, we have to focus on the issue of the invisible reality of freedom crystallizing the work of intelligible intuition of the sensus communis carried by free imagination coordinated with the rest of mental powers.

For the empirically grounded rationality, freedom, being incomprehensible for the reason that its reality is invisible by the external sense of vision, is easily identified with chaotic situations caused by breaking the chain of mechanical causality or by deconstructing the established order of physical and historical facts.

One of the reasons why the new complex Paradigm is dramatically needed, is the narrow-mindedness and the limited scope of positivism which render it incapable to cope with processes of reflective reasoning including the activities of mind and consciousness as well. These also explain why instead of confronting freedom of imagination as the creative power par excellence, inherent in processes of creation, action or construction, the positivist Paradigm drives us to conceive freedom only negatively as pure contingency.

But if freedom which crystallizes the work of intelligible intuition, is conceivable as a nihilistic force of contingency, this is

[24] H. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political P hilosophy*, p.64.
[25] H. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's PoliticaL P hilosophy*, p. 64.

due to negative inference that excludes out of the positivist paradigm's scope, processes like creation or transformation, construction or reconstruction, as inexplicable and thus incomprehensible.

Kant defines freedom positively as nexus finalis, id est, as purposiveness of acts, deeds or works, and of their public or private reception. Of course, purposiveness is totally unknown to robots and artificial intelligence, since it has nothing to do with blind mechanisms of nexus effectivus nor with empirically determinant judgment related to the heteronomy of empirical laws.

The purposiveness of acts, works or deeds, and of human praxis in general is tightly connected with the mind and its creative spontaneity corresponding, as Kant says, to the *" voice of reason ...which requires totality and consequently comprehension in one intuition... and which does not exempt even the infinite (space and time past) from this requirement, but rather renders it inevitable for us to regard this infinite in the judgment of common reason) as completely given."* [26]. The mind by coordinating reasoning, will and judgment, is not isolated from intellect or imagination which are both decisive factors of artistic creation and of political action as well. As such, the mind manifests in subjective reflective judgment and gives the law to itself in respect to the objects of pleasure or pain, of satisfaction, enthousiasm or respect[27]. The practical (deontic) reason is also supposed to do so in respect of the faculty of free will, but there is a radical difference between moral deontology of practical reason grounded on moral feeling and the esthetical or political teleology of reflective reasoning grounded on the subjectivity of those who judge, being in constant interaction with cognizable objectivity.

On account of the inner possibility of the knowing and judging subject and of the external possibility of a given civilisation harmoniously coordinated, judgment refers to something either within or without the knowing and judging subject. This is neither necessity nor freedom, but nevertheless it

[26] Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 26: 102.

[27] Ed. Burge refers to grief,, joy, terror or danger as source of sublimity; cl. *Recherche philosophique sur l'origine de nos idées du sublime et du beau,*. Vrin, (Paris, MCMLXXIII) pp. 63-70.

is connected with the praxical (empirically invisible) ground of freedom.

As said above, freedom defined as teleological causality[28], was conceivable by reflective reasoning and its subjective judgments. Moreover. these latter are unavoidably dialectical since they cannot be reduced to strictly defined and demonstrable rational concepts. Kant in his turn to Plato, was the first to admit the dialectical character of subjective judgments as opposed to the scientific and objective judgments produced by the intellectual faculty of Verstand grounded on sensorial representations.

Therefore, we need to discuss the issue of dialectical character of reflective judgments that has been totally neglected by H. Arendt and by postmodern philosophers who opposed to philosophical modernism.

III

Reflective and subjective judgments, grounded on the supersensible freedom inherent in both creation and praxis, are dialectical as far as they rationalize and claim, each one for itself, the validity of an a priori universality[29].

Here, dialectical means antinomical or contradicting reflective judgments in respect of their subjective principles; aesthetical or political judgements as far as they implicate concepts which contradict each other and give rise to antinomies, or to controversies, are dialectical. The antinomies created by contradicting concepts wavers the conformity of reflective judgments to law and its internal possibility. The a priori principle of subjective judgments may be either the Kantian indefinite idea of humanitas related to the teleological causality of freedom or, as said earlier in this paper, the definite idea of the Positivistic Paradigm in the core of modern Western civilisation. This is the reason why Hanna Arendt following Kant's third Critique, claims that the antinomies of the reflective and subjective judgments, can be solved only if the contradicting concepts to which they give rise, can be both true.

[28] Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K.Smith, Unabridged edition. St Martin's Press, (New York, 1965) 392-93.

[29] Kant's *Critique of Judgment, 55:.*204.

According to Kant, they can be true only because antinomies of the critique of taste in esthetics[30] can be solved. However, this is possible not in the sensible sphere of phenomenality, but in the supersensible sphere of psycho-social and historical reality where coordination or unification of all transcandental mental powers as a priori faculties of reason, takes place. In fact, for Kant, and German Idealism inaugurated in his Critiques, this is so because the supersensible process of coordination or unification is the only expedient to make our reason harmonious with itself[31].

Freedom is inherent in the supersensible process of coordination or unification of all the faculties of reason participating in the action of both actors and spectators, since before or after their acting, both actors and spectators use the critical power of reasoning in order to express their subjective, reflective judgments on what has been already done or would be possibly done. This is so because the supersensible freedom is bound in unity with creation or praxis, in a way which is common both in creation/ praxis and in their spectation/evaluation.

What is true for aesthetical judgments, is true as well for political judgments, given that they both take freedom inherent in creation/praxis and spectation/evaluation as the coefficient of coordination or unification, implicated in esthetical or political synthetic judgments.

Even though Hanna Arendt, is not ignorant of Hegel's further development of the Kantian thought that revealed freedom of mind as coefficient of both its acting and speaking (given that poetical or political discourse are forms of action of mind in the subjective, objective and absolute stage of its development[32]), she nevertheless separates acting or speaking from spectating and concedes to this latter the primacy in regard to the acting and speaking of the actors. Hence, even though by insisting in

[30] Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 57:206-209.

[31] Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, o.cit. p. 187.

[32] Hegel, in his *Philosophy of Mind*, makes clear that mind is the Idea in its indeterminateness, in the most abstract mode of reality, in other words, in the mode of being. But in its development, that is to say in full realization of its freedom, mind's abstract reality becomes concrete ; see Hegel's, *Philosophy of Mind*, forward J.N.Findlay, Oxford at the Clarendon Press (1971) 20-22.

reflective reasoning, she keeps in distance from the dominant positivist paradigm as long as the latter remains totally empirical, in a final analysis, she is not detached from it, since she does not take seriously into her account the fact that positivism neither discriminates nor coordinates reflective judging and seeing.

Theoretical and epistemological detachment from the positivist Paradigm is possible in terms of an epistemological and theoretical compromise. Because by remaining basically empirical and neglecting reflexive reasoning, positivism ignores that beauty, as morally good and sublimity as politically good, are ideas/values necessarily bound up with reflective and subjective judgment. Moreover, it ignores the fact that these ideas/values for those who share them, define an impartial interest and play the role of ideals, and less frequently, the role of an overall goal motivating the critical, theoretical and political action. So, we have to be precise and say that the dominant positivist Paradigm ignores processes of mind related to free imagination and its developing consciousness, and focus almost exclusively on the cerebral mechanisms. But in the domain of cerebral mechanisms of calculation or logistics, notions such as teleological or praxical freedom, do not make sense, and they are rejected as metaphysical or ficticious and hence incomprehensible.

However, freedom as the ground of action and creation and of spectation and judging, as well, due to its praxical and thus invisible character, is taken as non sense by positivism. However,, the critical faculty based on its invisible ground of praxicality is able to make esthetical or political judgments of works, actions, and deeds which are not empirically, but reflectively comprehensible and moreover, are valid or invalid for all or almost all members of a given community. These latter share a common sentiment reflecting their community's n economical and cultural conditioning. They also need to deepen their thinking and go beneath phenomenality in the aim of being able to act and do something in relation with objective reality within which they live.

The fundamental difference between aesthetical or political judgments of reflective reasoning and moral judgments of practical reason has been underlined earlier in this paper: The objective and constitutive principle of moral judgements is valid for every one who shares the moral feeling and for all actions,

given that it is cognizable through elaboration of general objective concepts. The validity of aesthetical or political judgements, in the opposite, is based on a subjective principle which is not cognizable, but which is, nonetheless, a universal concept, as far as it crystallises the common sentiment of pleasure or pain, despair, satisfaction etc. These common sentiments are caused by specific actions, deeds, works preserving their own particularity and singularity.

This is the reason why the presuppositions for arts and politics, and also for the relevant aesthetical and political judgments, do not lie in precepts, but in the edification of mental powers whose praxical character is evident in both the conception and the construction of ideological and institutional mechanisms or structures organizing the economic, political and cultural reality[33].

So the issue, here, is not about moral judgments of practical (deontic) reason which do not take into account essential or accidental particulars. The issue is about aesthetical and political judgments of reflective reasoning which is praxical in regard to essential or accidental particulars taken in their historical and socio-cultural context. Without reference to freedom which is immanent in various forms of action, theoretical and critical activity included, the praxical character of both theory and critique would be hidden, and as a result, both theory and critique would remain unavoidably antinomical in relation to practice; as if theory and practice were terms of an unsurmountable dualism.

In fact, by grounding spectation on taste taken as an external sense which is common in its peculiarity, H. Arendt regresses to

[33] The edification of the power of reasoning producing reflective and regulative judgments is possible by means of humaniora. But humaniora have been seriously neglected by the dominant paradigm in its aim to organize techno-electronically the historical world system. Hence it may not be wrong to maintain that the neglect of humaniora has had a serious impact on the present systemic crisis, since it explains in large extent our incapacity to find the way out of it. It is easy to realize how serious is the absence of interest in humaniora if only we recall that it is by means of humaniora that we can experience the universal inmost feeling of sympathy and the ability to communicate on its basis in the largest extent. [30]. The same is true of the praxical freedom indicating the universal inmost feeling of cognitive, artistic or political power.

a dualistic mode of "seeing". As said earlier in this paper, by reducing taste to spectation, she preserves the empirical ground for both cognition and reflective reasoning. But in doing so, instead of revealing the possible unification of acting and spectating undertaken by the supreme coordinator of the free imaginative reasoning, she risks to present their antinomy as definitely unresolvable.

So, it is all evident that we have to go once again back to Kant who claims that the contradicting concepts deriving from the subjective judgments could be both true if they obey to the same principle. If this is so, the antinomical propositions can be taken as presupposing each other and thus as complementary[34]. In final analysis, dividing or unifying them depends on the engaging principles; nevertheless, closure in the limited space of an antinomical thinking admittedly is not the best we can do.

Hence, in her will to avoid the closure in an unresolvable antinomy, H. Arendt, following Kantian dialectics of subjective and reflective judgments ascribed to the teleological causality of freedom, claims that the antinomy of spectation and action is resolvable, since the two terms, by sharing the same transcendental principle, are both true. Here, the a priori principle bridging the gap between spectation and action is publicity which is taken as an objectivation of the sensus communis. This latter prescribes judgment and free contemplation resulting from reflective reasoning, and makes them equally true; which is evident in the consensus which derives from it[35]

However, the antinomy of acting and spectating is not finally resolved on the basis of their principle of publicity, because publicity's inherent consensus derives from the common empirical sense of taste. This latter taken as a principle grounding rational concepts, is engaged to the logic of the

[34] Of course, the resolution of antinomies is not possibly always the case. Because there are contradictory propositions whose antinomies are not engaged by the same principle. In such cases, the propositions cannot be complementary and they remain conflicting and struggling until one is reduced to the other.

[35] H. Arendt does not refer to the distinction between theory and ideology as she should, given that the ideological interest is not impartial at all and hence the action dictated by it, even though it is equally public, is not impartial and free either.

positivist Paradigm and its axiomatic principles, including those of identity, of non contradiction, of the excluded third as well as those theoretical principles of continuity, homogeneity, stability, etc. These principles, on whose basis, cognitive and objective judgments gain their universal validity, have no relation to the universally valid principle of sensus communis, which, according to Kant, engages reflective judgments and their factual truths.

Kant made a clear distinction between sensus communis which is a common feeling (of truth, of property, justice, etc.) "*from the common understanding sometimes also called common sense; for the judgment of the latter is not one by feeling, but always one by concepts, though usually only in the shape of obscurately represented principles. The judgment or taste, therefore, depends on our presupposing the existence of a common sense. But this is not to be taken to mean some external sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition*" [36].

By identifying publicity to sensus communis reduced to an empirical common sentiment, H. Arendt does not ménage to show that action and contemplation do not contradict each other and bridge their gap. All she does is to transform artistic works or political deeds to objects of contemplation for public spectators who look after events that have already happened and have been restored in memory or events that eventually will happen in near future, without spectators' intervention.

In this sense, H. Arendt avoids to be dialectical herself [37]. In her scope, the aesthetical or political discrimination of the internalised sense of taste is not dialectical, given that subjective judgement does not emanate from the free acting of the artists or of the political actors and their works and deeds, but from the external seeing of mere spectators who engaged to the transcendental principle of publicity and without any interference, express their own impartial esthetical or political taste of others' artistic work or political agency. Indeed, in

[36] Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, 20:82-83.

[37] H. Arendt is not the only one who integrates her problematic into Traditional Theory; J. Habermas does the same with his generalised consensus or Lyotard with his generalised dissensus, which are both irrelevant with possible unification of controversial or opposite views on the basis of common principles.

Arendt's analysis of judgment, spectation engaged to the transcandental principle of publicity, goes even deeper, and governs not only the eye-witness of the spectators, but also the acting of political actors and intellectuals (artists, philosophers, etc.). Because the gap between contemplation and action, or between sensorial data and human facts, or else between representational and praxical thought, is bridged not by reconciling the contradicting concepts they give rise to, but by making spectation the common ground of agency and criticism.

Under these terms, free and public reasoning identified, in its whole, with spectation, does not constitute a power (vis) of acting, of creating or of doing only because it cannot be coordinated with free imagination and its intelligible intuition. It is evident, therefore, that the antinomy of action and spectation, or else of vita contemplativa and vita active, cannot be resolved by reducing the principle of action, which is praxical freedom inherent in mental intuition of impartial sensus communis, to the principle of spectation which is publicity derived from an internalised sensorial sentiment of taste. On the base of the principle of publicity, we explain how communicability of reflective judgment is possible. By the principle of praxical freedom inherent in mental intuition, we can explain how subjective judgment is possible.

In reducing one[38] principle to another, H. Arendt remains enclosed in the frame of the positivist Paradigm and preserves the dualism of rational intellect and reflective reasoning seen in an abstract way. Rational intellect grounded on a sensorial intuition is integrated in the empirical sensibility (Sinnlichheit) whereas reflective reasoning is grounded on praxical freedom of agency deriving from sensus communis of thinking Subjects motivated actively by their free will or desire.

The problem is that the positivist Paradigm denies the dialectics of reflective reasoning, by appealing to the axiomatic principle of non contradiction which authorizes rational Verstand to conceal contradictions and antinomies rather than to resolve them. By remaining within its framework and by preserving the false duality of contemplation and action on the basis of publicity which engage the spectators as far as they contemplate without

[38] Freedom defined as teleological causality and more concretely as praxis is not mere decision making nor an irrational and contingent acting.

being acting, Arendt does not give a clear image of the contradictive or controversial judgments of reasoning or of contradictive terms of living, and hence she is not able to see how it would be possible to overcome their conflict and bridge their gap, by proving that they are both true.

In her will to justify her own standpoint, Arendt claims that it is seemingly impossible to prove the truth equally of both action and theory, for the simple reason that only propositions dictated by theoretical reasoning can be true; propositions dictated by free acting and directed by reflective reasoning cannot be true, but only significant.

Here, H. Arendt introduces one more questionable division between truth and signification[39] supposedly based on the kantian distinction between intellect (Vestand) and reason (Vernunft). However, in Kant's Critiques, even though intellect (whose aim is to get to knowledge of perceptions on the basis of rational concepts)[40] and reason (whose aim is to comprehend on the basis of rational ideas) are distinctive terms, they do not exclude each other; on the contrary, they work in coordination in both areas of intellectual cognition and of reflective comprehension, through mediation of subjective judgments. In the area of cognition, reason regulates the intellectual work done by Verstand, by imposing to it its axiomatic principles and norms. In the area of comprehension and contemplation, reflective reason by mobilizing its critical power, is able to show that dogmatism derives from an arbitrary use of contemplative reasoning which hypostatizes mere ideas of pure reason that are far from being proved[41] and thus it leads not to truth but to unwilling error. That is precisely the reason why the Kantian *Critique of Pure Reason*, by eliminating dogmatic Metaphysics, opened the way into a future Metaphysics of possibly scientific character. Because whatever is the area and the scope of its free and public reasoning, reflective Vernunft remains in close collaboration not only with free imagination, but also with intellect so that the quest for truth become their common task.

As common task of both intellect and reason, truth becomes even more clear in the domain of the faculty of reflective

[39] H.Arendt, *La vie de l'esprit 1, la pensée*, 74-75.
[40] H.Arendrt, *La vie de l' esprit*, 1, la pensée,,74.
[41] Im.Kant *Critique of Pure Reason*, 500.

judgment where the activity of mind is based on the concepts produced by the intellect in combination with the ideas formed by reflective reasoning and with the schemas, figures and symbols created by imagination working either freely in the area of arts or under ratio's supervision, in the area of sciences. Mind as the field of conscious and spiritual activity of contemplation, in its aim to be free of prejudice, to enlarge its intellectual perspective and most important of all, to preserve its logical consistency[42] is placed in between.

As already noted, above, subjective and reflective judgments, either aesthetical or political, contradictive or controversial to each other, resolve their contradiction or controversy and become complementary, as equally true and thus universally valid, if only they are engaged both to the same principle. Otherwise, they remain conflicting with each other.

By following the principle of free and public reasoning grounded on a common internal sentiment, Kant was the first to show that the method of reduction imposed by Verstand in the domain of science, can be combined with a process of unification undertaken by Vernunft, in the areas of aesthetical and political reasoning. However, the dominant cognitive paradigm, by ignoring Kant's dialecticity, preserves its dualistic logic and keeps objective and subjective judgment incompatible to each other.

Under these terms, it can, conclusively, be said that H. Arendt remains enclosed in the dominant scientific and philosophical paradigm which ignores Kant's opening to mental intuition and dialectics as well, in the second part of the Critique of Judgment. This might be the reason why she neglects the fact that positivism devaluates reflective reasoning and its theoretical and critical impact, by conceding its domain of agency to techno-scientific culture and its normativity. Moreover, she does not suggest any specific process to prevent this turn that renders impossible any possible harmonization of the cognitive and evaluating faculties of reason, by constantly undermining reflective judgment and its connection with free imagination and intellect as well. But undoubtedly, that this is a reason why the devaluation of subjective judgments, even though it does not directly give rise to the present economic and ethical crisis,

[42] Im. Kant, *Kant's Critique of Judgment*,. 152.

intensifies its impasse, by rendering the human beings incapable to coordinate their mental powers and follow orientating ends.

Le cinéma et la transcendance

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Nous pouvons considérer que la transcendance cinématographique consiste en un processus par lequel on entreprend de rendre visible la possibilité dont dispose le mouvement, d' un côté, de surmonter sa dépendance à l' égard de la matérialité extérieure et, de l' autre côté, d' élargir sa vie noématique. Dans ce cas, le mouvenent fait apparaître sa tendance à devenir, en quelque sorte, ontologiquement autonome, dans la mesure où il arrive, d' une part, à actualiser des ordres du réel où les conditions de la matérialité se relativisent graduellement et, d' autre part, à produire par lui-même sa vérité particulière, c'est-à-dire à s' exprimer comme champ de réflexion. L' agent de cette tendance mais, aussi, des deux fonctions de celui-ci mentionnés ci-dessus (qui concernent respectivement les rapports du mouvement à la matière et à la production du sens), c' est le regard cinématographique qui aspire à la transcendance. A l' intérieur de ce dernier les mouvements déploient leur dynamisme méditatif, puisque le maniement de leur nature extensive favorise la sublimation des qualités sensibles – visuelles

et sonores – et du sens lui-même des événements representés. La texture et le caractère noématique de ceux-ci acquièrent une puissance ascensionnelle: à cause des tournures spécifiques des formes du movement, les images de la matérialité tendent à transcender – de manières multiples – leur spatialité normale et, en même temps, à élargir leur signification. La matière des épisodes, sans être supprimée, surpasse progressivement les normes de sa condition physique. En actualisant sa subjectivité jusqu' alors invisible, la matière en question accentue son expressivité dans une perspective d' idéalisation dynamique. Pendant que le mouvement se développe, le comportement de l' élément extensif (c'est-à-dire les flottements de ses tons ainsi que sa spontanéité inhabituelle) élève décisivement la qualité du réel qui se constitue dans le film. La composition et le statut des évéments rendent manifeste une vie qui se déploie à des niveaux supérieurs par rapport à celle que suggèrent les conditions de la tridimensionalité extérieurement sensible. Parallélement, le fait que l' oeuvre cinématographique se produit dans un tel cadre de réalité implique une revalorisation de la relation qui existe entre les images filmiques et la vérité. Celle-ci se crée dans la mesure où le regard qui manie le mouvement relativise, récuse et-dans ce sens-transcende les normes de la tridimensionalité, d' après la manière que nous avons déjà mentionnée. Ainsi, les agents de noèmes qui surgissent pendant le flux du film sont les aspects singuliers du mouvement qui, faisant évoluer la trame, rendent immédiate la logique de la sublimation dont il est question.

Nos remarques précédentes nous montrent que, pendant le processus de la transcendance cinématographique, le mouvement élève la qualité de ses formes en tendant à conférer une sorte d' autonomie à la subjectivité des images. Il s' agit d' une démarche complexe de dramatisation du mouvement: le devenir intériorisé de la matière accentue la singularité du produit filmique et, en même temps, il développe un ton méditatif qui libére le flux et le contenu des images de toute nécessité extérieure. Ce ton spécifique des événements cinématographiques, qui émerge de leur aspect même, se produit dans la mesure où on réussit à actualiser leur dynamisme spirituel, c'est-à-dire leur caractère ontologiquement ascensionnel. Par conséquent, d' une part, la constitution de la visualité des faits filmés manifeste leur verne noématique; d' autre part, la qualité de transcendance de l'

oeuvre cinématographique ne se reconnaît pas autant à sa thématique immédiate qu' à la puissance de l' auteur de rendre visible une logique de tension métaphysique des mouvements et de sublimation graduelle de la matière dramatique (ainsi, par exemple, comme nous allons voir plus loin, dans un film comme *La soif du mal* [*Touch of evil* (1958)] d' Orson Welles, où le thème central n' est pas le rapport à la transcendance en tant que tel, le problème de l' attrait ambigu qu' exerce à l' homme l' élément de la démesure, étant exprimé par la complexité géniale du scenario, acquiert une force proprement cinématographique: les images composent une perspective de mise en cause et, très fréquemment, de transcendance de la normalité spatiotemporelle de la matière et des mouvements). Dans les deux cas, c'est par et à travers la *forme* du mouvement que les épisodes filmiques tendent à la fois à la sublimation et au point culminant de leur fonction méditative. En effet, on ne peut arracher les faits filmés aux conditions du réalisme spatial et de la temporalité extérieure, que par la puissance du regard cinématographique d' élaborer l' aspect des mouvements et d' élever leur qualité, en leur donnant la possibilité d' être dramatisés à des niveaux supérieurs de réalité. Il se produit ainsi une sorte d' autotranscendance visuelle (et-éventuellement-sonore) des mouvements, ces derniers n' étant cinématographiquement vivants que dans le cas où leur subjectivation devient *visible*. Dans le cadre de notre discussion, la trans-formation du mouvement est, ipso facto, son élévation ontologique. Le mouvement exprime un ordre supérieur de réalité, dans la mesure où son *ana-morphose* favorise la sublimation de sa qualité. Un tel processus influe, en même temps, sur le sens des événements. La valorisation ontologique des épisodes filmiques intensifie, élargit et rend subtiles leurs significations. Cette évolution ne devient manifeste qu' à condition de prendre une certaine *forme*, c'est-à-dire lorsque le regard cinématographique actualise la puissance interne du mouvement d' attribuer une *figure* à ses noèmes. Cette puissance, à laquelle nous nous sommes déjà référés, c' est *le dynamisme méditatif du mouvement*, dont la fonction dépend le la profondeur de l' inspiration artistique et de l' aspiration spécifique du créateur.

La transcendance cinématographique se produit avec les moyens d' expression propres au septième art. Le sujet du film,

la composition des plans, les angles de prise de vues, les mouvements dans le cadre et ceux de la caméra, le jeu des acteurs, les rapports de l' ombre à la lumière, les objectifs, le décor, les lieux et les espaces intérieurs, la musique, le montage, donnent au processus de transcendance son orientation particulière, d' après la logique du regard cinématographique. Nous allons entreprendre de montrer comment, dans un cas caractéristique, les moyens d' expression filmiques déterminent la forme de la transcendance. Il s' agit de la séquence finale de *La soif du mal* de Welles.

Dans le film en question, le protagoniste Hank Quinlan (Orson Welles), inspecteur de police de Los Robles (ville frontalière – entre les États Unis et le Mexique –), sert la vérité d' une façon efficace, mais excessive, voire illégale, puisqu' il commet l' ubris: il vérifie par intuition l' indentité des criminels et ensuite il réussit à inventer de [fausses] preuves contre ceux-ci pour qu' ils soient condamnés. Cette tendance de Quinlan à la démesure est suggérée par son apparence (il est grand, obèse, mal rasé et imposant) et, en même temps, elle est renforcée par le souvenir dur de l' assassinat de sa jeune femme dont l' étrangleur, bien qu' étant indentifié, est resté impuni. Les méthodes du shérif sont découvertes par son collègue mexicain Miguel Vargas (Charlton Heston). Ce dernier veut organiser un aveu involontaire de l' inspecteur américain mais, pour y parvenir, il a besoin de l' aide de Peter Menzies (Joseph Calleia), ami très proche et collaborateur de Quinlan. Menzies vainc finalement ses hésitations et les deux hommes arrivent à un accord. L' entreprise a lieu le soir, aux environs de la ville, près de la distillerie. Ayant demeuré sobre pendant des années, cette fois-ci le shérif a trop bu; il est presque ivre. Menzies, ayant caché un micro-espion au-dessous de sa veste, rencontre son ami et l' entraîne à une promenade dans le paysage nocturne. C'est là où Quinlan se laisse discuter sur les manières dont il a abusé de son pouvoir. Vargas, tenant le magnétophone, suit les deux hommes, adroitement, en silence et à distance. Dans quelques minutes, et après avoir admis qui' il a systématiquement adopté des méthodes illégales, l' inspecteur s' aperçoit qu' on l' a piégé; il tirera sur Menzies qui' il blessera mortellement. Il annonce qui' il fera le même avec Vargas, qui est déjà présent devant lui. Mais Menzies, avant qu' il expire, tirera sur son ami trahi. Quinlan, en

titubant, avance quelques mètres parmi les ordures. Ensuite il tombe dans les eaux sales et noires de la rivière, où il rend son dernier soupir.

Welles conçoit et filme l' événement, en produisant une dynamique de transcedance dont l' actualisation est due à la constitution des formes du mouvement. Celles-ci confèrent à l' épisode final de la mort du protagoniste un aspect ambigu de démesure. La composition des images suggère le sens ultime des rapports étrangement excessifs de Quinlan à la vérité (il ne la sert qu' en commettant l' ubris). La scène conduit à son point culminant la logique suivante: *la mise en images filmiques de la tendance de l' homme à transcender les normes de sa condition, influe sur la forme du mouvement*.

Il s' agit d' une inspiration centrale, qui se particularise selon les choix esthétiques de Welles, comme ils développent dans cette épisode final. Ainsi, nous observons que la caméra effectue des mouvements complexes, en suivant les acteurs sous des angles inhabituels, principalement en contre-prongée. Les grands angulaires et la profondeur du champ mettent en cause la normalité euclidienne de l' espace: les éléments proches se dilatent; ils coexistent avec les lointains qui, tout en maintenant leur clarté, se contractent et, par cela même, ils acquièrent une puissance inattendue; la perspective s' étire, en achevant la tendance manifeste de l' événement représenté à transcender son caractère tridimensionnel. Une telle orientation du regard cinématographique détermine le statut et le sens des faits. L' entreprise contre Quinlan, la discussion fatale de celui-ci avec son ami (déjà (son) traître), son aveu soutiré, son opposition à Vargas et la mort du héros central du film, acquièrent un aspect ambigu, explosif, grandiose. La présence volumineuse du shérif américain et ses actes graves (devant deux témoins, dont l' un (Menzies) est visible pour lui, tandis que l' autre – Vargas – est caché, il révèle ses méthodes efficaces mais condamnables) prennent une forme imposante et, à la fois, énigmatique. Ainsi, une réalité d' ordre supérieur devient – elle visible. Cette dernière, pendant qu' elle se développe, d' une part elle transcende la normalité spatiale de l' événement que nous suivons et, d' autre part, précisément par cette fonction transcendante, elle exprime à la fois la tendance de Quinlan à la domination et l' intensité visuelle d' une *autre* grandeur, troublante et anonyme.

Celle-ci, tout en maintenant son caractère énigmatique, devient manifeste dans la mesure où une dynamique spécifique des images s' actualise. Les angles de prise de vue se multiplient et changent continuellement, de même que les distances entre l' objectif et les acteurs. Les éléments de l' espace, comme ils entrent violemment dans le champ visuel, intensifient le sens complexe de l' événement présenté. Les mouvements de deux hommes qui discutent et de Vargas, tantôt ils évoluent dans de séries parallèles de plans, tantôt ils se présentent à l' intérieur des plans selon le développement de la profondeur du champ. Le regard de la caméra prend une direction ascensionnele, en privilégiant surtout les diagonales, les courbes et les lignes brisées. A travers les clair-obscurs très forts les visages, les corps, les objets et les éléments de la nature acquièrent une emphase inattendue qui accentue leur ton subjectif. La puissance expressive de sons et les moments choisis des explosions dramatiques de la musique jazz achèvent un climat généralisé de tension, d' inquiètude et de démesure. La sensation qui se produit, d' une part, émane de l' intensité des faits: on a tendu une piège à Quinlan et ce dernier s' en aperçoit trop tard; le conflit qui suit est fatale, doublemenet mortelle. Mais, d' autre part, la sensation en question s' exprime à travers *l' aspect* lui-même des mouvements. Celui-ci est à la fois méditatif et dynamique. Il semble qui l' est dû à une qualité latente du devenir, qui ne s' actualise qu' au niveau de la visualité, c'est-à-dire dans, et par, le regard cinématographique. Il se constitue ainsi une réalité énigmatique et grandiose, à l' intérieur de laquelle l' épisode que nous suivons, en trancendant sa logique extérieure, nous communique son sens crucial.

La scène de *La soif du mal*, que nous avons commentée, est, à notre avis, un exemple du processus cinématographique de la transcendance. Nous avons voulu montrer que, en ce qui concerne un tel processus, le facteur décisif n' est pas seulement le sujet d' un film (qui, dans le cas où il se réfère directement à la question de la transcendance, favorise le développement de l' inspiration cinématographique elle-même), mais surtout la forme du mouvement dans le produif filmique. C'est précisément cette forme qui peut exprimer le rapport du cinéma à la transcendance, c'est-à-dire de rendre *visible* la tendance du mouvement à élever son sens en dépassant la condition de sa

dépendance de la matérialité extérieure. Le regard cinématographique peut certainement actualiser le dynamisme méditatif des mouvements selon d' autres logiques, différentes de celle qui régit la vision critique et baroque de Welles. Par exemple, dans la séquence final de son film *Nostalgia* (1983), Tarkovski transcende la logique de la géographie extérieure, en rendant visible l' approche spatiale de deux lieux différents, qui hantent la vie intérieure de Gortchakov (Oleg Jankovski), héros centrale de l' oeuvre. Dans le même plan d' ensemble, la maison paternelle russe et le paysage qui l' entoure coexistent avec le temple italien et sa colonnade de Renaissance. Qu' est-ce qu' il se passe exactement? Le protagoniste, ayant émigré en Italie en raison d' une recherche artistique, se promème mélancoliquement à travers les monuments italiens, mais sans arriver à sentir la sérénité à laquelle il aspire, puisqu' il a la nostalgie de son pays natal d' une manière profonde et persistante. L' imagination de Tarkovski conçoit et réalise cette aventure spirituelle (elle la vit, d' une certaine façon), en voit l' issue bouleversante et la développe sur l' écran. Dans le plan en question, les formes subltiles d' une angoisse déjà apaisée suggèrent le silence mystérieux d' une *autre* réalité. A l' intérieur de celle-ci, quoique exprimée d' après une logique très différente de celle de Welles, la puissance cinématographique de la transcendance ne cesse de confirmer sa caractéristique principale, qui est sa tendance à attribuer une valeur ontologique à la vie méditative du mouvement*.

* J' essaie de montrer ici que l' acte cinématographique de la transcendance est connaturelle à la libération – c'est-à-dire l' apparition – de l' aspect subjectif du mouvement. Cet acte se dèveloppe dans un espace-temps ouvert de formes et d' événements, où le mouvement nous adresse l' intensité du sens des relations entre l' intériorité et l' extériorité de sa vie, en acquérant ainsi une dimension méditative. Celle-ci s' exprime dans le cinéma de Welles à travers le dynamisme ascensionnel d' un baroque critique tandis que dans les films de Tarkovski elle se produit dans un climat sacré du sensible, où domine la puissance intime des mouvements. Sur les deux créateurs, voir Panayotis Doïkos, *La logique des formes dans le cinéma de Welles*, Athènes, Indiktos, 2006 [en grec], pp. 339-401, Heffernan, Julián Jiménez (introd.), *El guión radiofónico de invasción desde Marte, sobre la novela "La guerra de los mundos" de H. G. Wells, por Orson Welles y el Mercury Theatre*, estudio de H. Cantril, Madrid, Abada, 2005, Graver, Gary, with Rausch, Andrew J., *Making movies with Orson Welles*, foreword by Joseph McBride, Lanhain, Maryland – Toronto –

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Jacques Derrida's Deconstruction of Western Metaphysics: The Early Years

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1. Logocentrism and the Metaphysics of Presence

According to Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), the history of metaphysics is closely linked to the systematic "repression and suppression of writing" (*WD* 196/*ED* 293). For Derrida, metaphysics, "in spite of all differences, not only from Plato to Hegel (even including Leibniz) but also, beyond these apparent limits, from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger, always assigned the origin of truth in general to the logos" (*OG* 3/*DLG* 11-2). Within this history, writing is systematically differentiated from, and accorded an inferior position in relation to, a domain of "full" speech. For Derrida, who, here, indicates the influence of Martin Heidegger, this "logocentric" or "phonocentric" metaphysics is connected with the historical determination of the meaning of

Being in general as *presence*. According to Martin Heidegger, from Parmenides, Plato and afterwards, Being is comprehended as a simple unit, a completely transparent and self-subsistent origin or foundation. This determination of Being manifests itself in the historical forms of metaphysics through the "presence of the thing to the sight as *eidos*", presence as "substance", "essence" or "existence" (*ousia*), "temporal presence as point *(stigmé)*", the "self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity" (*OG* 12/*DLG* 23). Concepts, such as, essence, truth, origin, are linked and grounded in the conception of a direct presence. The search for truth of (including the truth of history) is merely a "detour *for the purpose of* the reappropriation of presence"; the "end" *(telos)* of this search was always presence (*OG* 10/*DLG* 20).

This "metaphysics of presence", according to Derrida, conceives meaning only on the basis of presence. For this tradition, a foundation exists beneath every meaning, which constitutes an immediate presence. For Plato, this foundation are the "Ideas", for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, it is the "passions", while for Edmund Husserl it is "pure consciousness". This origin, which is present-in-itself, confers an immediate and intuitive meaning upon what is expressed through language. It presupposes nothing beyond itself and, therefore, does not develop a system of signs other as a mere repository of already fully formed concepts. For the "metaphysics of presence", speech is an articulation which remains nearer to this present-in-itself origin of meaning than that of writing. The voice appears to ensure the proximity of the speaking subject to itself, the immediate and full presence of consciousness to itself. Whatever in speech is sound, voice or breath, when it takes the form of written presentation, when it is transported onto to the written page, into the space of the inscription of words, it is transmuted into dead letters, ink, silence. For Aristotle, as Derrida observes, spoken words (*ta en tē phonē*) are the symbols of mental experience *(pathēmata tes psychēs)*, and written words are the symbols of spoken words (*De interpretatione,* 1, 16a3) (*OG* 11/*DLG* 22). Hence, the voice, as the producer of the first symbols, has a relation of essential and immediate proximity to the soul. For Derrida, this proximity – the presence of consciousness to itself, which in the phenomenology of Edmund

Husserl constitutes the structure of autopathy ("hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak")[1] – explains why all metaphysical determinations of truth, "even the one beyond metaphysical ontotheology that Heidegger reminds us", are inseparable from logos (*OG* 10/*DLG* 21).

Writing has been underestimated by the totality of the philosophical tradition due to its "exteriority" to expressed meaning. Contrary to the *ideographic* systems of writing, in which each word is represented by a single sign, that is unrelated to the component sounds of the word itself (e.g. Chinese characters, Egyptian hieroglyphs), in the *phonographic* systems of writing (which include the *alphabetic* and *syllabic* writing), the role of written signs is traditionally considered to be limited to the depiction of sounds that make up a spoken word.[2] Writing, by definition, cannot offer the guarantees of an absolute presence, since it is separated from the writer, and therefore it is fatally connected with the necessity for interpretation.

Nevertheless, Derrida's reduction of apparently different philosophical positions to a single homogeneous history, a "historical totality", as he himself refers to it (*OG* lxxxix/*DLG* 8), has raised serious objections (e.g. Abel 1974, Wood 1989). Derrida's *totalizing* treatment of the history of philosophy, as "metaphysics of presence", rather than detaching itself from this history, indicates its potential to be the continuation of this "metaphysics of presence". Derrida's project undertakes to make "present" the history of metaphysics, to make it appear in its "truth", something, which seems, according to David Wood, to situate Derrida "firmly within the logocentric tradition he is criticizing".[3] Nevertheless, while some diagnose, in the Derridian interpretation of the history of philosophy, a contradiction, Derrida, and others, respond that this initial position, from which deconstruction commences, is a necessity: namely, that deconstruction is compelled to initiate its interrogation from

[1] Derrida undertakes the deconstruction of the Husserlian structure of "autopathy" in *Speech and Phenomena* (1967).

[2] According to Derrida, the phonographic system of writing is "that within which logocentric metaphysics, determining the sense of being as presence, has been produced." (*OG* 43/*DLG* 63)

[3] D. Wood, *Deconstruction of Time*, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989, p. 280.

within a philosophical tradition of logocentrism in order to generate the capacity to criticize or deconstruct it.

In order to reveal and question the unequal position of writing in relation to speech, Derrida undertook, during the 1960's and early 1970s, a series of immanent readings of major thinkers, as Plato (*Dissemination*, 1972), Rousseau, Saussure, Lévi-Strauss (*Of Grammatology*, 1967) and Husserl (*Speech and Phenomena*, 1967). He makes apparent in these readings, that every effort to subjugate writing to the immediate expressiveness and full presence of speech to itself, continually produces, and, thereby, immediately indicates a contradiction with the declared intention of the author, a framework in which language in general is "a species of writing" (*OG* 8/*DLG* 18), Why? Because speech is conditioned by all these characteristics, which are attributed, by metaphysics, to writing and constitute the reason for its debasement. Spoken language – as written language – is *always already* structured by difference and non-presence. Consequently, what applies to the written sign applies also to spoken language. More generally, difference and non-presence constitute the condition of possibility for any linguistic sign. Derrida's claim is that presence, identity, speech, meaning, etc., include precisely those elements which they seek systematically to exclude, which, in turn, renders the priority of these phenomena, and the entire system of logocentrism or phonocentrism, impossible.

2. "Différance"

Derrida's remarks on meaning, language, presence or origin, are condensed in the neologism, or better neographism "différance".[4] Derrida produces the neographism *différance* from the present participle *différant* of the French verb *différer*, which has two different meanings, those of "to differ and defer", meanings that it draws etymologically from the Latin verb *differe*. Différance encapsulates what finally emerges from the metaphysical texts through their deconstruction, namely, that despite the desperate efforts of their metaphysical authors to found and maintain meaning in presence, meaning is always

[4] J. Derrida, "Différance", in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. A. Bass, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982, pp. 1-27.

already conditioned by difference and non-presence. The thought of "différance", as the Heideggerian thought of Being, opens upon something prior to presence and identity that remains unthought by metaphysics: that absence and difference are not mere deviations from presence and identity but their very conditions of possibility (as well as constituting the conditions of *non* possibility of an *absolute* presence or identity). As such, différance names and renders more radical a series of gestures, which emerged, in part, from the separate critiques of presence by Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas.

The notion of différance can be understood through the problematic of semiology, and, in particular, the Derridean radicalization of the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) constituted by its determination of the sign as arbitrary and differential. For Saussure, the linguistic sign "unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image" or, respectively, a signified (*signifié*) and a signifier (*signifiant*).[5] Through the dissolution of this connection between sense and reference, Saussure moves away from the classical theory of the sign that considers that the idea, the concept, or the meaning exist independently of words. The meaning of signs is not determined by their innate relation with a referent (an object, a being, an event, etc), rather, they receive their meaning differentially, that is, through their place in a chain of conceptual and phonetic differences (e.g. the word 'I' receives its meaning from its difference from the words 'you', 'he', 'she', 'we', 'they' or the word *red* through its difference from the words *black*, *green*, *yellow*, etc). As Saussure claims, "*in language there are only differences*".[6] Moreover, these differences are not differences between positive terms, that is, between pre-existing identities, because "in language there are only differences *without positive terms*".[7] Language possesses neither ideas nor sounds that would pre-exist the linguistic system, but only conceptual differences and phonetic differences that emanate solely from this system, and have meaning only within it.

Yet, if a signified concept has meaning only to the extent that

[5] F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. W. Baskin, London: Fontana, 1974, pp. 66, 67.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[7] *Ibid.*

its position is registered in a chain or a system of differences, then, for Derrida, it is never present in and of itself, it does not constitute a sufficient presence which would refer only to itself (*P* 26/*POS* 37-8). Consequently, the structure of the sign is always marked by difference and non-presence. The game of differences that constitutes the conceptual identity of a sign, something that, thus, inscribes within it difference and non-presence (hence already constituting all traditional notions of the identity of a sign as problematic) is described, by Derrida, with the neographism *différance*, where the 'e' of *différence* has been replaced by the 'a'. *Différance* is the prerequisite of both conceptualisation and the existence of words. As Derrida declares, it is "the playing movement that 'produces' [...] these differences". It is "the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus, the name 'origin' no longer suits it" (*MP* 11/*MPh* 12). In a linguistic system, each "present" element signifies by referring differentially to another element and, consequently, it is never present in itself in a subsequent presence that would refer only to itself. In this sense, a sign is just a "trace" – a term that Derrida borrows from Emmanuel Levinas – a present, which has only ever existed as a trace of a present. The present is constituted by a differential network of traces, where the interval between the elements is described as "spacing", (*espacement*) and the temporal difference between them as "temporization" (*temporisation*). *Différance* is the name for these two different dimensions of signification, namely, that of spacing and that of temporization. Thus, *différance*, in the sense of the verb *to differ*, means that something is different from something else, and, in this way, includes a *spatial* dimension, which refers both to the space that separates the differing signs from one other and to the space that is opened up within the sign itself, since the sign is not identical with itself (due to the fact that it is itself determined by its difference from other signs). *Différance*, as postponement or deferment, has a *temporal* dimension, which refers to an infinitely postponed achievement or fulfilment of presence. Consequently, each sign is structured by *différance* that simultaneously promotes and postpones presence. As difference and deferment, *différance* renders possible the production of differences while it simultaneously prevents these differences

from being absolutely present in themselves. Meaning is nowhere absolutely present in language, it is always subject to a kind of semantic drift (or deferment) that precludes the sign from ever coinciding with itself in a moment of absolute identification.

Nevertheless, not only philosophers from the analytic tradition[8] but also others who are favourably disposed towards Derrida's philosophical position, consider Saussure's structural linguistics as a rather problematic approach to language.[9] Saussure's theory of language as a theory of structural linguistics was an important theoretical problematic, particularly for Claude Levi-Strauss's anthropology, Jacques Lacan's reading of Freud and Roland Barthes's exceptional literary and cultural analyzes. Yet, the presence of this problematic of structural linguistics within the work of these aforementioned thinkers does not itself resolve the question of the coherence and plausibility of Saussure's position, that meaning in language is *exclusively* a matter of difference: that the word 'red' is furnished with its meaning 'red' merely by its difference from the word 'red', 'blue', 'green' or 'brown'. Certainly, we should agree with Saussure that 'red' does not represent an idea given prior to language, that it does not constitute the invariable imprint of an unchangeable reality that is seen in the same way by all languages. We should also agree with him that someone could not comprehend what 'red' is without conceiving its difference from other colours. Nevertheless, when someone says that two things are different, what he or she means is that one of them has at least one attribute that the other does not have, or, while they share precisely the same attributes, they are numerically distinct. In Saussure's case, it is obvious that, from the moment that "in language there are differences *without positive terms*", concepts are unable to be differentiated by the two forms indicated above. Yet, while Saussure says that concepts differ from one another, he does not say *how* they differ. Because of this inherent ambiguity, it is reasonable that there are some, who consider that Derrida's elaboration of the notion of *différance*, through its

[8] See, for example, R. Tallis, *Not Saussure. A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory*, London: MacMillan, 1995.

[9] See S. Critchley, "Derrida's Influence on Philosophy... And On My Work", *German Law Journal*, 6:1, 2005, p. 25.

engagement with Saussure's problematic, remains shaped by the limitations of this structural linguistics.

3. Deconstructive Reading

Contrary to some Anglo-American analytic philosophers, who seem to believe in the possibility of the existence and elaboration of a formal language that could deliver philosophy from the tribulations of metaphysics, Derrida thinks that such an escape from metaphysics is not feasible, since we do not possess a language, which would be free from metaphysical presuppositions, and within which a non metaphysical discourse could be articulated (*P* 19/*POS* 29). Derrida agrees with both Ludwig Wittgenstein, who writes, "[a] *picture* kept us captives. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably",[10] and Nietzsche, who claimed that, "[w]e cannot change our means of expression at will".[11] Thus, as Derrida remarks in "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (1966), "[t]here is no sense of doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest" (*WD* 280/*ED* 412). Hence, in response to Michel Foucault's claim in his book, *History of Madness* (*Folie et déraison*, 1961), that he attempts to write the history of madness, not in the language of logic, namely, the language of psychiatry that led madness into silence, but by leaving madness to speak for itself,[12] Derrida objects, in "Cogito and the history of madness" (1963), that it is impossible for any historian to escape from the closed metaphysical circle of the order of reason. For Derrida, "[t]here is no Trojan horse unconquerable by Reason (in

[10] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, § 115.

[11] F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Vintage Books, 1968), § 625, p. 334.

[12] M. Foucault, *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, Paris: Plon, 1961, p. vii.

general)" (*WD* 36/*ED* 58). Only from within reason we can protest against reason.

Nevertheless, despite the captivity of language within metaphysics, Derrida finds, within the texts of the metaphysical tradition, the traces of an alterity which is irreducible to metaphysics, "which is no longer that of presence but of *différance*" (*MP* 16/*MPh* 17). Deconstruction shows that, within the "system of fundamental constraints" and "conceptual oppositions" of metaphysics, there is, as the non-transcendental or "quasi-transcendental" condition of its possibility (and its impossibility), a heterogeneous nexus of non-oppositional differences and deferments, a *différance*, an "archi-writing", that metaphysics has tried to repress. Thus, for Derrida, to "deconstruct' philosophy [...] would be to think - in the most faithful, interior way - the structured genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time to determine - from a certain exterior that is unqualifiable or unnameable by philosophy - what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into a history by means of this somewhere motivated repression" (*P* 6/*POS* 15).

Derrida has declared that, when he initially introduced the word *deconstruction* in 1967, he aimed at the translation of Heidegger's terms *Destruction* and *Abbau* (dismantling).[13] Heidegger had used the term *Destruktion* in *Being and Time* (1927) (in the sub-chapter entitled "The task of Destroying the history of ontology") not in its Latin sense of destruction or annihilation, but in the sense of dismantling, of the dissolution of the sedimented layers and accretions that were accumulated by the metaphysical tradition, and, thereby, occluding the "premordial experiences, in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being – the ways which have guided us ever since".[14] The meaning, not of destruction or annihilation, but of dismantling, is also maintained in the Derridian term "deconstruction", in which, with the insertion of the syllable – con- in the term *Destruktion*, the Heideggerian intention is better

[13] J. Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend", trans. D. Wood & A. Benjamin, in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, Volume II, edited by P. Kamuf & E. Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, p. 2.

[14] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, p. 44.

expressed.[15]

Nevertheless, for Derrida, the Heideggerian "overcoming of metaphysics", as it is embedded in the senses of the words *Destruktion* and *Abbau*, contains the risk of finally reaffirming that which is to be deconstructed. "By repeating", as Derrida observes in "The End(s) of Man" ("Les fins de l'homme"), "what is implicit in the founding concepts and the original problematic, by using against the edifice the instruments or stones available in the house, that is equally, in language", the Heideggerian strategy remains insufficient, to the extent that it attempts an exit from metaphysics without essentially changing terrain (*MP* 135/*MPh* 163). Hence, in "*Ousia* and *Grammē*: Note on a Note from *Being and Time*"), a text which deals with Heidegger's reading of Aristotle on time, Derrida notes that "[a]t a certain point, then, the destruction of metaphysics remains within metaphysics, only making explicit its principles" (*MP* 48/*MPh* 54). More specifically, Derrida argues that the concept of time that Heidegger wants to oppose to the corresponding naïve concept of time promoted by metaphysics remains metaphysical, because time *in general*, in all its aspects, belongs to the resources and possibilities of metaphysical conceptuality, and it names the domination of presence: "In attempting to produce this *other* concept, one rapidly would come to see that it is constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheological predicates". In consequence, "the extraordinary trembling to which classical ontology is subjected in *Sein und Zeit* still remains within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics" (*MP* 63/*MPh* 73).

However, Derrida thinks as equally insufficient that strategy of overcoming of metaphysics – the strategy that he identifies with some French philosophers, particularly with Levinas – which consists in deciding "to change terrain, in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by affirming an absolute break and difference" (*MP* 135/*MPh* 162). This strategy is insufficient, because "the simple practice of language ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on the oldest ground". Thus, while the first "strategy", that of Heidegger, rightly recognizes that someone is forced to draw the means for the deconstruction of a certain conceptual edifice from the building itself, something that the second strategy overlooks, it

[15] J. Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend", *op. cit.*, pp. 1-6.

fails to perceive "the necessity for a 'change of terrain'", something that is rightly promoted as something imperative by the second strategy. Consequently, "the choice between these two forms of deconstruction cannot be simple and unique". Derrida proposes a "new writing" that "must weave and interlace these two motifs of deconstruction" (*MP* 135/*MPh* 163).

The impossibility of a simple and unproblematic escape from metaphysics, compels us, according to Derrida, to abide within it, to a critical re-examination of its history, to a continuous re-reading of it - a practice, which Derrida names "deconstruction". Derrida undertakes to oppose the western metaphysical tradition within its own field, with its own weapons, but to operate through an extended and radicalized concept of writing that metaphysics cannot control; a writing which "no longer issues from logos" and which "inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source in that of the logos" (*OG* 10/*DLG* 21).

The aim of deconstructive reading is, initially, to render visible the latent metaphysical structure of a text. In the readings that he undertakes, during the 1960s and 1970s, Derrida shows that the particular philosophical text is constituted by a set of hierarchical binary oppositions (e.g. identity/difference, speech/writing, inside/outside, man/woman, nature/civilization, good/evil, etc). This hierarchical ordering is generated from one element of a binary opposition which expresses the meaning of an originary "presence". This attribution is simultaneously the constitution of its primacy in relation to which the other element is necessarily constituted as subordinate. Thus, absence, for example, is conceived as a lack of identity, writing as a mere representation of speech or woman as a degenerated form of man. From this, deconstructive reading concentrates on those elements of a text which not only cannot be incorporated into the "metaphysics of presence", but also disorganize it, making apparent another logic that is not of that of traditional metaphysics.

According to Derrida, a metaphysical text is *never* "homogeneous", "self-identical", "never totally governed by 'metaphysical assumptions'". In short, a text does not always coincide with its declared intentions. Together with the

"dominant" "metaphysical model", there are "counter-forces which threaten or undermine this authority".[16] More specifically, Derrida's claim is that the metaphysical text cannot maintain the seemingly impermeable boundary between the two poles of every oppositional pair (for example, remedy/poison], inside/outside, and so on) because linguistic meaning is conditioned by difference and deferral (*différance*). Every time a metaphysical author attempts to use an *equivocal* term (for example, the *pharmakon* in Plato or the *supplement* in Rousseau) or a binary opposition (for example, speech/writing) in one of its two senses, sooner or later, due to the "differential" constitution of opposites, - namely the presence of the "trace" of the one term within the other - the other meaning also comes to the fore in order to haunt the text, despite its author's intentions. The principle of *différance* is presented as working unceasingly in the texts of philosophical tradition against their authors' explicit intentions. In this manner, a philosopher's views do not subsist until refuted by another philosopher. They are always already refuted by language itself, which exceeds the will of authorial intention.

In *Of Grammatology*, in the Chapter entitled "The Exorbitant. Question of Method", Derrida notes that deconstructive reading situates itself in the gap between what the author "commands" within her text and what she does not "command", that is, what takes place in her text without her will. This distance, fissure or opening is something that deconstructive reading must "produce" (*OG* 158/*DLG* 227). Yet, in order to produce this fissure or opening, deconstructive reading must first reproduce what the author "wants-to-say", something that requires the submission to classical reproductive reading practices. As Derrida points out in one of his later texts, entitled "'To Do Justice to Freud': The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis" (1991):

In a protocol that laid down certain reading positions...I recalled a rule of hermeneutical method that still seems to me valid for the historian of philosophy...namely the necessity of first ascertaining a surface or manifest meaning...the necessity of gaining a good understanding, in a quasi-scholastic way,

[16] J. Derrida, "'This Strange Institution Called Litterature' (An Interview with Jacques Derrida)", in *Acts of Literature*, edited by D. Attridge, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 53.

philologically and grammatically, by taking into account the dominant and stable conventions, of what Descartes *meant* on the already so difficult surface of his text, such as it is interpretable according to classical norms of reading: the necessity of gaining this understanding...*before and in order to* destabilize, wherever this is possible and if it is necessary, the authority of canonical interpretations.[17]

The *traditional* reading (the reproduction of the authorial or textual intention) is then *destabilised* through the utilisation of all those elements that have refused to be incorporated within it, with the result that the meaning of the text is different from that which its author intends it to say. For example, in *Of Grammatology*, Derrida writes:

To speak of origin and zero degree in fact comments on Rousseau's declared intention [*intention déclarée*]...But in spite of that declared intention, Rousseau's discourse lets itself be constrained by a complexity which always has the form of the supplement of or from the origin. His declared intention is not annulled by this but rather *inscribed* within a system which it no longer dominates. (*OG* 243/*DLG* 345)

Hence, the meanings produced during the *first* reading of deconstructive reading become "disseminated" during the *second* reading. In other words, during the second reading, the text loses its initial appearance of semantic determinacy, organized around the axis of its authorial intention, and is eventually pushed into producing a number of incompatible meanings which are "undecidable", in the sense that the reader lacks any secure ground for choosing between them. For example, in "Plato's Pharmacy", Derrida exhibits the way in which the text of the *Phaedrus*, despite Plato's intention to keep the two opposite meanings of *pharmakon* - namely the meanings of "remedy" and "poison" - separate, ends up affirming *à la fois* both, thus exhibiting another logic, that of "both...and" (namely, *pharmakon* is "both remedy and poison", both beneficent and

[17] J. Derrida, "'To Do Justice to Freud': The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis", in *Resistances of Psychoanalysis*, trans. P. Kamuf, P.-A. Brault, & M., Naas, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 84.

maleficent).[18]

A deconstructive reading, therefore, contains both a "dominant",[19] reproductive reading and a "critical", productive reading. The *first* reading, which Derrida calls a "doubling commentary" ("*commentaire redoublant*") (*OG* 158/*DLG* 227), finds a passage "lisible" and understandable, and reconstructs the *determinate* meaning of a particular passage according to a procedure that the deconstructive reader shares with common readers. The *second* reading, which he calls a "critical reading", or an "active interpretation", moves on to *disseminate* the meanings that the *first* reading has already determined.

In this double reading or "double gesture" ("*double geste*"),[20] Derrida is obliged to use classical interpretative norms and practices and, at the same time, to negate their power to "control" a text, to thoroughly construe a text as something determinate, and to "disseminate" the text into a series of "undecidable" meanings.[21]

Derrida's "double" interpretive procedure is one which can only undermine the position of a text from the tradition by commencing from the assumption that its meaning has a high degree of determinacy. In order for a text's *intentional* meaning to become destabilised, the text needs to possess a certain stability in its meaning so that it can be rendered determinate. However, the fixity generated by this preliminary procedure is necessarily undermined by Derrida's subsequent destabilization of this textual determinacy of meaning which precludes the attribution of any (even "relative") stability to it.[22] It is this shift between the two practices of reading which reveals a tension within this procedure. Hence, despite the fact that he thinks that

[18] J. Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy" in *Dissemination*, trans. B. Johnson, London: The Athlone Press, 1981, p. 70.

[19] Derrida calls this initial reading that deconstruction enacts on the text, "dominant interpretation" ("*interprétation dominante*") (J. Derrida, "Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion", in *Limited Inc*, trans. Samuel Weber, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993, p. 143).

[20] J. Derrida, "Signature Event Context", in *Limited Inc*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[21] M. H. Abrams, "Construing and Deconstructing", Rajnath (ed), *Deconstruction: A Critique*, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 44.

[22] For this contradiction, see G. Kakoliris, "Jacques Derrida's Double Deconstructive Reading: A Contradiction in Terms?", *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 35:3, 2004, pp. 283-292.

no communicative action or textual practice is able to prevent the *dissemination* of meaning – a *dissemination* which is "irreducible to *polysemy*"[23] – or all he says about the endless play between concepts, the fissure that *différance* effects on the core of presence, the sign which is just a "trace", or, in the language of the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, despite the fact that "the self-identity of the signifier conceals itself unceasingly and is always on the move" (*OG* 49/*DLG* 72), Derrida treats authorial or textual intention as something which can be determined *univocally*.[24] Hence, deconstruction seems to be conditioned by the paradoxical and contradictory textual necessity that the determination of the meaning of a text has to be *stable* since the destabilising force of deconstruction can take place only on something that possesses a certain stability whilst, simultaneously, being unstable in order for deconstruction to be possible.[25]

The above paradox flows from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself. Deconstruction is installed between a text's intended meaning (its *declarative* layer) and the text itself (its *descriptive* layer). Derrida's deconstructive reading repeatedly uncovers opposed meanings between what the metaphysical author (for example, Rousseau) "wishes to say" and what "he says without wishing to say it", or between what the author "declares" and what the text "describes without Rousseau's wishing to say it":

He *declares* what he *wishes to say* [Il *déclare* ce qu'il *veut dire*], that is to say that articulation and writing are a post-originary malady of language; he says or describes that which he

[23] J. Derrida, "Signature Event Context", in *Limited Inc*, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

[24] See G. Kakoliris, "How Radical is Derrida's Deconstructive Reading?", *Derrida Today* 2:2, 2009, pp. 177-185.

[25] One could agree with Derrida that a certain textual structure, although stable, is potentially destabilizable: "a stability is not an immutability; it is by definition always destabilizable" (J. Derrida, "Afterword", *op. cit.*, p. 151). It is always possible for someone to find elements in a text which destabilize its intending argument. Nevertheless, the contradiction in the case of deconstruction is located in the fact that Derrida invokes the same precisely reasons for the deconstruction of certain textual structure that would preclude it from any stability.

does not wish to say [Il dit ou *décrit* ce qu'il *ne veut pas dire*]: articulation and therefore the space of writing operates at the origin of language. (*OG* 229/*DLG* 326)

Or

Rousseau *would wish [voudrait]* the opposition between southern and northern in order to place a natural frontier between different types of languages. However, what he *describes [décrit]* forbids us to think it... We must measure this gap between the description and the declaration. (*OG* 216-7/*DLG* 310)[26]

What Rousseau declares and wishes to say is what is determined by standard reading; what the text, irrespective of authorial intention, proceeds to divulge is disclosed by the second level of deconstructive reading.

Derrida divides the second level or motif of deconstructive reading, - the 'active interpretation" or the deconstruction of the textual or authorial intention *per se*, into two phases. In the first phase, that of "inversion" (*renversement*), the emphasis is placed upon the reversal of the metaphysical primacy accorded to the particular elements of each binary opposition which structures the text. Hence, when someone is confronted with a text, which accords primacy to speech, reproducing the dominant hierarchical binary opposition between speech and writing, the first move will be to reverse this hierarchy, that is, to find those elements in the text, which, against the intentions of its author, support the priority of writing. The aim of the second phase - that Derrida names "displacement" (*déplacement*) - is to prevent the reappearance of this old opposition, even in an inverted form. The aim of deconstruction is to go beyond the metaphysical system of conceptuality, and this presupposes a radical rearrangement of the conceptual field through the re-inscription of the new (privileged) term, in a new extended form, into the body of the system. This new term is "undecidable", from the perspective of the old field of binary oppositions, in order to prevent its reappropriation by the metaphysical structure of this field (for example, the "pharmakon" is *both*

[26] See also, *OG* 200/*DLG* 286, 238/338, 242/344, 245/348, 246/349.

remedy *and* poison, the "trace" is *both* present *and* absent, the "supplement" is both surplus and lack or the "hymen" is *both* inside *and* outside).

These "new undecidable concepts" resist the symmetrical, formal structure imposed by the hierarchical binary logic of philosophical opposition, demonstrating another "logic", which has been repressed and excluded from the history of metaphysics, and which Derrida names "logic of supplementarity" (*logique de la supplémentarité*) (*OG* 144-5, 215/*DLG* 207-8, 308).

While binary logic takes place between the limits of a disjunctive "either... or", the "undecidable" logic of supplementarity constitutes the conjunctive logic of "both... and", which, not only denies, but also disorganises classical binary thought. The fundamental laws of binary logic are the "principle of identity" ([A]=[A]) and the "principle of non-contradiction" (no [A and - A]). The movement of the "undecidables" exposes a different "principle": (*both* A *and* - A). The *pharmakon*, for example, is "remedy and poison, both... good and bad". *Pharmakon* "plays" between the poles of remedy and poison and, therefore, its rendering as *either* remedy *or* poison, as metaphysical binary thought ordains, prevents the revelation of the essential ambiguity of the word. Derrida refuses to determine a categorical, unambiguous meaning for *pharmakon*, or for the other undecidables. On the contrary, he stresses their characteristics of intensity and oscillation.

During 1960s and 1970s, Derrida's deconstructive readings of philosophers such as Plato, Rousseau,[27] Hegel, Husserl or Levi-Strauss, are accompanied by the composition of more overtly playful texts (e.g. *Glas*). His aim is to show that any exhaustive interpretative determination of a text is impossible, because

[27] For a critical reading of Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau in *Of Grammatology*, see my articles: "Writing as a Supplement: Jacques Derrida's Deconstructive Reading of Rousseau's *Confessions*", *Philosophy Study*, 5:6, June 2015, pp. 302-313 & "Misreading Rousseau? Jacques Derrida's Deconstructive Reading of Rousseau's *Essay on the Origin of Languages*", *Philosophy Study*, 5:10, October 2015, pp. 499-512. Also, I discuss Derrida's deconstruction of Plato's condemnation of writing in *Phaedrus* in my article: "The 'Undecidable' Pharmakon: Derrida's Reading of Plato's *Phaedrus*", *The New Yearbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, XIII, 2013, pp. 223-234.

language does not draw its "meaning" from some deeper conceptual layer, a "transcendental signified", which would exist outside of any system of the sign and, which, at some point, "would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign" (*OG* 49/*DLG* 71), that is to say, it would put an end to the search for a true meaning. This, therefore, is the basis upon which to comprehend Derrida's statement that "*There is nothing outside of the text*" (*OG* 158/*DLG* 227). According to Derrida, this phrase "does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book, as people have claimed, or have been naive enough to believe and to have accused me of believing. But it does mean that every referent, all reality has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this "real" except in an interpretive experience. The latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in a movement of differential referring."[28]

Abbreviations

DLG De la Grammatologie, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967.
ED L'écriture et la différence, Collection «Essais», Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1967.
MP Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982.
MPh Marges de la philosophie, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972.
OG Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri C. Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976.
P Positions, trans. Alan Bass, London: The Athlone Press, 1987.
POS Positions, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972.
WD Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

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[28] J. Derrida, "Afterword", *op.cit.*, 148.

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Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to offer a critical overview of Derrida's deconstruction of Western Metaphysics, concentrating in particular on his early texts (e.g. *Of Grammatology*, *Writing and Difference*, *Dissemination*, etc.) during the 1960's and 1970's. Besides the discussion of key Derridian concepts as "logocentrism" or "différance", the paper approaches deconstruction as enacting a process of "double reading". This double

reading commences with an initial stage or level which seeks to reconstruct a text's authorial intention or its *vouloir dire*. This initial level then prepares the text, through identification of authorial or textual intention, for the second stage or level. At this second stage or level, which is the passage to deconstructive reading *per se*, the blind spots or aporias of the text are set forth.

Keywords: Derrida, deconstruction, différance, double reading,.



Die Einheit und die Vielheit des Socrates (Plat. *Parm.*, 129 c-d)

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Εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἕν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων ὅταν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφῆναι, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μού ἐστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὄπισθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως – πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω– ὅταν δὲ ἕν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ἄνθρωπος μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα.

Nachdem Zenon sein Paradoxon vorgelesen hat, daß die Seienden sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich seien, weil sie viele seien, stimmt ihm Sokrates darin zu, bemerkt aber zugleich, daß die genannten Widersprüche im Bereich des Sinnlichen gar keine Schwierigkeiten bieten. Die Schwierigkeit trete erst dann auf, wenn man die Widersprüche an den Ideen selber aufzeigen wolle.

Sokrates behauptet, daß, wenn etwas an zwei entgegengesetzten Ideen Anteil habe, ihm dann auf Grund dieser Anteilhabe auch entgegengesetzte Bestimmungen zukommen. Wenn etwas z. B. an der Idee der Ähnlichkeit und zugleich an der Idee der Unähnlichkeit Anteil habe, werde es sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich. Dasselbe ergebe sich, wenn etwäs an der Idee der Einheit und der Idee der Vielheit Anteil habe; Es werde zugleich eins und vieles. Dies, so meint Sokrates, wäre aber nichts Verwunderliches, sondern werde von allen zugegeben. Nun folgt die zur Debatte stehende Stelle, an der Sokrates sagt, daß, wenn jemand darlegen wolle, daß er, Sokrates, sowohl eins als auch vieles sei, er nur zu sagen brauche, daß etwas seine (des Sokrates) rechte Seite, sei, etwas seine linke, etwas seine vordere, seine hintere, ebenso oben und unten. So nämlich habe er Anteil an der Idee der Vielheit und sei vieles. Weil er aber ein Mensch sei unter den sieben Gesprächsteilnehmern, habe er auch Anteil an der Idee der Einheit und sei daher eins. Das vorliegende Problem ist das, ob die Ausdrücke *ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μού ἐστιν* usw., außer der Übersetzung: "meine rechte Seite", "meine linke Seite" usw. noch eine andere Deutung zulassen und, wenn ja, welche. Das wirft die Frage auf, wo und inwieweit der Zusammenhang für die Entscheidung zur einen oder anderen Auslegung herangezogen werden kann, oder ob der Kontext beide Möglichkeiten offen läßt. Da bis heute, soweit ich feststellen konnte, nur die eben vorgetragene Interpretationsmöglichkeit von hochangesehenen Forschern aufgezeigt und für richtig gehalten worden ist[1], ist mein Versuch, auch eine andere Möglichkeit aufzuzeigen und für sie plausible Gründe zu finden, kühn genug.

Daß der Ausdruck τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου "meine rechte Seite" bedeuten kann, hat man über zweitausend Jahre geglaubt, und

[1] Dies ist die allgemeinanerkannte Interpretation; Vgl. z.B. *Platon oeuvres complètes*, tome VIII, I partie, Parmenide, texte établi et traduit par A. Dies, Paris 1956, S. 58. Platon Spätdialoge, *Philebos*, *Parmenides*, *Timaios*, *Kritias* II Band, Artemis Verlag, Zürich und Stuttgart 1969, S. 110. Fr.M. Cornford, *Plato und Parmenides*, London (I.Aufl. 1939) 1964, S. 70. H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos*, Dritter Teil, Erste, Hälfte, Die, Spätdialoge, *Theätet*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist* und *Politikos*, Verlg Herbert Lang, Bern 1960, S. 125; B. Jowett, the dialogues of Plato, Volume II (1871) fourth edition, Oxford 1953, S. 634; Πλάτωνος Διάλογοι, *Παρμενίδης*, ἀρχαῖον κείμενον, μετάφρασις, σχόλια Λία Λάγιου, Ἐκδοτικὸς Οἶκος Ι. Ζαχαροπούλου, Ἀθῆναι 1954, σ. 16.

der Versuch, die Wahrheit zu verifizieren, müßte den Eindruck erwecken, daß ich Eulen nach Athen trüge. Deshalb möchte ich dies auf sich beruhen lassen. Ich möchte dagegen die andere Möglichkeit aufzeigen. Das Wort *τὰ* kann nicht mit *δεξιὰ* verbunden werden als bloßer Artikel, wie es der Fall ist z.B. *Tim.* 77e: *τὰ τοῦ θνητοῦ ζῴου συμπεφυκότα μέρη καὶ μέλη.*

An unserer Parmenides–Stelle ist die Präposition *ἐπὶ δεξιὰ* zwischen die beiden Wörter geschoben. Der Ausdruck ist vielmehr adverbiell zu verstehen und bedeutet "nach rechts". *Τὰ* ist an dieser Stelle demonstratives Element, wie z.B. im *Symp.* 214 c4: *τῷ ἐπὶ δεξιά.*

Lg. VI, 760 d2: *τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δεξιὰ γιγνέσθω τὸ πρὸς ἕω.* Das Pronomen *μου* ist daher nicht possesiv zu verstehen wie etwa bei *Ap.*, 41 e2: *τοὺς ὑεῖς μου τεθνεῶτος αἰτοῦμαι* sondern es ist bloßes Personalpronomen wie bei Platon, *Euthyd.* , 283 e3; *Phd.*, 89 a9: *ἐν δεξιὰ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος.* Daß die Ausdrücke *δεξιὰ* und *ἀριστερὰ* mit Genitiv konstruiert werden, ist durch viele Stellen erwiesen (vgl. *Soph.* 264 e: *κατὰ τουπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος*; Hom. *Hel.*, M, 118: *εἵσατο γὰρ νηῶν ἐπ' ἀριστερά*), heißt somit "dies rechts von mir"_und an unserer Stelle die Gegenstände, die sich rechts von Sokrates befinden, d.b. etwas anderes sind als er selbst. Weil aber Sokrates als Seele etwas anderes ist als sein Körper, kann eventuell der Ausdruck auch "meine rechte Seite" bedeuten.

Natürlich erhebt sich nun die weitere Frage, was unter diesen Gegenständen zu verstehen ist. Meint Sokrates beliebige Gegenstände, die sich in seiner Umgebung befinden? Meint er alle Gegenstände, die die Totalität der Welt ausmachen? Oder meint er die sieben Menschen, die am Gespräch teilnehmen? Wenn das letztgenannte der Fall ist, dann besteht in der Tat eine Übereinstimmung der Zahl der Menschen mit den vorher angeführten Ortsbestimmungen. In diesem Fall ist die Frage zu stellen, warum Platon in der Form "ta" 1. das Neutrum und 2. den Plural gebraucht, obwohl der Mensch, den dieser Ausdruck bezeichnen soll, 1. männlich und 2. ein Singular ist. Doch dies ist sprachlich durchaus möglich[2].

Einer der Gesprachsteilnehmer ist rechts von Sokrates, ein anderer links von ihm. Diejenigen, die oberhalb und unterhalb

[2] Jean Humbert, *Συντακτικὸν τῆς ἀρχαίας ἑλληνικῆς γλώσσης*, ἐξελληνισθὲν ὑπὸ Γ. Κουρμούλη, Ἀθῆναι 1957, σ. 16.

von ihm sich befinden, könnte man sich etwa mit Sokrates auf einer Treppe, einer Mauer oder etwas Ähnlichem sitzend vorstellen. Das Problem besteht in der Frage, für welche der beiden Auslegungen man sich entscheiden soll. Oder ist das Problem überhaupt nicht lösbar? Könnte Platon beides im Sinn gehabt haben? Wollte er wieder einmal den Leser in Verwirrung bringen, indem er das Problem offen ließ? Diese Frage soll hier diskutiert werden.

Sokrates stimmt dem zu, was Zenon vorgelesen hat und zeigt die Widersprüche, auf, die Zenon gezeigt hat, für die Sinnendinge durch deren Anteilhabe an entgegengesetzten Ideen. Für ihn ist diese Tatsache nichts Erstuaunliches, sondern etwas, was jeder zugeben muß. Widersprüche aber in den Ideen selbst aufzuzeigen, das wäre für ihn etwas Erstaunliches. Sokrates führt ein Beispiel dafür an: Wenn er selbst und Zenon und alles andere, das man Vieles nennt, an der Idee der Ähnlichkeit und der Idee der Unähnlichkeit Anteil habe, dann würden sie alle in Bezug auf sich selber sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich sein, und das wäre nichts Widersinniges. Worauf spielt Sokrates damit an? Zenon hat gefolgert, daß, wenn die Dinge (*τὰ ὄντα*) viele seien, sie sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich seien. Weil es aber unmöglich sei, daß die Dinge in ihrer Totalität ähnlich und unähnlich seien, könnten die Dinge nicht viele sein. Sokrates ist zu demselben Ergebnis gekommen vermöge der Anteilhabe der Sinnendinge an den Ideen, aber für Sokrates ist diese Tatsache nichts Widersinniges, sondern etwas Notwendiges. Dieses Vorgehen des Sokrates jedoch ist unlauter, weil Zenon das Moment der Anteilhabe der Sinnendinge an den Ideen nicht benutzt hat, um zu zeigen, daß die Dinge einander sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich seien, während Sokrates es tut. Wir müssen uns fragen, was Sokrates unter "Widerspruch" verstanden hat. Hat er gemeint, daß den Dingen unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten jeweils konträre Bestimmungen zukommen? Dies läßt sich aus dem Beispiel der Ähnlichkeit und Unähnlichkeit nicht herauslesen, wo vielmehr die Totalität des Dinges gemeint ist. Wenn Sokrates zugleich an der Idee der Ähnlichkeit und der Idee der Unähnlichkeit Anteil hat, dann ist er jedenfalls als ein totum sich selber sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich. Eine Begründung dafür, daß ein und dasselbe Ding an zwei entgegengesetzten Ideen Anteil habe, gibt Sokrates für

das Beispiel der Ähnlichkeit und Unähnlichkeit nicht. Er sagt nämlich nicht, warum z.B. Sokrates als eine und dieselbe Person zugleich an der Idee der Ähnlichkeit und der Idee der Unähnlichkeit Anteil haben kann. Es ist aus diesem Grund schwierig, die Frage zu beantworten, warum Sokrates zugleich an der Idee der Einheit und der Idee der Vielheit Anteil hat. Hat Sokrates deswegen Anteil an der Idee der Vielheit, weil er eine rechte und eine linke Seite usw. hat? Oder ist es umgekehrt so, daß Sokrates geteilt ist, weil er an der Idee der Vielheit Anteil hat? Oder trifft keines von beiden zu? Im Text steht, daß vermöge der Anteilhabe ein und dasselbe Ding ähnlich und unähnlich, eins und vieles sei. Sokrates ist sich selber ähnlich und unähnlich, weil er an der Idee der Ähnlichkeit und Unähnlichkeit Anteil hat. Entsprechend müßte man hier annehmen, daß Sokrates auf Grund seiner Anteilhabe an der Idee der Vielheit vieles ist. Die Anteilhabe des Sokrates an der Idee der Vielheit macht ihn zu einem Vielen. Sokrates scheint jedoch gerade hier einen Grund für seine (Sokrates') Anteilhabe an der Idee der Einheit und der Idee der Vielheit gegeben zu haben. Der Ausdruck *ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγώ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς* zeigt offenbar den Grund an, warum Sokrates an der Idee der Einheit Anteil hat, nämlich eben deswegen, weil er **ein** Mensch ist.

Betrachten wir jetzt den Beweis für die Behauptung, daß Sokrates vieles ist. Er geht davon aus, daß entweder Sokrates eine rechte, linke usw. Seite hat oder aber, daß es einen Menschen gibt rechts von ihm, einen anderen links von ihm usw., und so die vielen Menschen eine Vielheit bilden. Auf jeden Fall, sei es nun so oder so, ist er von den sinnlichen Dingen ausgegangen. Nach dieser Aufzählung entweder der Teile seines Körpers oder der sieben Menschen steht ein parenthetischer Satz: *πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω*. "Denn ich glaube, ich habe Anteil an der Vielheit". Das Partikel *γὰρ* zeigt uns an, daß dieser Satz als Begründung für das Vorhergehende dient, d.h. dieser Satz ermöglicht die vorausgabende Aussage: *ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μού ἐστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά*. Es stellt sich nun die Frage, was hier mit *πλῆθος* gemeint ist: die Idee der Vielheit oder eine sinnliche Vielheit? Hier handelt es sich dann entweder um die Vielheit der Teile des Körpers des Sokrates oder um die Vielheit der sieben Menschen. Die Tatsache, daß das Verb

μετέχειν: "Anteil haben", ein speziell zur Bestimmung des Verhältnisses der Sinnendinge zu den Ideen verwandter Ausdruck ist, bedeutet keinen zwingenden Grund anzunehmen, daß hier die Idee der Vielheit gemeint sein muß, denn dieses Verb wird auch mit Bezug auf den Bereich der Sinnendinge angewendet, wie z.B. in der *Politeia* V, 465 e: *ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν*, VII 520 b: *οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν πόνων*, *Lg.* IV, 721 d: *καὶ μὴ μετεχέτω δὲ τιμῶν*. Wenn wir annehmen, daß die Vielheit hier als Idee zu verstehen ist, dann bedeutet diese Tatsache, daß, weil Sokrates an der Idee der Vielheit Anteil hat, jeweils etwas anderes ist seine rechte und seine linke Seite oder jeweils etwas anderes ist der Mensch, der sich rechts von ihm, und der Mensch, der sich links von ihm befindet. In diesem Fall scheint aber die Aufzählung der Teile seines Körpers oder der Menschen recht überflüssig zu sein. Sokrates hätte einfacher sagen können, daß er vieles sei, weil er Anteil an der Idee der Vielheit habe. Was will er mit seiner Ausdrucksweise erreichen?

Wenn wir aber annehmen, daß hier "Vielheit" eine bloß sinnliche Vielheit bedeutet, dann gibt es für uns zwei Auslegungsmöglichkeiten: Entweder ist diese Vielheit die Vielheit der Teile seines Körpers oder die Vielheit der sieben Menschen. Im ersten Fall würde das heißen, daß Sokrates an sich selber Anteil hätte. Im zweiten wäre gemeint, daß Sokrates an der Vielheit der sieben Menschen oder der sieben Dinge Anteil hätte, d.h. er wäre ein Teil dieser Vielheit der sieben Menschen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist darauf hinzuweisen, daß Platon, wenn er das "Viele" bestimmt, das einzelne Individuum meint und nicht dessen Teile. Die Stelle im *Parm.* 129a: *τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν*, legt den Sinn der Vielheit als derjenigen der sieben Menschen nahe. Wenn die "Vielheit" hier die sinnliche Vielheit meint, dann läßt sich die Anteilhabe dieser sinnlichen Vielheit an der Idee der Vielheit annehmen. Die beiden Möglichkeiten wären folgendermaßen zu denken; entweder: Sokrates hat die Teile seines Körpers, hat deswegen Anteil an dieser Vielheit seiner Teile, und diese Vielheit seiner Teile hat wiederum Anteil an der Idee der Vielheit, und deswegen ist Sokrates vieles; oder: Die sieben Menschen bilden eine Vielheit, Sokrates hat an dieser Vielheit der sieben Menschen Anteil, und

diese Vielheit hat Anteil an er Idee der Vielheit, folglich auch Sokrates, und so wird Sokrates vieles. Zu der ersten Auslegung ist zu bemerken, daß hierbei das Moment der Anteilhabe überhaupt nicht nötig wäre, um zur Vielheit des Sokrates zu gelangen. Denn Sokrates ist ja von Anfang an vieles, weil er seine Teile hat. ln der Deutung der sieben Menschen ist dagegen das Moment der Anteilhabe unbedingt nötig, um die Vielheit des Sokrates zu erreichen. Gewiß, die Anteilhabe der Sinnendinge an der Idee ist nach der platonischen Philosophie immer vorausgesetzt; trotzdem könnte man auch ohne die Ideenlehre beweisen, daß jedes Ding sowohl ein als auch vieles ist, weil ja jedes Ding Teile hat. Wie könnte man aber sonst beweisen, daß Sokrates als totum sich selber sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich ist, ohne daß er zugleich an der Idee der Ähnlichkeit und der Idee der Unähnlichkeit Anteil hat?

Noch etwas möchte ich zubbedenken geben. Im Text steht, daß man alle Dinge zugleich als eine und vieles nachweisen kann: Eins sind sie, insofern sie an der Idee der Einheit Anteil haben und vieles, insofern sie an der Idee der Vielheit Anteil haben (*Parm*. 129b). In welcher Weise könnte man nun beweisen, daß alle Dinge eins sind, wenn jedes Ding Teile hat und somit vieles ist so wie Sokrates? Nehmen wir an, daß die Interpretation: Sokrates ist vieles, weil er die Teile seines Körpers hat, richtig ist, dann wäre, da Platon zugleich sagt, daß beides wahr ist, nämlich daß Sokrates eines und vieles ist, diese Aussage Platons mit einer ähnlichen im *Sophistes* (251) und im *Philebos* (14c) schwer zu vereinbaren. An diesen Stellen wird nämlich gesagt, daß jemand vieles ist, weil er die Teile seines Körpers hat oder weil ihm verschiedene Bestimmungen zukommen. Diesen Gedanken lehnt Sokrates mit Verachtung ab und charakterisiert ihn als kindisch.

Warum hat Sokrates gesagt, daß die Widersprüche im sinnlichen Bereich kein Wunder seien, sondern daß es erst ein Wunder wäre, wenn man in den Ideen selber diese Widersprüche aufzeigen könnte? Bei den Sinnendingen sind die Widersprüche deshalb leicht zu zeigen, veil jedes Ding Teile hat, eine Tatsache, die offensichtlich ist. Dem kann man entgegenstellen, daß es nicht offenbar ist, daß ein Ding als totum sich selbst sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich ist. Warum soll es schwierig sein, die Widersprüche in den Ideen selber aufzuzeigen? Wenn wir annehmen, daß Platon im zweiten Teil

über die Idee der Einheit handelt, so sehen wir, daß das Eins sich selber sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich ist, ohne Anteil zu haben an der Idee der Ähnlichkeit und der Idee der Unähnlichkeit. Könnte man von daher die Spuren des platonischen Gedankengangs ahnen? Ich kann diese Frage nicht weiterverfolgen.

Man kann sagen, mit den Ausdrücken: *τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου, τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά μου, τὰ πρόσθεν*... usw. unmöglich die Menschen gemeint sein können, da es sich hier ja um den Sokrates handelt und nicht um die übrigen. Es soll gezeigt werden, daß Sokrates eins und vieles ist. Dem ist entgegenzuhalten, daß auch, wenn wir die Interpretation der sieben Menschen annehmen, doch gezeigt wird, daß Sokrates eins und vieles ist. Die Tatsache, daß auch in dieser Weise die Möglichkeit gegeben ist, auch jeden anderen von den sieben Menschen als eins und vieles zu erweisen, widerlegt nicht, daß Sokrates als Glied dieser Vielheit Anteil hat an der Idee der Vielheit und somit vieles ist.Diese Erwägungen und Fragen haben nicht den Charakter der Verteidigung der einen Deutung und der Widerlegung der anderen. Sie zielen nur darauf ab, die Problematik aufzuzeigeh. Zu einer Entscheidung fühle ich mich nicht fähig.

Zum Abschluß dieser Aporie, in die ich geraten bin, möchte ich noch eine Erwägung in Betracht ziehen, die nur den Sinn hat, das ganze Problem klarer zu machen: Wenn wir annehmen, daß *τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου* usw. "meine rechte Seite" usw. bedeutet, d.h. die Teile des Körpers des Sokrates bezeichnen, so ist die Erwähnung der sieben Menschen, die zu dem noch einen konzessiven Sinn hat – *ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγώ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς* völlig unmotiviert. Der absolute Genitiv *ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων* ist in den Übersetzungen paraphrasiert, z.B. von Schleiermacher: "Wenn aber hernach als eins, wird er sagen, daß unter uns sieben hier ich ein Mensch bin, an mir habend insofern auch Einheit." Das Partizip *ὄντων* hat aber hier im strengen Sinn konzessive Bedeutung: Obwohl wir sieben sind, bin ich ein Mensch, und insofern habe ich auch Anteil an der Einheit. Der Gegensatz besteht zwischen den vielen (7) Menschen und dem einen Menschen. Die Vielheit der sieben Menschen wird der Einheit des einen Menschen, nämlich des Sokrates, gegenübergestellt. Logisch hat die Erwähnung der sieben Menschen gerade hier keinen Platz. Vielmehr sollte man etwas

anderes erwarten: Statt *ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων* müßte stehen *ἑπτὰ ἐμοῦ ὄντος* obwohl ich vieles bin, obwohl ich aus vielen Teilen bestehe, bin ich **ein** Mensch. Wir haben es hier zweimal mit einer Vielheit zu tun, aber in jeweils verschiedener Bedeutung. Einmal bezeichnet sie die Teile des Sokrates, einmal die sieben Menschen. Wenn wir dagegen der Erwähnung der sieben Menschen stattgeben und sie als notwendig ansehen, so liegt der Verdacht nahe, daß mit *τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου* usw.
die Menschen gemeint sind. Denn zunächst hat Sokrates gesagt, daß die sieben Menschen eine Vielheit bilden, und diese Vielheit hat Anteil an der Idee der Vielheit, folglich auch Sokrates, der zu den sieben Menschen gehört, und dadurch wird er vieles. Er fährt dann fort: "Obwohl wir sieben Menschen sind, bin ich **ein** Mensch, und insofern habe ich Anteil an der Idee der Einheit.

Die Glieder korrespondieren sogar chiastisch:
Sokrates (Einheit) sieben Menschen (Vielheit)
sieben Menschen (Vielheit) Sokrates (Einheit)
Nach der anderen Deutung erhalten wir dagegen folgendes

Schema:
Sokrates (Einheit) Teile des Sokrates (Vielheit)
sieben Menschen (Vielheit) Sokrates (Einheit)

Es ließe sich auch denken, daß mit dem Ausdruck *τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου* nicht die sieben Menschen gemeint sind, sondern die Teile des Sokrates. Daß hier der Plural gebraucht wird, obwohl man den Singular erwarten sollte: *ἑπτὰ ἐμοῦ ὄντος* ist sprachlich möglixh[3]. Diese Deutung widerlegt sich jedoch aus dem Zusammenhang heraus, denn Sokrates gibt selbst die Teile seines Körpers als sechs an. Wenn an unserer Stelle statt sieben die Zahl Sechs stünde, dann wäre diese Möglichkeit diskutierbar.

Hier muss es erklärt werden, dass die Ausdrücke *τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου* usw. die sechst Ortsbestimmungen meinen (*Tim.* 43b) Ich möchte hier noch letztlich eine wichtige Bemerkung beifügen. Die Phrase *ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγώ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος* bedeutet

[3] Siehe Anmerkung 2. Diese Arbeit wurde im Jahr 1969 in Bonn geschrieben und im Jahr 2001 an der Universitaet Ioannina vollendet worden. Fuer dieses Thema vgl. G. FINE,The One over Many. *The Philosophical Review*, 99, No. 2, 1980,197-240.

nicht unbedingt, das es hier sieben Menschen sind, weil die Ausdrücke *ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου* usw. die Seienden die rechts von miv liegen, bedeutet. In der Mitte steht Sokrates, der ein Mensch ist. Mit diese Auslegung ist die Totalität der Welt gemeint, d.h. die ganze Welt, in Schema einer Kugel (Sphaere). Die Welt hat das Schema einer Kugel (*Tim.* 62d, 33b, 44d). Auf diese Deutung hat mich Yannis Anastasiou, Professor der klassischen Philologie an der Universität Ioannina. Auch Prof. Tezas hat es mir bestaetigt. Ich bedanke mich herzlich dafür. *Ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγώ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος*... bedeutet: obwohl wir sieben Entitäten sind, bin ich doch ein Mensch. Diese sieben entitäten bilden die ganze Welt aus und Sokrates ist die Seele dieser Welt. Diese Deutung ist meiner Meinung nach die richtigsteMit all diesen Gedanken hoffe ich nur, anderen einen Anlaß gegeben zu haben, über das Problem weiter nachzudenken.



Der eigentliche Sinn von *κοινή αἴσθησις*

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Wenn die κοινα αισθητα von den einzelnen Sinnen wahrgenommen warden, und ausser den fuenf Sinnen kein anderer sinn da ist, was soll es dann heissen, dass wir die κοινα mit der sogenannten κοινη αισθησις wahrnehmen bzw. Erkennen: αλλ' εστι και η τουτων κρισις της κοινης εργον αισθησεως[1] ? Auch Aristoteles drueckt sich aenlich aus, wenn er sagt: των δε κοινων ηδη εχομεν αισθησιν κοινην, ου κατα συμβεβηκος[2]. Handelt es sich hier um einen Widerspruch? Keineswegs. Denn mit κοινη αισθησις ist hier nicht ein einzelner bzw. ein sechster Sinn gemeint, sondern die gemeinsame Wahrnehmung des κοινον αισθητον, d.h. seine Wahrnehmung mit mehreren oder sogar mit allen Einzelnen Sinnen[3]. Denn was sonst kann es heissen, wenn Aristoteles ausdruecklih betont: es gibt also fuer sie, fuer die κοινα Gegenstaende, keinen eigenen

[1] Alexander von Aphr., *De anima* 65. 17.

[2] Aristoteles, *De anima* 425a 27-28.

[3] Vgl. Aristoteles, *De anima* 418a 18-19: τα γαρ τοιαυτα (sc. τα κοινα) ουδεμιας εστιν ιδια, αλλα κοινα πασαις.

Sinn: ουκ αρ' εστιν ιδια (sc. αισθησις)[4]? Denn sonst, faert Aristoteles fort, d.h. wenn wir die κοινα nicht mit einer gemeinsamen und gegenseitig sich ergaenzenden Wahrnehmung der Eizelsinne wahrnehmen wuerden, wuerden wir sie nur so wahrnehmen, wie den Sohn des Kleon mit dem Gesichtssinn, d.h. indirect: κατα συμβεβηκος[5]. Mit dem wesentlichen Unterschied aber, dass, waerend bei der κοινον-Wahrnehmung alle daran teilnehmenden Sinne aktiv und gemeisam mitwirken, bzw. von dem gemeisamen Wahrnehmungsgegenstand affiziert warden, bei der Wahrnehmung einer eigentuemlichen Qualitaet mit dem nicht entsprechend eigenen Sinn die Wahrnehmung des nicht Eigentuemlichen[6] aisthetisch nicht gegenwaertig ist, sondern sich auf eine schon einmal vollzogene gemeinsame Wahrnehmung stuetzt, die jetzt nur anhand der φαντασια praesent ist. Deshalb ist hier die Gefahr der Taeuschung nicht gross[7], da die aisthetische Gemeinsamkeit und Einheit[8] nicht gegenwaertig[9] ist. Waehrend sich bei der κοινον-Wahrnehmung die Einzelsinne nicht nur durch den gemeinsamen Sinnesgegenstand einigen, sondern auch und zugleich dadurch, dass sie alle Kraefte, und zwar in einer aisthetisch gegenwaertigen Wirksamkeit, eines einzigen Wahrnehmungsvermoegens sind.

Diese gemeinsame Wahrnehmungswirksamkeit der Einzelsinne bei der κοινα-Wahrnehmung wird auch von den altgriechischen Kommentatoren richtig erkannt und herausgestellt[10]. Die κοινα-

[4] Aristoteles, *De anima* 425a 28.

[5] Siehe Aristoteles, *De anima* 425a 28-29.

[6] Siehe Aristoteles, *De anima* 425a 30 ff.

[7] Siehe Aristoteles, *De anima* 425b 3.

[8] Siehe Aristoteles *De anima* 425a 31.

[9] Es geht hier um eine Einheit, die auf die Einheit des diese beiden (z. B. Sehen und Schmecken) erfassenden einen Subjekts zurueckzufuehren ist. Durch diese Einheit des Wahrnehmenden sei auch das Wahrgenommene so geeignet, dass es unterschieden werden koenne (vgl. W. Broecker, Aristoteles, Frankfurt 1964, S. 149).

[10] So versteht Simplikios die κοινη αισθησις als die Praesens des einzigen Wahrnehmungsvermoegens in allen ihren Differenzierubgen, d. h. den fuenf Sinnen in ihren Vereinigung und Gemeisamkeit bei der κοινα-Wahrnehmung, wobei nicht, wie er es ausdruecklich betont, ein eigener Sinn zu verstehen ist, der auf Grund der Vereinigung der fuenf Sinne wahrnimmt (s.De anima 185. 7-10). Aenlich Philoponos (s. De anima 460.

Wahrnehmung ist auch unter einem anderen und zwar hoch interessanten Aspekt als κοινη αισθησις zu betrachten; einen Aspekt den wir Simplikios verdanken. Dem gemaess ist die κονα-Wahrnehmung der Einzelsinne, wobei jedoch jeder Einzelsinn ueber seine eigene aisthetische Qualitaet hinaus auch das κοινον erfasst: αλλως δε κοινη η των κοινων αντιληπτικη λεγεται, ως εκαστης προς τω ιδιω και το κοινον εχουσης[11]. Und somit haben wir zusammen und zugleich mit der Wahrnehmung der ιδια eine zusaetzliche Wahrnehmung zu nennen. Diesen Gedanken finden wir implizit auch bei Themistios, der naemlich meint, dass sich die Einzelwahrnehmung veraendert bzw. erweitert bei der κοινα-Wahrnehmung, indem z.B. der Gesichtswahrnehmung bei einer κοινον-Wahrnehmung einer Groesse, ein gewisser Charakter von Groesse, Bewegung, Gestalt und Einheit eingepraegt wird: επι μεντοι των κοινων αισθητων, οταν αισθανηται μεγεθους η οψις, εγγινεται του μεγεθους αυτη χαρακτηρ, και της κινησεως δε ομοιως και του ενος και του σχηματος[12]. Gemeinsame Wahrnehmung bedeutet also in beiden Faellen eine Doppelfunktion des Einzelsinnes und zwar in einem dialektischen Verhaeltnis.

Wenngleich nach Alexander und den anderen altgriechischen Kommentatoren der Aristotelische Ausdruck κοινη αισθησις keineswegs auf einen eigenen bzw. sechsten Sinn verweist – davon spricht Aristoteles niergendswo – meinen viele moderne Aristoteles-Kommentatoren und Forscher, dass mit diesem Ausdruck ein eigener Sinn gemeint ist. Zu diesen gehoeren u. a. Baeumker, Zeller, Hicks, Beare, Duering und Hamlyn. Ich werde nur kurz Hamlyn repraesentativ heranziehen, der nicht nur zeitlich der letzte ist, sondern auch am schaerfsten diese Aufassung zu vertreten scheint. So versteht er unter κοινη αισθησις einen eigenen Sinn , der fuer die κοινα-Wahrnehmung da ist: "The koine aesthesis is a sense, it is the one concerned with the koina" [13]. Darueber besteht sogar nach Hamlyn kein Zweifel: "Now, the koine aesthesis as the sense concerned with

17-19) wie auch Themistios (s.De anima 82.22). Simplikios erweist sich hier, in der κοινη αισθησις-Lehre des Aristoteles, als sein bester Interpret.

[11] Simplikios, *De anima* 185. 16-18.

[12]Themistios, *De anima* 82. 18-20.

[13] Hamlyn D.W.,"koine Aesthesis", *The Monist* 52 (1968), S. 205.

the koina is undoubtedly" [14]. Es handelt sich allerdings, faehrt Hamlyn fort, nicht um einen spezifischen Sinn, wie es die fuenf sind: "although not a special one"[15]. Dass die Sachen irgendwie voneinander verschieden sein muessen, das kann ja nur stimmen. Auch bei Hamlyn fehlt aber die Tendenz zur richrigen Auffassung der κοινη αισθησις nicht, wenn er sie eher al eine Kraft auffasst, die in den einzelnen Sinnesorganen enthalten ist: "Rather the koine aesthesis is a potentiality possessed by each of the individual senseorgans[16]. Das steht also sehr nah zur richtigen Aufassung der κοινη αισθησις von Ross: "it must be interpretend not as meaning a sense over and above the five and perceiving a more varied group of objects, but as the common nature inherent in all the five. We must think of sense as a single faculty which for certain purpose is specified into the five senses, but discharges certain functions in virtue of its generic nature"[17].

Zu denjenigen, die zwischen den einzelnen fuenf Sinnen und dem sogenannten Gemeisinn: sensus communis im Sinne eines anderen eigenen Sinnes trennen, gehoert auch Thomas von Aquin. Obwohl er von dem Gemeinsinn als "radix et principium exteriorvm sensuum"[18] spricht, versteht er ihn nicht als die eine geneinsame aisthetische Natur (Kraft) der Seele, in der alle Einzelsinne ihr Sein haben, was allerdings richtig waere, sondern als einen eigenen Sinn, der gerade ueber den Einzelsinnen steht, indem er "apprehendit sensata omnium sensuum proprium"[19], indem er naemlich, konkreter gesagt,

1. Zwischen den heterogenen aisthetischen Qualitaeten unterscheidet (erkennt), und dadurch, dass alle einzelsinnigen aisthetischen Wahrnehmungen, auf Grund einer immanent-teleologischen Bewegung, zu ihm gelangen, und 2. Indem durch ihn die Wahrnehmungs-Wahrnehmung erfolgt[20]. Diese Gegenueberstellung von Einzelsinnen und sensus communis kommt in seinem De anima-Kommentar nicht vor. Im Gegenteil es wird dort die Wahrnemung einer direkten und gemeisamen

[14] A.a.O., S. 204. Vgl. auch S 207 usw.
[15] Ebda.
[16] Ebda.
[17] Ross D., *De anima* S. 33.
[18] Thomas von Aquin, *Summa theologiae* I 78, 4 ad 1.
[19] Thomas von Aquin, *Summa contra Gentiles* II, 74.
[20] Thomas von Aquin, *Summa Theologiae* I 78, 4 ad 2.

Wahrnehmung mit den Einzelsinnen zugeschrieben: "id est communia sensibilia communiter sentiuntur a diversis sensibus per se, et non secundum accidens[21].

Zu unserer grossen Ueberaschung versteht auch Franz Brentano selbst den Aristotelischen κοινη αισθησις-Begriff nicht richtig, wenn er ihn, anscheinend Thomas folgend, als einen besonderen und zwar inneren Sinn, ueber allen Einzelsinnen stehend, versteht, der die Wahrnehmungs-Wahrnehmung vollzieht, gemeinsame Sinnesobjekte wahrnimmt, und die Unterscheidung der sogenannten heterogenen Sinnesobjekte ermoeglicht[22]. Das alles leistet er, da "sein eigentuemliches Objekt einzig und allein die Sensationen sind"[23], eine voellig Thomasische Auffassung, nach der der sensus communis dasjenige "discretionis iudicium" ist "ad quem referantur, sicut ad commune terminum, omnes apprehensions sensuum"[24].

Die Tatsache der Untrscheidung der Sinnesobjekte in einzelne und gemeisame fuert Brentano, wie er selbst gesteht, zur Annahme eines consequenterweise entsprechenden besonderen Sinnes fuer die κοινα, da eben dessen Objekte "von dem Objelte jedes der bereits angenommenen Sinne verschieden seien"[25]. Brentano selbst meint, dass seine Auffassung von κοινη αισθησις widerspruchlos ist und alle Schwierigkeiten wegraeumt. Darauf, d.h. ob es wirklich so ist, werde ich hier nicht eingehen, moechte aber kurz sagen: Wenn das, auf welches die Wahrnehmungen der Einzelsinne gehen, selbst ein besonderer Sinn ist, dann kann es nicht als das Einheitliche der Wahrnehmung ueberhaupt fungieren und somit nicht die Funktionen, die ihm zugeschrieben werden, erfuellen. Das war gerade der Grund, aus welchem die Einzelsinne diese Funktionen sich nicht leisten konnten. Das Problem also bleibt bestehen. Und auf jeden Fall wurde es von Brentano nicht im Aristotelischen Sinne geloest.

Abschliessend ist nur zu sagen, dass die κοινη αισθησις bei Alexander und Aristoteles einen Doppelsinn hat, indem sie zum einen die direkte κοινα-Wahrnehmung mit allen oder auf jeden Fall mit mehreren Sinnen bedeutet, wie es oben ausfuerlich

[21] Thomas von Aquin, *In de anima* III 1 n.580.
[22] Brentano Fr., *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, S. 93.
[23] Ebda.
[24] Thomas von Aquin, *Summa theologiae* I 78,4 ad 2.
[25] Brentano Fr., a.a.O. S. 93.

dargelegt wurde, und zugleich und parallel dazu eine ueber die ιδιον-Wahrnehmung hinaus andere Wahrnehmung, diejenige naemlich des gemeinsamen Sinnesobjekts, und somit eine mit der ersteren gemeinsame κοινη-Wahrnehmung des jeweiligen Einzelsinnes, der an der κοινα-Wahrnehmung beteiligt ist. Nur eine solche Auffassung laesst sich mit der Sinneseinheit vereibaren, wie sie Aristoteles und im Anschluss an ihn auch Alexander gedacht haben. Eine Einheit, in der die Einzelsinne durch ihre Organizitaet, d.h. ihre organische Lokalisierung, von ihrer Funktion her auf Verschiedenes gerichtet sind, ohne aber auch selbstaendig zu sein, da sie alle aus einer einzigen Wahrnehmungskraft herauswachsen, bzw. sich der Verschiedenheit des Wahrnehmbaren gemaess differenzieren, waerend sie immer, sowohl ontologisch als auch aisthetisch, an ein und demselben Wahrnehmungsvermoegen untrennbar inhaerieren und dialektisch sich einigen und eine Einheit bilden. Diese Einheit kann nicht durch den Gemein- oder Zentralsinn geleistet werden[26], wenn er sich von den Einzelsinnen prinzipiel unterscheidet, auch wenn er "eine bestimmte Gattung von Objekten habe, auf die sich die Wahrnehmungsfaeigkeit beschraenke"[27], eine Gattung, die naemlich wie bei Brentano und Thomas "in den Sensationen als solchen bestehen soll"[28]. Im Gegenteil die Existenz eines solchen Gemeinsinnes wuerde die Sinneseinheit einfach gefaehrden und keineswegs foerdern. Ein solcher Gemeinsinn laest die, allerdings beschraenkte, Selbststaendikeit der Einzelsinne auheben: "alle Sinne sind in Wahrheit nur ein Sinn, naemlich der Zentralsinn, der in den einzelnen Sinnen nur in verschiedener Weise sich aeussert"[29], ohne als Gegenleistung die Sinneseinheit garantieren zu koennen.

[26] Wie ausser Brentano noch J. Neuhaeuser meint: "...dass dem Zentralsinne namentlich auch die Funktion zukommt, die Vereinigung der durch die verschiedene Sinne wahrgenommenen Qualitaeten in einem Objekt wahrzunehmen, oder die verschiedenen Wahrnehmungen zur Wahrnehmung eines Objekts zu vereinen" (*Aristoteles' Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnisvermoegen und seinen Organen*, Leipzig 1878, S. 35).

[27] Neuhaeuser J., a.a.O. S.67.

[28] Ebda.

[29] Ebda S. 35.

The One-Dimensional Society and its Possible Negations in Herbert Marcuse's Thinking

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"If we still have some hope,
we owe it to those who have none."
Walter Benjamin

1. Introduction

The objective of this article, is to review the work of Herbert Marcuse, who as an intellectual in early 1920's had joined with others and found the "Frankfurt School for Social

Research", the so-called "Critical Theory". That Institute was constituted by intellectuals and critics who, after 1933, had made clear their position against the bourgeois system, fascism and monopoly capitalism in the west and the orthodox socialism in the east. They appeared to have one mission to complete and that was to provide a clear view of the existing reality in order to be critics who could criticize adequately the society as a whole. If they were to show the direction to confront the social obstacles, they could not remain critics. They could be something else and their expressed opinions could become a new ideology so as organizing a new political party. Herbert Marcuse was the critic who synthesized the first group of theorists that became the first generation of the Critical Theory. He shares Adorno's 'unrest about the criticism and the transition of objectification and fetishism,'[1]on the one hand. While on the other, as Held suggests, he follows Horkheimer's line of thought, stressing the "endless nature of the dialectic, one possibility in human being to be realized yet, in understanding totality".[2] He shows however, optimism and an image of revolutionary substance, which was definitely missing from his other colleagues. What characterized them in fact was generally pessimism, a melancholy that existed in most of their writings and attitudes.

Marcuse's stand on the classical marxism and his interest in such a theory was greater than the other critical thinkers of the school. His interest was toward philosophy, culture and political power in general. Politics seem to have played a central role in his thought and his writing activity with the restless attempt to scrutinize, support and rebuilt the marxist theory. His constant anxiety, for the cause of social revolution, the possibility to reach democratic socialism, is clearly revealed in his work. In other words, the aims of his approach for modern society, as it has been observed, are basically the liberation of consciousness, the mental cultivation of a political movement which will be able to function in decentralized mode and the reconciliation of man and nature.[3] Many of the works he wrote are representative to

[1] Held D. *Introduction to Critical Theory*, University of California Press, Berkeley 1980, p. 223.

[2] Ibid, p. 223.

[3] Ibid, p. 224.

Critical Theory. The *One-Dimensional Man*[4] which was written in late 1950's, constitutes a strict as well as a rational criticism for the industrially advanced societies in the bourgeois social formation as well as for the existing socialist world of his time.

The critical view that is expressed in his work reveals a negative dialectical philosophy because the given situation and especially the dialectic of Hegel had reached a conflict with the existing social reality. The thinking which adopts a critical method for analyzing the imperfections of the modern society for him thus, is the negative philosophy. In other words, the substance of one such critical investigation is formulated by one strictly negative conception for the institutions and the structure of society. At this point, there must be added an analysis about the causes that make this negative attitude necessary. Not only to reflect the common spirit between him with the other theorists, but to connect his writing that deals with *Reason*, with that of the "One-Dimensional Man" later. In order to see this clearly, it is highly important a brief retrospection of the general view of the School and the other theoreticians about the Enlightenment and its evolution. For that, our **research aim is** to indicate **how seasonable such a thinker, who expresses optimism in contrast with the other critical theorists, is today regarding potential social resistance to the existing one-dimensional society**.

2. Enlightment, Positivism & Science

The intersected views of many who have studied the *Frankfurt School* merge into a general conclusion. That, critical theory and it's theoreticians with their collective work: *The Dialectics of Enlightenment*,[5] made certain that despite the fact that the Enlightenment was the light of detecting all the aspects of social existence to reveal truth, took some moment a wrong course. In particular, it slipped from its orbit as a result to depart from its correct route and aim as it initially had. It's about the changing

[4] Marcuse H. *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, Beacon Press, Boston 1964.

[5] Horkheimer M. &Adorno Th. *The Dialectics of Enlightment*, Upsilon/ Books, Athens 1975.

pattern of reason.[6] While it was for long the force of demystification of the world[7]facilitating the liberation of human being from the middle age bonds that held him bounded to fear and prejudice. It was like a demythologization which could tear down the castle of myth, the superstitions and attempt to scatter around triumphantly the dark clouds of prejudices, so as the desired emancipation of the simple citizen could be achieved. But the Enlightenment showed itself helpless to complete this work of liberation of people which would make them sovereign over their environment, simply because it took a false direction. In this case reason had already suffered if not a deep fall a whole changing pattern. Since reason goes not through a withering or lapse but into a vertical deviation from its rout, Enlightment itself looses its value. That is, it loses its most substantial weapon which is **reason**, in order to light up the darkened and dusty folds of society and so sinks into darkness. As Horkheimer dexterously observes, "the technical procedure to which subjectivity has been reduced after its uprooting from consciousness, is immune to the ambivalences of mythical thought and from any meaning in general, since Reason is no more than an aiding instrument of the economic mechanism that embraces everything."[8] The revitalizing of reason becomes conclusively if not impossible for itself, at least highly problematic, since it seems to serve other aims.

At this point, we should note the interest and anxiety of Marcuse as well as of the other theoreticians of the school with an ambivalent matter such as the one of domination. Mainly because the concept of domination is sometimes related with some forms of terror that help each form of oligarchy to rule wide social strata without resistance. What the thinker of critical theory observed was that, with the use of domination which bourgeois society exercises on its members and not with the significance of those rights that safeguard the suzerainty of ethnic state. Particularly, with the ways that the bourgeois system with its ideology of liberalism coerces, manipulates and deceives

[6] Lukács G. *History and Class Consciousness*, Publications of Ulysses, Athens 1975.

[7] Terlexis P. *Max Weber, The demystification of the World*, Publications Papazisis, Athens 2000.

[8] *The Dialectics of Enlightment*, op. cit. p. 47.

people so as to assure its reproduction and perpetuation.[9] This domination is articulated on three levels: "The first has to do with instrumental reason, that is, with the way which we conceive the world and in which the domination of the system is legitimized in our eyes. The second field refers to modern mass culture, which incorporates people in the system of domination. The third refers to that type of personality that not only accepts, but also seeks domination".[10] Therefore, the historical practice of reason, in late modernity, moves away from its initial aim. This change of the movement shows that reason carries out another function than the search for truth and this is the reason of its profound fall. Instead, then of the Enlightenment to struggle for the obliteration of the superstition and the rejection of myth, the terms inverted and it becomes myth itself. When reason slides into a tautology with its object with no resistance, or is not shockingly vibrated from its place within historical conditions, whatever they might be, it is undoubtedly led to serve the existing social order. Its gradual evolution is to end up in a technical enterprise which proves its usefulness repeatedly until it finally becomes an instrument of productivity and social stability. It's about the instrumentalization of reason which refers to the transformation of the relations of people in capitalist society into relations of objects, where according to Lukacs they regard themselves as tools.[11]

The term *instrumental* means two things. On the one hand, "it is a way to see the world and on the other, it is a way to confront theoretical knowledge. To see the world instrumentally, means that we confront its various elements as tools."[12] The critical theoreticians, were terrified when they discovered that the reason of modernity led us into an irrational situation in which the common reason of the tradition had to be rejected, creating so the major paradox of the absurd or illogical rationality.[13] In

[9] Graib I. *Modern Social Theory*, Publications Greek Letters, Athens 1998, pp. 428-429.

[10] Ibid, p. 429.

[11] Lukács G. *History and Class Consciousness*, Publications of Ulysses, Athens 1975.

[12] *Modern Social Theory*, op. cit., p. 430.

[13] Friedman G. *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School*, Cornell University Press, London 1988, p. 16.

their collective works, they underline that reason has became an instrument, since it had lost its autonomy. "Its functional value, its role in the domination of people and nature, had become the only criterion".[14]This phase of evolution of the instrumentalized reason into the direction of productivity has an ideological tone which is given a scientific notion, since it inclines positively towards production. That is, since the incorporation of reason in the process of production and its metamorphosis into an instrument that aims at increasing production the moment which the means of production do not belong to the community, reason cannot but pave the way towards a positive blossom of the bourgeois society. Thus, reason becomes instrumental after it has been incorporated in the process of production and expressed in a positivistic manner. Positivism becomes this way inevitably, the ideological expression of this movement of reason within such an affirmation or rather certainty of functioning as an instrument of production and stability of the system. That is, the representatives of this current regarded that in the general decline in which the philosophical thinking had entered to, society does not lose anything since it is substituted from a more powerful instrument of cognition which is the one provided by the contemporary scientific knowledge. In other words, whatever philosophical thought had left out as incomplete was handed it over to science. It means, it was handed over in general to the modern experimental methods. However, the users and the planners of these kinds of methods put a great stress and priority to physical sciences and in their use they oversaw in this sense the fact that such sciences are of their own nature simply a helpful medium of production. They are an element, as the theoreticians of critical theory stress, among many in the social process. Additionally, in regarding science as a medium or instrument for production and progress, what eventually evolved was not society but simply technology. As Plato tried in antiquity to make rulers philosophers, so as technocrats today determine engineers as the supreme administration of society, transforming this way, the point of view and the entire content of this current into philosophical technocracy. For Horkheimer, "positivists believe engineers are philosophers ...and apply the science of

[14] Horkheimer M. *The Eclipse of Reason*, Publications Kritiki, Athens 1987, p. 33.

which philosophy is simply a derivative". [15] In other words, this current of positivism adjusts philosophy to science as it proves useful to it instead of adjusting practice to philosophy. The only way to rescue humanity in positivist thought is "to be subjected to rules and methods of scientific reasoning."[16]

For the School in general, philosophical and empirical positivism constituted the end of Enlightment and its great aim. The social function of positivistic ideology was its negation in the critical fold of reason, allowing it to function alone on the ground of fictitious or illusory expression. Consequently, the representatives of this ideological current, who were indeed named positivists since they followed the positive rout using simultaneously science negatively, rejected reason as a critical moment or stage and under their famous dogma remained firmed towards the awe of the event. Under the marcusean thought, their function simply ends at the categorization of the event or events. Their task therefore ends of course when their function has already confirmed and interpreted the event. Under such conditions and such norms of positivism, reason not only is defective, but if it exists at all it is without any critical capacity. In searching for the beginning of the digression of reason and the evolution of its instrumentalization, it is necessary to stand, according to the marcusean thinking, in the realm of occurrences. The fact that, positivism came to govern generally the world, by dominating the field of the scientific conceptions and consciousness was to the theoreticians of the School, not an accidental result in the process of the Enlightenment. The roots of positivism, according to critical thought, are already to be traced in the works of Plato, especially in the *Philosopher King*, 'where everything is subjected to the ideal of the king, who is the only one who knows what is generally good'.[17]Specifically, the thinkers of the School drew the parallel between the platonic philosopher leader and the modern erudite technocrat social architect. The essential part here is, that equally the leader in the platonic conception as the bureaucrat of the modern world intent

[15] Horkheimer M. *The Eclipse of Reason*, Publications Kritiki, Athens 1987, p. 77.

[16] Ibid. p. 77.

[17] Sabine G. H. *History of Political Theories*, Publications Atlantis, Athens, p. 83.

to subordinate society to the principle of reason as well as to the sense of the truth of reason.[18] As a consequence, positivism plans to subordinate philosophy into the social function. Critical theory, however, sees here a radical difference in that the platonic thinking was planning one metamorphosis of this social function with the exact duplication of the philosophical function. While the basic intention of positivism indisputably is to make philosophy an object of the social function, since it is incapable to permit philosophy to escape from the brutal falsification of the events. The point of crystallization of positivism is thus its speculation about science itself and its role within the society and not its philosophical foundation.

3. Philosophical Thought &Dialectic

The position of Plato, to transform social function into philosophical function, constituted for critical theory a basic thrust for Enlightenment. Because, what the philosopher expected was, an identification of philosophy and society only in the theoretical context, while recognizing that historically is quite difficult, since they do not converge. This platonic theory is wedged deep in the historic teleology in Hegelian thought. That is, this unrealized platonic hope becomes the unavoidable necessity in Hegel, transforming the speculative notion of the philosopher-king into a particular practice of the public employee-bureaucrat in Prussia. As a result of this, 'if Plato gave an impulse to the development of the Enlightenment, as mentioned above, Hegel declares its realization'.[19] After this declaration and the reconciliation between reality and reason the social practice of philosophy gives in to positivism. Thus, Marcuse will later write, that the interest of the critical theory is the real content of the philosophic issues and ideas while the content of sociology are the untruths of the previous

[18] Friedman G., *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, p.117-18.

[19] Ibid, p. 119.

philosophies.[20]Hegelian dialectic began by eliminating the distinction between image and reality. The deeper truth of the world, in a way, should converge with the societal image of the world according to the above Hegelian logic. Yet, that the distinction between the object and its notion should have historically been reconciled in one and only entity.[21]Thus, what arises as a theory of the empirical activity is eventually positivism since it is the result of such reconciliation. The criticism of the School against the hegelian conception is constituted of four elements. The first is, the criticism against the hegelian theory of identity, in which the dialectic attacks but without preponderating the radical negation of the positivist unity. The second element is the critique of the hegelian concept of reason as an instrumental one. The third is the criticism of the hegelian positive faith in the dialectic certainty of history. The final is the criticism of the School to the hegelian vision of historical resolution.[22]According to the thinkers of the Frankfurt School, a transition is been registered from philosophy to the domain of state, which develops the essence of the theoretical system of Hegel. The hegelian ideas therefore, are integrated with the form they take state and society historically. Since then, these categories become the centre of discussion, research and interest in the hegelian system of thought, philosophy hands over the task to social theory to deal with them. In general, the School theorized that the hegelian thought actually teaches that reason is captive of the social powers who govern and that it has been transformed to an instrument. Consequently, thought is the negation to what is before us, because as Marcuse claims, even the most abstracted ideas are impregnated with experience.[23] Experience though of one world which the irrational becomes rational and so determines the events, where the un-freedom becomes freedom and war becomes the warrant of peace. This world has contradictions. The common sense and the science are

[20] Jay Martin, *The Dialectical Imagination, A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950,* University of California Press, Berkeley 1966, pp.63-64.

[21] *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School*, op. cit. p.119.

[22] Ibid, p.53.

[23] Marcuse H. "A Note on Dialectic", included in Andrew Arato's book: *The essential Frankfurt School Reader*, Continuum Publishing Company, New York 2000, p. 444.

defined by these contradictions, while the philosophical thought doesn't. The latter, initiates by admitting that facts do not reciprocate or do not correspond to the notions which common sense and science impose and for that negates them. The negation that dialectic enforces on facts, following marcusean view, is not a criticism of a compromising logic which negates the reality of contradictions, but the critique of a given state of affairs that negates its own hopes and abilities.[24]The rational and critical moments of Hegel especially his dialectic, comes to an opposition with the prevailing social reality. For that reason, the hegelian system for Marcuse may be named negative philosophy as it was termed by his contemporary opponents.[25]However, despite the negation that is presented in the Hegelian system of thought, it does not allow that negation to be original or authentic. The problem appears after Hegel's death, where the positive philosophy takes up the subjection of reason to the power of the event.

Consequently, such a philosophical way of thinking denotes today absence in marcusian thinking. Such a philosophical thought simply belongs to the past, where it is confuted only by the achievements of technological culture. In this way, the established reality seems to be much promising and productive so as to confute or imbibe the various alternatives. Thus, the acceptance of such a reality presents itself as being the only rational and methodological principle which does not involve criticism or change. In contrast, it shows a powerful insistence on the character of the social system in constantly repressing the various revolts or whatever resistance. Progress in this way, becomes quantitative and tends to delay its transformation into qualitative, with a consequence to rise new forms of existence accompanied with new forms of speech and freedom. The force of negative thought, according to Marcuse, is the driving force of the dialectic of cogitation, where it is used as a tool to analyze the world of events always in relation to its inner insufficiency. The dialectical thought, according with this conception itself begins with the feeling that the world is not liberated. That is, man and nature exist in states of alienation. In other words, these two categories exist as different concepts of what they

[24] Ibid, p.445.

[25] *Reason and Revolution*, op. cit. p. vii.

really are. Whatever form of thought however, does not include this contradiction in its logic is unavoidably a mistaken logic.[26] Because, thought can corresponds to the existing reality only when it transforms this reality through the understanding of its contradictory structure. In order, however, to understand this reality and its contradictions, means that we must know things exactly the way they are, the moment which it presupposes the rejection of things the way they are presented. Such a rejection or negation is not only a process of thought but of the practice itself. The dialectical thought thus, becomes negative as a daring opposition against the delusion of social reality. The society as a whole then, is quite unreasonable and this is equally evident in the mid-war as in the post-war era.

4. One-Dimensional Society and its Resistance

In the *One-Dimensional Man*[27]the critical theorist confirms the absurdity of the post-war era, underlining that the forces which direct the fate of the people of modern societies are in the position to impose those decisions which serve their interests much easier than before. That means they have, for him, the capacity to move the masses of toil, as the wide social strata, into this direction by disarming them psychologically and neutralizing or eliminating their potential criticism or any form of their resistance. For the critical thinker, those forces of power have the means and the way to resolve the inner problems and the social contradictions within the bourgeois as well as in the so called former socialist societies, by presenting some bearable level of consistency and integration.[28] Within such formulated social context therefore, the identity theory has prevailed which he calls one-dimensional society and which allows one-dimensional existence.

The success however of the integration of the other sides can be gained with a new method of oppression, very different from the previous epochs, mainly of the mid-war which was based on

[26] Marcuse H. "A Note on Dialectic", on the Arato's Book, *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, op. cit. p. 446.

[27] Marcuse H. *One-Dimensional Man*, Publ. Papazisi, Athens 1971.

[28] Ibid, p. 9.

the external threatening and terrorism. If in politics generally exist two basic conceptions that reflect the quality and the interest of the two main social groups and the one possesses the power, it depends on the way the integration of the other strata is achieved into society, it may be considered as a success. It is however, ascertained as an absurdity of the modern industrial society. As himself puts it, referring to that modern industrial society that: "its productivity obliterates the free development of human needs and virtues, its peace is being maintained with the constant threat of war and if it develops, this is made so by the suppression of all possibilities to take a peaceful form the individualist, national and international struggle for existence".[29] What is made clear here, is the fact that the oppression differs in our days in comparison to other times in mid-war, because it is based on technology rather than on the physical and technical immaturity of the era of terror. Technical progress, for the critical thinker, is reinforcing, if not creating, an effective system of domination and consistency, since the incorporation of the masses is being achieved by a new reconciliation with the side of the established state of affairs, those forces that they were previously opposed.[30] In this way, every protest or opposite stand aiming at human liberation, not only is being driven to failure but is being regarded as unrealistic and against the national interest. That is, a national interest in which the acceptance of its notion seems to be expression of the general will of all the forces that advocate and incorporating into society, by seemingly blunting the wounds of the class struggle of capital and labour within a powerful state.[31]When those forces with the opposite positions, which are pursuing social change in order to liberate the modern man, do not play decisively their role in the society and being unable to demonstrate boldly in the political field their positions, their criticism turns out abstracted and the industrial culture ends up without negation.

The industrial society as a result, ends up being one-dimensional society. What Marcuse says, in reference to this type of society is, "the effectiveness of its system prevents the individuals to comprehend that the system contains nothing but

[29] Ibid, p. 24.
[30] Ibid, p. 25.
[31] Ibid, p. 26.

elements which transfer the oppressive power to the whole".[32] The one-dimensional thought of society not only is being favoured but is also promoted from the people of media, who have at their disposal the mass information, as well as from those in the political arena. If the freedom of man is gradually gained in proportion with the development of human productivity, where in as much as more goods are accumulated the necessary working time for producing them is being reduced, thus what is being rightly increased here, is his free time. As much as free time tends to be maximized the human active being is transferred from the realm of needs to the realm of freedom, which in marxist terminology is called social freedom. In other words, social freedom is exclusively a product of the work of the individual and it cannot be created without that social labour of man. The technique of the industrialization though, in Marcuse's thinking, is a political technique which is extremely opposite with the essential aims of reason and freedom. Thus, in the stage where our society has reached to, instead of freedom and abundance oppression invades in all the aspects of personal life by accomplishing so an embodiment of opposite tendencies as well as assimilating all the social movements of the historical controversy.[33]Under such conditions, the potential resistance that could each individual show in any type of work and mainly in the industry gradually is vanished. The changes in labour and in the tools of production in the second half of the twentieth century changed not only the attitude but equally the consciousness of the working people. Trade unions could also not see themselves as something distinct from the enterprise and many times they are formed together with the interest or pressure groups.[34] Nor they can convince the workers of an arms factory that the same weapons they produce may be their own enemy. Political parties, on the other hand, those who suppose to represent the labour classes and logically should demonstrate different political and social view of things, are today incapable to exercise real criticism and do free and open political discourse. With the bourgeois political parties, restrict themselves exclusively to parliamentary rules despite their ideology.

[32] Ibid, p. 41.
[33] Ibid, p. 47.
[34] Ibid, p. 49.

For instance, the social-democratic parties, while officially have repudiating marxist programs in order to show their conformity of the established society and its institutions, trustfully ratify and identify themselves with various forms of control.[35] While the parties of the left in Europe, according to this view, are contemned to play the historical role to legitimate opposition, completely losing their radicalism. They are yet another testimony of the significance and the magnitude of the capitalist integration."[36]At the same time, the technological organization that is applied on a group of labour, creates a mutual dependence that integrates the worker in the factory.[37]He makes certain thus, that "often is being stressed the zeal of the workers for participation in the solution of the problems of production, the desire for unification of their mental capacities for the study of the problems of the technique and production that are clearly dependent on technology".[38] In the formed modern technological world of labour, in his view, the working class ceases to be an energetic lever of opposition against established society and its negative attitude is degrading. This is shown if we examine the organization and the administration where the oppression obtains an administrative character. Managerial oligarchies in various societies today, invade to the domain of scientific reasoning, research centers, laboratories and governments, obliterating thus with the mask of their rational objectivity the real factors of exploitation. The new element for Marcuse here is, "the rule of rationality within an irrational world, the efficacy of a heterogeneous determination that bottles up the instinctive impulses and desires of the individuals and dissimulates the difference between real and false consciousnesses".[39]

[35] Ibid, pp.49-50.

[36] Ibid, p. 50.

[37] Ibid, p. 57. Note: In this book Floyd Mann and R. Hoffman are mentioned: Automation and the Worker. A study of Social Change in Power Plants, New York, 1960, p.189.

[38] Ibid, pp. 57-58.

[39] Ibid, p.59.

5. "Eros and Civilization": Sovereignty and Psychology

What is being regarded as necessary for the thinker of critical theory and reflected in all his writings is an approach with a hermeneutic annotation on the systems of thought of Hegel, Marx and Freud. If not a strict reexamination at least a careful reflection on the past theoretic thought, in the light of the new data of a new socio-economic environment of a post-industrial capitalism, which emerges immediately after the end of the Second World War.[40]The priorities of the post-war epoch, after such a destructive war and barbarism, couldn't but be towards the reconstruction of societies and in general towards the elimination of poverty. The new environment which is being formed economically, socially and politically has a parallel course. It is an environment where the possibility of the reduction of hunger for the first time in history is being identified with the technical ability for control and organization of social life. The result of such an attempt in the decades that follow those of 60's and 70's is being however marked according to the theoretician of the Frankfurt School with one peculiarity. Specifically, the result of the *abundance* and the *totalitarian control* is the paradox that makes him reflect on Freud and Marx, in order to re-estimate the classical way of resistance between personal happiness and social organization, that both were interested.[41] In the work "Civilization and its Discontent",[42] the first had posed the problem as interdependence between progress in the evolution of society and discontent in the suppressed soul of the person. Freud had recognized the amazing 'progress that man has made in natural sciences and their applications, having control over nature, to an extent that he could never imagine'.[43] But the power that was gained over space and time, this enslavement of the powers of nature, a desire of thousands of years, has not increased the pleasure or

[40] Jameson F. *Marxism and Form, Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1971, pp. 106-107.
[41] Ibid, p. 107.
[42] Freud S. *Civilization and its Discontents*, Hogarth Press, 1975.
[43] Ibid, pp. 24-25.

satisfaction that people expect from life and it doesn't make them happier'.[44]

Life in organized societies presupposes in general the repulse of our desires and the transfer of our energy to other areas which society will benefit. But repulse and repression appear to vary in proportion with the constitution of society. In the reasoning of Freud's theory, Marcuse demonstrates how in late capitalism with the great development of the forces of production a high rate of repulse and repression is not necessary, because tensions have being created. Such 'tensions may be channeled into the perspective of social change, so that modern man may begin to face the world for the pleasure and the satisfaction it provides and not of its practical or instrumental use'.[45]Culture is just a mental expression and mental will and so the expression and the will of a substance is placed above every mental domination and rests on the existence of one soul which is not interested for the advisability and the usefulness in its own desire to be expressed.[46] The soul is what defines the real essence of the person, where it is seemed to be the incorporeal being. It cannot be seeing though but only with the manifestation of its behavior or action of the person itself.

Marcuse regards that man is the most precious of all, that the truth, benevolence and justice should exist among individuals that, all the human weaknesses may be mended through humanity and this ideal is not represented in society by any law of value but only from the soul.[47] Consequently, in Marcusean thought, the healthy soul has no exchange value. It cannot be a commodity because it may exist in a sick or ugly body. But this is the truth in the established social reality of capitalism which was formed into its opposite. 'The freedom of the soul', according to this view, "was used to justify the misery, the suffering and the enslavement of the body'. By referring to freedom he claims that, "it served the ideological tradition of the

[44] Ibid, p. 25.

[45] Craib I. *Contemporary Social Theory*, Publications Greek Letters, Athens 1998, p. 453.

[46] Marcuse H. *Negations*, Upsilon Publications, Athens 1998, p. 75. The author refers at this point to Alfred Weber, who designates culture as the realization of the possibilities of the soul. He describes in the page 29, 'the course of the soul up to itself, as the fundamental occasion of culture'.

[47] Ibid, p.80.

existence in the system of capitalism".[48]For this reason, though all the provided goods in the market connected to the photographic material of naked women for the increase of sales as a substitute of sexual pleasure. Studying Freud again all about desires, the pleasures of life and the soul, Marcuse managed an effective analysis of the whole matter of suppression and domination. He tried to supply marxism with one spiritual opponent through Freud and enrich freudian theory with one historical dimension through Marx. In this way, he used the psychological possibilities of liberation that underlie in Freud as a basis of deepening the revolutionary possibilities of Marx, while using the marxist certainty concerning the domination of nature as a basis to reveal new historical possibilities for the resolution of the constant freudian tension between the I and the self.[49] The conception of Freud about the world is rooted in unhappiness. While life for Freud is rough, since it provides us with pain, disappointments and unbearable situations, simultaneously demands satisfaction. The principle of enjoyment or pleasure gives in to the principle of reality with ultimate aim the survival of the organism. The principle of fulfillment on the other hand, reinforces thoroughly not only one organization of sexual repression but also the instinct of destruction. Consequently, if the historical procedure aimed at making the institutions of the principle of fulfillment redundant, it would likewise do so in the organization of feelings. That is, to liberate the instincts from the constrains that are demanded by the principle of fulfillment'.[50] Life as Eros conclusively can become in marcusian thought the exclusive principle of culture. In turn, the conquest of nature as the domination of man could rearrange not simply the social world but equally the psychological world. The bourgeois industrial civilization has not managed according to the Freudian psychoanalytic analysis to satisfy the demands with a plan for life to make people happy.[51]In Marcusean thought thus, in the post-war era, despite the technological development and the

[48] Ibid, p.80

[49] *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School*, op. citation, p.89.

[50] Marcuse H. *Eros and Civilization*, Vintage Books, New York 1955, p. 119.

[51] Freud S. *Civilization and its Discontents*, W. W. Norton & Company, London 1961, p. 29.

abundance of goods, despite the technical progress that produces and reproduces the image of a world of ease, pleasure, satisfaction, and convenience that does no longer seem privilege of the few or the elite, but rather of the masses, the modern man remains fossilized and stunned at the corner, in subjection and in constant control by the forces of power. The above as the 'achievements of the bourgeois social formation are obliterated or lost within the world of disappointment, misery and repression'.[52] For this reason he mentions, that today "capitalism has opened a new dimension which is both: its vital space as well as its negation".[53] The world, as it has been evolved, seems as a mental desert, in marcusean thought, where the meanings are wiped and the human being loses his soul since he is not able to understand what is happening around him.

6. Marxism and Revolution

On the other side, for the thinker of the critical school, "the socialist" society which ensued from the proletarian revolution in Soviet Union in 1917, with its Stalinist form, was no better or less depressive than the bourgeois society, but substantially poorer. In this way he thinks that, "the vision of freedom which Marx opposed to suppression and exploitation which was prevailing seemed to have lost its realistic content".[54] Marxist political theory, in Marcuse's conception, teaches the transition from capitalist system to socialist in the form of political revolution. The working class that would lead the revolutionary strata or classes would smash the state mechanism and uphold the technological mechanism, which it would be later socialized. In the conception of Marx then, had prevailed the view that if the workers as immediate producers could organize and direct the mechanism of production we could have a change in the technical continuity.[55] That is, this change in the production

[52] Marcuse H. Counterrevolution and Revolt, Publ. Papazisi, Athens 1974, p. 26.

[53] Ibid, p.26.

[54] *Reason and Revolution, The Ascend of Social Theory*, op. citation, p. 207.

[55] *One-Dimensional Man*, op. citation, § 51.

process would have as one main objective to 'satisfy those needs that would develop freely'.[56] That however, did not take place either in western capitalism or in eastern socialism. In the latter, the eastern "socialist" industrialization took place in an atmosphere of hostile coexistence which could explain its terrorist character by putting in motion the forces that bring about progress as a mean of constant oppression. The nationalized economy of Stalin as well as of his descendants, didn't eventually manage to take advantage of the labour productivity and capital in favour of the majority of people and the society. Thus, instead of the development of the society and the citizens, what was constantly growing and swelling was the state. This development, was taking place simultaneously with the development of the political party, to which the democratic process of function was unknown, obtaining thus gradually an evermore authoritarian and cruel form with several deviations and discriminations.

What took place in the western world was one reconstruction of the system. A reconstruction of the capitalist system, as the new imperialism that begun after the II World War, which despite the exploitation, the injustice and the inequality regarding values and incomes as well as the complete submission of the enterprises to the demands of capital as a whole, continues to function.[57]It does so, however, due to the economic and military force that the bourgeois state disposes overcoming its various crises, inside and outside of its sovereignty. The way modern bourgeois society arranged its technological basis tends unconditionally to totalitarianism. What there has been recorded thus in industrial civilization was one totalitarianism, for Marcuse, which is not only a particular form of government or party, but it is also a specific system of production and allocation in complete harmony with parties and newspapers.[58]Under such circumstances, it seems quite difficult with the evolution the capitalist system has to have effective resistance in the fields of politics and ideology.

The Marxist concept of revolution, for the theoretician of critical theory, does no fit any longer in the real social occasion of our days. This happens in this way, because the bourgeois

[56] Ibid, pp. 51-52.
[57] *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, op. citation, p. 17.
[58] *One-Dimensional Man*, op. cit. p.35.

system while going through the crisis of 1930 and the subsequent insanity during the Second World War, has managed to channel antagonisms, so as to succeed eventually to influence selfishly the working class. Materially and ideologically, these classes which once have been the absolute negation of the capitalist system are now according to the above thinking integrated in it. As a result of that, the industrial society shows in postwar era a different image from the one during the mid-war era. The economic and technological thought is transformed into a policy and the integrated man in such a society might asphyxiate but he goes on and lives in the society without resistance. Specifically, the critical theorist traces the distinctive feature of the industrially advanced societies that is also based on the forecast of Marx concerning the high level of technological rationality. Its main characteristics are the following: First, an increase on the living standard that extends now to the previous sensitive or non-privileged strata of the population. Second, an abundant industrial and technical capacity which has been expended almost entirely on the production and the distribution of military weapons, mechanical devises and luxury goods. The third is the scientific research, the control and skillful manipulation of the individual and the group behaviour. While on the other side the industrially advanced society is capable of containing a qualitative change for the near visible future. Marcuse himself recognizes that the forces and tendencies or currents which could smash the politics of containment and trigger the explosion of society in general, still exist.

However, the thinker's idea is that under the bourgeois system technology determines the state and the nature of the system, and not the system itself which would determine the state and the nature of technology. As a result, he anticipates that these qualitatively new historical developments presupposing a fundamental revision of marxist analysis on capitalism. Himself though neither thinks nor mentions neutrality of the technology as the traditional thought maintained. What he recommends, is one type of technology which it would be the outcome of a political practice that could be certainly transformed into a qualitative social change for converting the technical progress to the direction that is beneficial to man. For this reason he claims, that Marx did not predict these results of the technological

advanced society. Under this prism, the relations of production which are the power structure of society, may line up against the possibility of the development which it may be achieved by the forces of production. However, the present relations of production that exist are represented as that form of organization, which is technologically necessary for a rational society. That is, today's technology, as he will later claim, is the technology of the advanced industrial society which makes possible the elimination of the class conflict and the potential insurrection because technical progress itself has been incorporated in the system.[59]

Marcuse abandons the belief of Marx that refers to the necessity of the transition into a higher stage of human development and to the final success of this transition which will bring social change. He has however the unwavering idea that the transition form capitalism to socialism is necessary through one manner where it presupposes the complete development of the individual. For this reason, he maintains that the essential function of philosophy is its critical stance against the existing reality, confronting the space of reality with that which is historically possible. In referring to the societies of the existing socialism then, the thinker maintains the same views as those of capitalist social formation, since their social structure has been equally hierarchical. That is, although in these societies the proletariat seized power; it became and remained as one ruling class, but it has no ability to identify its own destination. This was in addition proved indisputably in the last decade of the twentieth century with the collapse of this model by justifying so such kind of positions or predictions. Consequently, in the advanced industrialized nations this type of *state-socialism* that appeared in eastern countries is for Marcuse equally absurd as its predecessor. The irony here however is that although this critical marcusian work was making sure about the misery within the system which was leading towards its final collapse, as it happened at the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, it didn't pay heed to it as a warning. In his work for industrial society, the prevailing one-dimensional thought is being thoroughly analyzed by means of subject-object dialectic within the hegelian system. He maintains that the hypostasized

[59] *One-Dimensional Man*, op. cit. p.46.

totality is the particular objective basis one separated force and independent from individuals. That is an established state of affairs which determines people's lives. With this hypostasized totality, he refers, to the permanent synthesis of the material institutions and to the general consciousness, which represents a state of affairs where the object dominates the subject.

Consequently, the totality which in reality is the object itself exercises power and domination upon the individual subject. In this way, the consciousness of autonomy from external factors, which is essential in the meaning of subjectivity and freedom that constitutes the subject to be truly free, is clearly absent. The notion of Marcuse for the one-dimensional society and the one-dimensional man includes the complete acceptance and objectification of the given social forms. It confirms that, the human development has been exhausted in one particular historical and social period and in this way it denies the dialectical transcendence of the subject, imposing on it the objectified totality as the final form of the essence of man and society. In that way, the hypostasized totality becomes the final form of the general whole, of which the acceptance itself diminishes the particular subject in the reified universal object. By denying however this totality, the dialectic gap between reality and potentiality denies the necessary condition for the possibility of human transcendence. The denial of transcendentality which emerges, in marcusean thinking, is achieved by diminishing the distinction between what is true and what is factually real. As he accurately stresses, the cognition has been liberated from the tension between facts and substance, because the world of facts, that empirical world is one-dimensional.[60] The message that marcusean conception eventually conveys is that, since one-dimensional society alters the relations between the rational and the irrational, the ground of the latter is being conclusively turned into a source of rationality. In other words, the true human freedom, the social progress and the true rationality are under this prism absent.

The only outlet out of this intolerable situation is through the critical theory for modern society and the critical stance of the individual against the one-dimensional logic that produces and cultivates the one-dimensional established power. The

[60] Ibid, pp. 42-45.

theoretical approaches of critical thought have confronted this existing situation with the presence of their real forces equally objective and subjective. These forces moved towards the direction of rational and liberated institutions in the established industrial society, with an ultimate aim to obliterate the already existing institutions which have started to become an obstacle to social progress. Marcuse then, as it was noted earlier, does not appear as pessimist as the other theoreticians of the School. This same postwar industrially bourgeois society, in his view, due to its mechanism will bear those forces which will tend to negate it, because they are simply not incorporated into the mechanism of production and consumption. These forces are no others then the various minority youth groups mainly comprised by students and intellectuals. This is equally true today since no other group indicates ability for resistance. His thinking about the overthrow of the bourgeois system exists in his texts and his mind in general mainly when he refers to *Cultural Revolution.*

It appears clearly then for him when he asserts that: "the struggle for different modes of life, seem to be largely dependent on the very liberation from bourgeois culture."[61]The term bourgeois culture refers to the dominant culture from the 16th century to today. The historical subject of such a culture in his sense is not other than the bourgeois class. He states that, "first it was the middle class within the city between the nobility and the farmers along with the primal industrial workers. Then it was the ruling class which confronted the industrial working class during the 19th century. But the bourgeois class that is represented by the culture of that period, in terms of social function and intellectual coherence, is no longer today the ruling class and its culture is not the culture that dominates the advanced capitalist society: neither the material nor the spiritual, artistic culture".[62]

7. Conclusion

As a conclusion then, it becomes evident that the ruling class today in Marcuse's thinking has no culture of its own and it can

[61] *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, op. cit. p.80.
[62] Ibid, pp. 80-81.

neither use nor preserve the bourgeois culture it has inherited. The culture named bourgeois, has been superseded and decomposed, a result not of a cultural revolution and the student uprising in '60s, but rather of the effect of the dynamics of monopoly capitalism that brought this culture in opposition to the demands of survival.[63] The disintegration of the bourgeois culture as a work of the dynamics of later capitalism is the adjustment of culture to the demands of the capitalist system and it is as a set of ideas which is based on an illusive system of deceit. This set of ideas, detaches itself from the superstructure and gets integrated in the commodities and generally in the services of the consumption society of the advanced industrialized world, where they reinforce the false consciousness of good life. If we witness therefore a disintegration of the bourgeois culture, the resistance should not be leveled to bourgeois adaptation and the re-defining of culture. The insurrection, he maintains, should not change its strategy in order to find a solution to the bourgeois contradictions, because 'it annuls thus its aim for qualitatively different, a radically anti-capitalistic culture'.[64]The oppositional strategy should be constant anti-bourgeois in order to reach a real change to the social system. Such an overturn, is not only regarded as necessary by him, but it is also a political issue, because ***politics is the practice through which political institutions are defined, developed, functioning and changing.*** It is therefore that practice of the citizens that they change the institutions through whichever way these citizens are *organized*. Since therefore the above organization of the citizens is founded upon its opposition against private interests, according to this critical thinking, it cannot but ensue a qualitative social change that will create a free rational society. That type of rational society thus is the necessity today in the epoch of information and globalization and the above indications are quite alive and effective.

[63] Ibid, p. 82.
[64] Ibid, pp. 82-83.

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Abstract

The objective of this article is two folded. The one is to carefully review Marcuse's work of "One-Dimensional Man", regarding his investigation on technology, society and individual. The other, to reflect on his thought about the relationship among these categories in the era of late capitalism. The main interest lies on the particular stance and thought of the intellectual of critical theory in order to see how he responded to the problems of his time and how he investigated contemporary man within his social environment. That is, to examine the way he scrutinized the postwar era in the fields of technology and society as well as in the areas of politics

and philosophy. In so doing, we expect to reveal not only how Marcuse viewed the potential resistance of the modern man who lives in such an irrational industrialized world, but to compare this reflection with our times for our clear comprehension concerning the existing reality.

Key Words: *one-dimensional society, social consciousness, negative thinking, revolution, culture and dialectic.*

Nietzsche and Castoriadis's Anaximander

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For all that exists is worthy of perishing.
So it would be better if nothing existed [1].

Whence things have their origin,
Thence also their destruction happens,
According to necessity;
For they give to each other justice and recompense
For their injustice
In conformity with the ordinance of Time [2].

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[1] Nietzsche F. W., *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, 3.5, 76. The quoted lines are from Goethe's *Faust*, Part I, 1339-1341.

[2] Anaximadrus, B. 1 DK: *ἀρχὴν .... εἴρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον .... ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν.*

In this study the only surviving fragment of the philosopher Anaximander (B1 DK), as it is interpreted in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Cornelius Castoriadis, is investigated. This fragment has a protean alternation of its interpretation in absolute analogy to the philosophical subject who defines its meaning. Nietzsche and Castoriadis analyze this text aiming at their own philosophical interest. Finally, does the text of Anaximander suggest an extreme *philosophical nihilism*, the inevitability of the *tragedy* of human existence (Nietzsche) or is it just the foundation of the political theory of human *autonomy* (Castoriadis)? Are these proposals of the later philosophers correct or do they result in a basic misinterpretation? Are there terms and signs within the text of Anaximander, which "escaped" the attention of the later philosophers or deliberately ignored, so that the text could be used as a theoretical basis to their own philosophical purpose? If this hypothesis is true, what is the correct meaning of this Pre-Socratic fragment?

Nietzsche's interpretation[3]

Nietzsche begins the interpretation of anaximandrian fragment with a comparison between the *chaos* (*Χάος*), which Anaxagoras placed before the creation of the world, and the infinity, which Anaximander sets at the beginning of creation. We could be argued that the interpretation of Nietzsche starts from a misconception, because while the *chaos* of Anaxagoras is the opposite of *creation*, the non-existence, the no-creation, the *infinity* (*ἄπειρον*) of Anaximandros is the cause of the creation. Nietzsche starts from this comparison taking into account only the *time* (*Χρόνος*), the time step of creation and not the cause of creation. For Nietzsche the *infinity* of Anaximander is a form of *chaos*, of an indeterminacy, something that can not be defined, the before and after of human natural existence. We don't know

[3] Nietzsche F. W., *Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, Werke in Drei Baenden, Muenchen 1954 (1872-73), Band 3, Ch. 16, (English Translation) *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Vol. 6075, Gateway editions, tnsl. Marianne Cowan, Regnery Gateway, 1996.

where we come from, or where are moving and this ignorance of the before and after is the common, tragic human fate. Nietzsche uses the words of Arthur Schopenhauer to approach close to the interpretation of the mysterious anaximandrian *infinite*:

The proper measure with which to judge any and all human beings is that they are really creatures who should not exist at all and who are doing penance for their lives by their manifold sufferings and their death. What could we expect of such creatures? Are we not all sinners under sentence of death? We do penance for having been born, first by living and then by dying.

Parergis, Vol. II, Chapter 12

Here Nietzsche removed from the common ancient Greek concept of existence, namely that nothing comes from nothing and nothing leads to nothing[4] and decides that everything comes from nothing and all go to nothing. This nothing, this non-being, this nothingness is not for Nietzsche -as possibly for Anaximander- a conclusion of physical observation, the beginning and the end of nature, but a product of human ignorance about the origins and the purpose of our existence. If for Nietzsche *God is dead* as both a human creator and as posthumous destination the earlier and the later nothingness of existence is undeniable. We exist, but because we don't know, nor will we ever know the before and the after of our existence, we are an intermediate existence between the permanence of nothingness.

We must be careful that Nietzsche does not deny the natural existence of anaximandrian infinity. He considers that this infinite as primarily being can exist as the beginning and end of everything. Its indeterminacy, its infinity, its immortality its eternity lies in that it is not has specific quality, perishable characteristics. The infinity is not specific; it is indefinable as opposed to the finite of human and natural becoming (*γίγνεσθαι*). If it was definable, if it was not infinity, and it was completed, it would be a part of the natural world itself and it will not be different from this, and therefore could not be the

[4] Cf. Democritus, A. 1 DK: *μηδέν τε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι.*

matrix and the beginning of the world. But something, which is infinite, can not be adequately determined, can not be a subject of definition. The usefulness of the theory of infinity is not in the natural or metaphysical interpretation of the world, but in a tragic interpretation of it. The infinity as first being or as nothingness -Nietzsche isn't interested in this- is located at the beginning and at the end of everything, between the beginning and the end, between the *genesis* (*γένεσις*) and the *corruption* (*φθορά*) is the existence as *injustice* (*άδικία*) at the *justice* (*δικαιοσύνη*) of chaos, of destruction. Beings pay with the justice of detriment the injustice of their existence. Life is an injustice, a finite between the infinity, the chaos and the indeterminacy. But inversely in the world can not be only the justice, it is necessary to have the injustice as well, the justice of the disaster will always oppose to the injustice of existence, of genesis and all this feed back and end up in the matrix of infinity.

For Nietzsche the infinity of Anaximander is a reasonable interpretation of the world that the eternal becoming, the eternal course from the genesis to corruption must stem from an infinite being, which however must not be identifiable, because it would automatically deduct in the realm of corruption. The real and useful interpretation of the fragment is that if the world is dominated by the justice of corruption, which is binding on all the existent beings remain to benefit the injustice of our existence between the justice of our annihilation. The before and the after should not interest us, it is nothingness, chaos, infinity, non-being, death. But *God is dead*, as the before and the after of existence. So what is left to do as prime unjust beings? We must strive to create as artists our own "injustice" against the justice of wear, to become *supermen*, to transcend our existence by creating –by the authoritarian way of an artist- between the space of our genesis and corruption before subject to us the inescapable of justice of our destruction. For Nietzsche the only value of the injustice of our existence is the active utilization of this, the creation of life on our own measures. Once we treated unfairly, once we broke the eternal law of infinity, of chaos and of indeterminacy and we came to life we must create in our lives for the sake of the life itself. The pessimism and nihilism, i.e. the fear of nothingness exceeded by our practical faith in the injustice of the finite life against the eternity of infinity.

Castoriadis's interpretation

There isn't a cosmic "wording" that dictates the right,
except the wording that recognizes only one right for ever:
death, which is certainly not a right.

Cornelius Castoriadis[5] chooses to deal with this passage of Anaximander to establish its own cosmological vision. For Castoriadis the early Greek thought (Homer, Hesiod, tragic poetry) sets the beginning of everything in Chaos. From there all begin, from the nothingness, and there end up. Placing the fragment of Anaximander in this position Castoriadis identifies the infinity with the chaos, the indeterminacy with the nothingness. The infinity of Anaximander is not an undefined material substrate, which is responsible for the movement and change of everything, but is the chaos that is before and after the movement and change. Also, Castoriadis uses the zeugma *hubris - Justice*, to interpret the text. Justice for Castoriadis is chaos, while the existence is hubris, which should be punished. This view excludes the existence of a natural right, which gives to the beings a natural *measure* (*μέτρο*), an internal *order* and a *harmony*[6]. Instead it promotes the idea that the only natural right that exists is the right of death, of nothingness, because all the beings therein ending according to the eternal law of genesis and corruption. Thus endorsing the interpretation of Nietzsche, Castoriadis interprets the anaximandrian infinity as nothing

[5] Castoriadis C., *Ce qui fait la Grèce, 1. D' Homère à Héraclite Séminaires 1982-1983. La création humaine II*, Seuil, Paris 2004, Ch. X.

[6] Cf. Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* 704b.15-17: *ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ζῴου τὸ ἄριστον.* Cf. Heraclitus. B 123 DK: *Ἡ φύσις καθ' Ἡράκλειτον κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.* - B 54 DK: *ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων.* - B 41 DK: *ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων.* Cf. Vavouras Ilias, 'Plato and Castoriadis: a metering dispute', *Philosophein* (Φιλοσοφεῖν: *ἐπιστήμη, εὔνοια, παρρησία*, Greek Journal), 10, p. 35-50, (2014). Zitros publications.

(nonbeing), as nothingness and puts it in a place of an insurmountable natural right that harmonizes everything with its necessary destruction. The Infinity is the confirmation of the tragedy of existence, the perpetual course from genesis to corruption and the vindication of nothingness.

But the infinity is not necessarily a negative factor for humans, but the chance of *autonomy*. Human civilization is man's exit from the stream of tragedy and of nothingness. Civilization is the result of human collectivity, is the result of policy. The political activity of man creates civilization as a self-instituting, as an autonomous establishment. Man imposes his own measure on things and is not affected by a natural mystic measure, which defines an imposed correctness. The man, the human will is the measure of all things[7]. Since every human will is individual and subjective and therefore relative, objectivity and truth are defined by the majority. Every human decision is valid if it is validated by the majority, therefore democracy is the measure of correctness, since the validation of decisions by the majority only happens in democracies. The more direct democracy is the greater participation of everyone in the shaping of human correctness. Castoriadis presents here the example of the ancient Athenian democracy, which make citizens responsible for the determination of their own destiny. It does not matter whether the decision of the democratic majority is correct or incorrect, important is the autonomy of citizens on the decision. The correctness coincides with autonomy. The citizens democratically determine the laws, the rectum, the justice, the interest and accept the responsibility of their autonomy. Moreover, if a democratic decision proved in fact wrong, the majority itself by accepting the responsibility of its error will check and correct it.

Therefore, the tragic, the infinity, the nothingness intercepted by the introduction of the human civilization that gives the man the possibility of establishing an own measure between of chaos. Human civilization is a limiting factor of the vindication of the chaos[8], a creative injustice against the confirmation of the corruption. Man goes out of the universal stream of nothingness only after he becomes a political being, from the zero point of

[7] Plato, *Theaetetus*. 152a: *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.*

[8] Cf. Sophocles. *Antigone*. 332-375, 353-375.

human policy shift begins a continuous progressive course, which is a great hubris to the justice of nothingness.

Conclusion and critic

Therefore, Nietzsche and Castoriadis start from a common interpretative line regarding the passage of Anaximander. They think that the infinity is identified with chaos, with nothingness, and that the justice of the universe implies the imposition of the corruption. The existence is hubris, an injustice against the justice of the corruption. The corruption, of course, always justified, since all the beings slowly or quickly are led to the inevitable corruption. But between the two nothing, between the earlier chaos and the impending death is the tragic course of all beings from the genesis to corruption. For Nietzsche this interim tragic of human, even it may never be eliminated, may be suspended by the human will to power, the active human creation, which may impose even temporarily -between the genesis and the corruption – its own right, its arrogant right of personal artistic creation, the right of *superman*. To reach the man in the excess of the corruptible self must believe that the infinity, the chaos or in other words the supernatural god are dead, there aren't exist. All that exists is the man, who may impose by his own forces its own subjective justice in the process of becoming. This is the great existential hubris that can attain the man against the justice of tragedy and corruption.

For Castoriadis the infinity of Anaximander is equivalent to the chaos, to the nothingness. This is the eternal cosmic justice, the vindication of the corruption of everything. Man through the political creation suspends the justice of the chaos and establishes the injustice of the existence. The policy and by extension the civilization are the human existential response to the determinism of corruption that governs everything. Since man became a political being and established the sociability began to acquire existence, to putting his own creative position in a progressive, linear, historical route from the zero point to modern times. Every human establishment has value, since it is a product of collective-democratic decision. The meaning isn't so the correctness of a decision, but its autonomy. Humans should

democratically objectify their existence in history. Democracy in its most direct form is the foundation of autonomy and self-instituting, because a collective decision involving the responsibility of the whole community to determine its existence. There isn't an individual without the political matrix, we exist because we are political beings, or more precisely, because we are citizens participating in judgment and in authority, as Aristotle would say[9]. Human civilization and political man are the beginning and the end of existence. Nothing exists if it is not objectified by the civil law of the state, which defines the essence of everything. Man through the creation of the political state becomes the legislator of his existence, who sets -as sophist Protagoras would say- what is and what is not. Political man and precisely citizens of a direct democracy is the measure of the existence of all things.

In an attempt to review these two interpretations we could give our opinion that both Nietzsche and Castoriadis using text Anaximander to serve the purposes of their own philosophical system. Both of them avoid integrating the fragment in the philosophical period, in which it was written, almost forgetting that this is a text of the pre-Socratic natural philosophy. First, Anaximander is a Greek philosopher and could not escape from the general rule of Greek thought that nothing comes from nothing and nothing ends up in nothing. The infinity for Anaximander is a logical response to other cosmological considerations of natural philosophers on the existence of a stable, eternal material substrate (*ὑποκείμενον*), which is responsible for the change. Therefore, the infinity could not be identified with the nothingness but with the essence of being. If Anaximander gave to the infinity qualities he would equate it with the matter and would therefore classify it in the same ontological level with it. So he just gave to infinity the basic characteristic of indeterminacy. Instead, both interpretations divert the importance of text on the anthropological level, equating infinity with nothingness. Thus, human life becomes tragic if it moving fated to corruption. Second, the chaos does not mean nothingness for the Greeks, but lack of form. We recall the cases of Anaxagoras and Plato, where the creation of the world is

[9] Aristotle, *Politics*, 1275a: *πολίτης δ΄ ἁπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς.*

not made out of nothing but the creative mind formats the existing amorphous material[10]. The creator is limited by the nature of the material and that is why the world is not infinite but finite. Thirdly, both interpretations do not penetrate on two important phrases of the text: *According to necessity* and *in conformity with the ordinance of Time*. Identifying the infinity with nothingness, Nietzsche and Castoriadis leave entirely to human jurisdiction to regulate the human existence between the initial and final chaos. For Nietzsche the will to power is the will to preserve the existence and this means the every way predominance of the powerful man, he expresses the continuous fight to predominance in the tragic course of life. For Castoriadis the autonomy of man is achieved by the political self-determination of man through the democratic decision-making. But the two phrases, which are contained in the text, do not leave completely free the attempt of philosophical interpretation. They show that in the existential injustice is opposed to justice of chaos there is a necessity and an ordinance, which determines the course of things. Between genesis and corruption there is a natural measure, a natural right that defines the natural beings. The necessity and ordinance define a rightness, an order and not a chaos that we regulate, as we want. Therefore, man as a part of the world, as a natural being can not act arbitrarily, but must find means of logical order and necessity that govern everything but his own existence and according to this to adjust his life. Under this interpretation the text of Anaximander moves in the place Greek philosophy, which recognizes that in the nature of beings is a natural measure, an ordinance and a necessity and the meaning of philosophy is just there: to diagnose and apply the natural regularity in the human condition.

[10] Anaxagoras, A. 1 DK: *πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν*. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 47e-48a: *μεμειγμένη γὰρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη· νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτῃ κατὰ ταῦτά τε δι΄ ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος οὕτω κατ΄ ἀρχὰς συνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν. εἴ τις οὖν ᾗ γέγονεν κατὰ ταῦτα ὄντως ἐρεῖ, μεικτέον καὶ τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας, ᾗ φέρειν πέφυκεν.*

Philosophical Notes

* * *

Truth and falsity in *De Anima* and the Simplicius interpretation

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The Aristotelian treatise *De Anima* and the philosophical game of the truth and falsity

The philosophical game between truth and falsity, as it is presented in the Aristotelian treatise *De Anima (Περί Ψυχῆς)*, is inextricably intertwined with the relationship among the senses, the mind, and imagination as a whole and with the truth, which is not always feasible to be defined.

Sensus (*aisthêsis*): The Philosopher supports that the aesthetic comprises part of the soul, which can renders us capable to develop critical thinking. Hence, the sensibile (*aisthêton*), cannot be felt with another sense, but only with a specific one. The sensible is true or it contains minor falsity (ἡ

αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τό ψεῦδος)[1]. However, the senses may be incorrect, when referring to common sense and *symbebikothta*. For instance, when we see a person, we do not simply realize that he or she is a human, but we conclude that this person is for example the son of Diari or the son of Kleon, based on his color[2]. Thus, conclusions regarding the substance (*ousia*, human) are made based only on color, but the color comprises an object of the vision.

Consequently, the first action, which is based on what someone couldn't sense with another sense (ἴδιον) is always true. In contrast, the other two, in which the falsehood is possible, especially when the sensible (αἰσθητικόν) is located at a distance.

Imagination (*phantasia*): Imagination according to Aristotle, is determined as a motion, which derives from the senses, but it carries a mediating role between the senses and the mind[3]. Imagination is the part of the soul, which is connected with the ability to critically judge. Whilst, the senses are always true, *phantasmata* are mostly incorrect. We don't for example say "I imagine this is a human", when we are sure about something, but when we could say it, when we lack of clarity or precision regarding our comprehension[4].

Mind (intellectus, nous): The mind receives data and makes judgments due to the senses and *phantasia*. The mind can compose this initial information through a logical judgment and observe the numerous synthesis of reality. During that combinational function of logical judgment, the combinations that take place may not correspond to the combinations of reality. The philosopher claims that falsity derives from the incorrect synthesis of reality. Therefore, based on that fact that there is no pathological or mental condition affecting, the world constitutes a precise reflection of the senses and the mind.

[1] Aristotle, *De Anima*, 428b 18-19, 427b 12-13, 430b 30.
[2] Ibid., 428b 18-30.
[3] Ibid., 429a.
[3] Ibid., 433a 1-30.
[4] Ibid., 428a 1-11.

The Simplicious's Commentary

The Simplicious's Commentary[5] or for others Priskianou Lidou in the Aristotelian treatise "De Anima" may be characterized as the oldest and most complete. The author supports that his ideas or others philosophical views correspond with the Aristotelian philosophy.

Simplicius, as Aristotle agrees on the fact that the perception of the objects of each sense is true or contains minor falsity[6]. However, the senses may be false, when they refer to common sense and s*ymbebikothta*[7]. Within the Aristotelian book, the commentator supports that the imagination cannot always be true[8]. In addition, imagination seems to follow the senses, in order to define true or falsity.[9].

The mind (intellectus, nous) according to Simplicius is divided into material or passive (*ὑλικό, παθητικό*), middle or second (μέσο ή δεύτερο, *νοῦ ἐν προβολῇ*) and the first, supra mind (*κορυφαῖος, πρῶτος οὐσιώδης λόγος, πρῶτο γνωστόν, πρώτη γνῶσις, θύραθεν, ὕπερθεν νοῦς*), which is coincide with the truth. The second kind of mind engages with life and is perfectly completed by the superior form of the mind[10] .

The first kind of mind is never true or false (*πρῶτον γνωστόν, πρῶτος οὐσιώδης λόγος, ή πρώτη γνῶσις)*[11], but only true, because it holds the substance (*ousia*) of things[12]. During its entry in the second kind of mind, it leaves something of itself (*παραθραύεται κατ' οὐσίαν*)[13]. However, the mind does not leave all of his features or itself, but it traces the

[5] M. Perkams, ''Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the "De Anima" in the Tradition of Iamblichus'', *Mnemosyne*, Vol. 58, 2005, p. 510-530 και Hadot I., ''Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima" (CAGXI)'', *Mnemosyne*, Vol. 55, 2002, p. 159-199.

[6] Simplicius, *Aristotelis De Anima*, 203. 23-24

[7] Ibid., 182. 16-20.

[8] Ibid., 215 31-34. 215 31-34.

[9] Ibid., 215 31-34. 216. 1-7.

[10] Ibid., 234.24-28.

[11] Ibid., 219. 20-25.

[12] Ibid., 261.1-8.

[13] Ibid., 220. 2-4..

mental midway (*mesôtes*, μέσος ἐκ τοῦ μεριστοῦ καί ἀμερίστου)[14].

Although, Aristotle makes the distinction between passive and active mind (*παθητικός-θεωρητικός νοῦς*), Simplicius, distinguishes between material and passive *(ὑλικός, παθητικός)*, middle or second (*μέσος, δεύτερος, νοῦς ἐν προβολῇ)* and the first, superior mind (*ὕπερθεν*), which notes the difference between the human and the divine mind (*ἄνθρώπινος-θεῖος νοῦς*). Hence, Simplicius seems to introduce a third kind of mind, which is divine (*θεῖος νοῦς*) and does not exist in Aristotelian text. In essence, the divine mind is for Simplicius source of truth and knowledge. Consequently, Simplicius in his analysis harmonizes the truth with the divine mind and it is not based on the combinations of data, which derive from the sense perceptions (*αἰσθήσεις, aisthêseis*), imagination (*φαντασία, phantasia*) and mind (*νοῦς, nous, intellect*), as Aristotle suggests.

[14] Ibid., 220.4-6.

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Abstract

The purpose of the current study is to discover the philosophical game between truth and falsity, as it is presented in the Aristotelian treatise *De Anima (Περί Ψυχῆς)* and in the Simpliciu's Commentary on Aristotle's text, which is included in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (or C.A.G.). For this reason the purpose would be to examine the relation between the philosophical question and the sense perceptions (*aesthêticon*), imagination (*phantasia*) and the mind (*nous*). In the second chapter of the article there is a reference to Simplicius Commentary. The main finding is that in Simplicius the truth is harmonized with the superior kind of the mind (ὕπερθεν νοῦς).

Key words: Aristotle, *De Anima*, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Simplicius

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